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ABSTRACTS

FROM POPULISM TO NEOLIBERALISM

LABOR UNIONS AND MARKET REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA

By M. VICTORIA MURILLO

In the late 1980s, populist labor parties, which had advanced protectionism and state intervention in the postwar period, implemented market-oriented reforms in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. In all three countries, market reforms hurt their union allies. The interaction between allied unions and governing labor parties, however, varied across countries and across sectors within the same country. While some unions endorsed neoliberal reforms, others rejected them despite their long-term alliance with governing parties. While some unions obtained concessions, others failed to do so.

This article argues that the incentives created by partisan loyalties, partisan competition, and union competition explain these interactions. Partisan loyalty results from the long-term affiliation of unions with a political party. Partisan competition takes place among union leaders affiliated with different political parties for the control of unions. Union competition occurs in diverse national and sectoral contexts among labor organizations for the representation of the same workers. Loyalty derived from a long-term affiliation with the incumbent party facilitates collaboration between labor unions and the government. Yet, if partisan competition makes loyal union leaders afraid of being replaced by activists affiliated with the opposition parties, their incentives for militancy increase as a way of showing their responsiveness to the rank and file hurt by market reforms. Union competition for the representation of the same workers makes coordination more difficult, thereby weakening unions and making them less likely to obtain concessions from the government despite their partisan loyalty. The article presents empirical evidence from eighteen cases, including national confederations and individual unions in five economic sectors in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela to test this theory.

CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS

INDUSTRIALISTS, LABOR, AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATE-DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

By EVA BELLIN

Many classic works of political economy have identified capital and labor as the champions of democratization during the first wave of transition. By contrast, this article argues for the contingent nature of capital and labor's support for democracy, especially in the context of late development. The article offers a theory of democratic contingency, proposing that a few variables, namely, state dependence, aristocratic privilege, and social fear account for much of the variation found in class support for democratization both across and within cases. Conditions associated with late development make capital and labor especially prone to diffidence about democratization. But such diffidence is subject to change, especially under the impact of international economic integration, poverty-reducing social welfare policies, and economic growth that is widely shared. Case material from Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, Zambia, Brazil, Tunisia and other countries is offered as evidence.

THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By DANIEL PHILPOTT

The Protestant Reformation was a crucial spring of modern international relations. Had it never occurred, a system of sovereign states would not have arrived, at least not in the form or at the time that it did at the Peace of Westphalia. This is the counterfactual the author seeks to sustain. He first advances an elaborated but qualified defense of the conventional wisdom that Westphalia is the origin of modern international relations. He then accounts for how Protestant ideas exerted influence through transforming identities and exercising social power. Structural theories, emphasizing changes in material power, are skeptical of this account. The author roots his empirical defense of ideas in the strong correlation between Reformation crises and polities'

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interests in Westphalia. A description of the historical causal pathways running from ideas to political interest then follows. Germany and France are brought as cases to illustrate two of these pathways. Finally, the author shows the evidentiary weakness of alternative structural material explanations.

The Many Voices of Political Culture

Assessing different approaches

By RICHARD W. WILSON

Works in political culture have employed a variety of approaches with different assumptions and methodologies. Commentary on the field, however, generally fails to take account of these differences or to assess the merits of the different approaches. Recent works that typify five different approaches are evaluated in terms of the ways that they conceptualize preference formation and the linkage between preferences and cultural norms. The tendency in most approaches to conflate preferences and norms points to the need for further theoretical development.

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FROM POPULISM TO NEOLIBERALISM
Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Latin America

By M. VICTORIA MURILLO*

A Tale of Three Carloses

CARLOS Salinas, Carlos Andrés Pérez, and Carlos Menem were inaugurated between December 1988 and July 1989 as presidents of Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina, respectively. They not only shared the timing of their administrations[1] but also the task of turning populist labor parties toward neoliberalism. All three had been the candidates of populist labor-based parties that had advanced protectionism and state intervention in the postwar period. Once in office and facing tremendous fiscal crises and capital flight, all three presidents reduced state intervention and opened the economies of their countries. This shift in development strategy not only was the most important policy turnaround of the postwar era in all three Latin American countries, but it also moved their labor-based parties away from the policies upon

*Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the twenty-first meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, September 24–26, 1998, and at the conference "Space, Place, and Nation: Reconstructing Neoliberalism in the Americas," University of Massachusetts, Amherst, November 20–21, 1998. I would like to thank Arun Agrawal, Ernesto Cabrera, Ernesto Calvo, Javier Corrales, Miguel Glatzer, Miriam Golden, Pauline Jones-Luong, Robert Kaufman, Steven Levitsky, James McGuire, Nicoli Nattrass, Phillip Oxhorn, Héctor Schamis, Jeremy Sikkins, and four anonymous reviewers for helpful comments to previous versions of this paper, and Antonieta Mercado for her research assistance in Mexico. I would also like to thank Alberto Alesina, Robert Bates, David Cameron, John Coatsworth, Jorge Domínguez, Geoffrey Garrett, Peter Hall, Ian Shapiro, Juan Carlos Torre, and Deborah Yashar, who provided useful comments to clarify the ideas presented in this paper. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Mellon Foundation, the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University, as well as the Institute for the Study of World Politics. I also want to acknowledge the institutional support of the Department of Political Science at Yale University; the Instituto Torcuato Di Tella in Argentina; the IESA in Venezuela; the Colegio de México, Flacso, and ITAM, and Intelmex in Mexico.

[1] Salinas was president of Mexico from the end of 1988 to the end of 1994, and Carlos Andrés Pérez was president of Venezuela from the beginning of 1989 to mid-1993. To hold the international conditions constant in the comparison with Mexico and Venezuela, I analyze the first administration of Carlos Menem in Argentina, which ran from mid-1989 to mid-1995.

World Politics 52 (January 2000), 135–74

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which their historic relationships with long-term union allies had been built.

Despite the parallel convergence of labor-based populism turning into neoliberalism and the common challenge faced by unions in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, union responses to neoliberal reforms were diverse. Union-government interactions varied across these countries and across sectors within the same country. For instance, the Mexican Workers' Confederation subordinated to Salinas's policies, endorsing them in corporatist pacts and even campaigning actively for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). To the contrary, the Venezuelan Workers' Confederation opposed Perez's reforms by organizing the first economic general strikes in the history of Venezuela. Argentine teachers unsuccessfully resisted the decentralization of schools; their militancy accounted for more than a third of the total strikes in the two years before the government, with no union input, finally implemented the reform. In Mexico, however, teachers successfully opposed key pieces of the decentralization process and limited its scope. Meanwhile, Mexican telephone workers negotiated with their government to support the privatization of their company in return for job stability, handsome social benefits, and easy financing for the purchase of almost 5 percent of the shares in the company.

Such variation in union-government interactions in response to market-oriented reforms has considerable political importance. First, unions can organize support for or opposition to the reforms, thus changing the costs of reform for policymakers. Their actions can affect the feasibility, design, and implementation of reforms, as shown by the delays in the reform of labor market regulations in all three countries. Unions should therefore be included in the analysis of the politics of economic reforms.

Second, unions can have a direct impact on the governance of administrations led by labor-based political parties. Unions not only have organized the core constituency of labor-based parties and provided them with political machines for electoral campaigns, but they also have shared a long-term partisan identity with governing politicians. As a result, the interaction between unions and labor-based parties implementing market-oriented reforms can influence the future of the electoral coalition that brought these parties to power. Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela are key cases in that regard because the alliance between unions and labor-based parties had shaped the national party system fifty years earlier.[2]

[2] Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

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Thus, a theory that accounts for the cross-sectoral and cross-national variations in union-government interactions in these countries can help solve the puzzle of the transition from closed to open economies in Latin America.[3] Moreover, an explanation of such variation has broad comparative implications for our understanding of similar stories in other regions of the world where the pressure of globalization turned labor-parties toward policies that challenged their long-standing agreements with labor allies.

Theories of union politics suggest that union behavior varies according to either differences in national-level institutions or interests of economic sectors with regard to market policies and international integration. Yet, in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, the interactions between unions and labor-based governments over market-oriented reforms cut across national borders and sectoral cleavages. Explanations based on either economic interest or national institutions are thus insufficient to understand such patterns of interaction. I argue instead that the incentives created by partisan loyalties, partisan competition, and union competition explain these interactions. Partisan loyalty results from the long-term affiliation of a union with a political party. Partisan competition is the struggle for control of the unions among union leaders affiliated with different political parties. Union competition is the rivalry among labor organizations for the representation of the same workers, which can take place in diverse national and sectoral contexts. Loyalty derived from a long-term affiliation with the incumbent party facilitates collaboration between labor unions and the government. Yet, if loyal union leaders are afraid of being replaced by activists affiliated with the opposition parties because of partisan competition, their incentives for militancy increase to show their responsiveness to the rank and file hurt by market reforms. Union competition for the representation of the same workers makes coordination more difficult thereby weakening unions and making them less likely to obtain concessions from the government despite their partisan loyalty. I use the empirical evidence from eighteen cases, including national confederations and individual unions in five economic sectors in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela to test this theory.

The article is divided into six sections. The first section introduces the policy shift of labor-based parties from populism to neoliberalism

[3] The politics of Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela have a strong effect in Latin America and the Caribbean. By 1995 they made up 32 percent of the regional population, 43 percent of the regional gross domestic product, and 48 percent of regional exports. Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 357–61.

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in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. The second examines the relevant literature upon which I build my analysis. The third describes the patterns of union-government interaction in the context of market-oriented reforms. The fourth presents my hypothesis for explaining those patterns. The fifth section reports the test of my hypothesis on the case studies, and the last offers some conclusions.

From Populism to Neoliberalism

On October 17, 1945, a multitude of workers organized by their unions marched into downtown Buenos Aires to demand the release of imprisoned Colonel Juan Perón and to defend the social legislation he had implemented as secretary of labor. In the elections of February 1946, the Labor Party—organized by the leaders of those same unions—led the political coalition that elected Perón to the presidency. Most workers voted for Perón and taught their children to be Peronist, creating one of the strongest partisan loyalties in Latin America. After all, Perón and the Peronist unions had changed their lives by providing better wages and labor benefits, social security, and even paid vacations at union resorts. Since labor benefits compensated them for previous frustration in dealing with indifferent employers and hostile governments, the unions identified with Peronism and served as Peronist political machines. Peronism, which became the symbol of workers' rights, promoted import substitution industrialization and state intervention as development strategies.[4] It also turned unions into key players in the Argentine political system.

In 1989 a Peronist candidate, Carlos Menem, won the presidential elections. During his populist electoral campaign, Menem promised wage hikes and social justice, and he threatened not to pay the external debt. After his inauguration, however, he delivered austerity, followed by trade liberalization, privatization, and adjustment of the public sector. As state intervention had done forty years earlier, the retreat of the state and market-oriented reforms reshaped state-society relations. The national labor confederation, the Peronist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT), although surprised by the policy turnaround, accepted market-oriented reforms and reduced the number of general

[4] Import substitution industrialization (ISI) was a development strategy adopted by most Latin American countries after the Great Depression. They originally raised tariffs to compensate for the shortage of foreign exchange produced by the crisis, but this policy gradually evolved into active protectionism that included subsidized exchange rates for importing inputs with closed markets. ISI created few incentives for developing internationally competitive industries and, thus, exporting.

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strikes from thirteen against the previous administration of the Civic Radical Union (UCR) (1983–89) to only one under the first Menem administration (1989–95). Peronist unions, though, were able to negotiate concessions on the reforms of social security, labor legislation, and privatization.

In Mexico during the same period, the story of the policy turnaround of labor parties in government was similar to that in Argentina. Unions entered the political arena during the Mexican Revolution. They first formed six "Red Battalions" that fought with the army of President Venustiano Carranza in 1915. In 1919 they organized a Labor Party, which supported the elections of Presidents Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco E. Calles. In return, unions obtained political appointments and favorable labor legislation to compensate for their weakness in collective bargaining with private employers. In 1936 President Lázaro Cárdenas promoted the organization of the Mexican Workers Confederation (CTM). In 1938 he founded the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) and integrated labor into its functional structure. Unions became political machines for the PRM, which would become the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and were included in the party structure. Unions also gave Cárdenas a suitable excuse—in the form of a labor conflict—for the nationalization of oil in 1938. In return, workers received social benefits, and union leaders gained political influence they could use in the industrial arena. The PRI also implemented policies of import substitution industrialization while using the state as the main instrument for economic development.

Half a century later, however, PRI labor leaders witnessed a PRI president, Carlos Salinas, become the champion of economic liberalization, state shrinkage, and market-oriented reforms. The main national confederation, the PRI-dominated CTM, explicitly supported Salinas's stabilization plan and structural reforms both in the annual corporatist pacts signed with government and business representatives and in an agreement to increase labor productivity signed in 1992. Moreover, it campaigned for Salinas's proposal to integrate Mexico into NAFTA. In spite of the CTM's acquiescence, the administration ignored most of its demands even while paying lip service to the alliance between the PRI and the labor movement.

During the same period, a similar story of policy turnaround was being written in Venezuela, where Democratic Action (AD) had traditionally been a champion of democracy and nationalism as well as of union organization. During its first administration (1946–48), AD promoted an upsurge in union organization and social mobilization.

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Democratic Action union leaders promoted the founding of the Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV), and its labor bureau integrated union leaders into the party structure. Unions provided AD with political machines while channeling workers' loyalty and supporting AD development policies based on state intervention and import substitution industrialization. In return, AD administrations provided workers with social and labor benefits, and union leaders with political influence.

In 1988 AD union leaders endorsed the populist Carlos Andrés Pérez in the primaries of AD and in his campaign for the presidency. Pérez extended state intervention, established a minimum wage, and made dismissals more difficult during his first administration in the 1970s. After his inauguration in February 1989, however, he surprised foes and followers with his announcement of the "Great Turnaround." The Great Turnaround included trade liberalization, macroeconomic adjustment, and structural reforms of the state. The response of Perez's union allies to his reforms differed from that encountered by his Argentinean and Mexican counterparts. The AD-controlled CTV responded to his policy shift by organizing the first economic general strike in Venezuelan history, followed by a series of demonstrations and other strikes that boycotted most of Pérez's reforms in the labor and social sectors. Opposition by the CTV resulted in diverse concessions related to labor-market and social-security reforms until the government reformist intentions receded under the pressure of social protests and two failed military coups.

The Policy Turnaround and the Challenge for Labor Unions

These convergent policy turnarounds in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela resulted from the failure of strategies based on state intervention and import substitution industrialization. The 1982 debt crisis highlighted their strategic limitations while it worsened fiscal deficits and balance-of-payment difficulties. Macroeconomic instability and recession followed during the 1980s, the "lost" decade. By the end of the eighties, incumbent populist labor-based parties in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela had shifted toward market-oriented reforms.[5] Accord-

[5] Market-oriented reform included short-term stabilization measures, fiscal restraint, tax reform, financial liberalization, competitive exchange and interest rates, trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation of most markets, including the labor market. See John Williamson, *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990).

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ing to Cukierman and Tommasi, labor-based parties have a comparative advantage in implementing market-oriented policies that bring uncertainty to their constituencies because they enjoy their trust.[6] That is, they are more credible when they claim that it was the exogenous shock rather than ideology that had induced them to implement market-oriented reforms. Yet, to bring capital back into their economies, labor-based parties in government have to overcome business's distrust of their previous populist character. Their policies, therefore, should be more drastic to show their new commitment to the market.

Drastic market reforms, though, had costs for labor unions and workers whose influence had developed based on state expansion, protectionism, rigid labor markets, and political clout. Trade liberalization increased differences among workers across and within sectors, making it harder to organize labor unions based on horizontal solidarity. International competition and privatization also provoked labor restructuring and layoffs in sectors that had been among the most highly unionized in the past, thus reducing the relative influence of unions. Higher unemployment hurt union bargaining power and increased job instability for union constituencies.[7] Stabilization policies that relied on wage restraint and international competition further reduced their wage bargaining power.[8] Moreover, the reform of social and labor regulations challenged institutions that had provided unions with legal and political clout—from appointments on social security boards to monopolies of representation—which they would not have been able to achieve based solely on their industrial power. More importantly, mar-

[6] Alex Cukierman and Mariano Tommasi, "Credibility of Policymakers and of Economic Reform," in Federico Sturzenegger and Tommasi, eds., *The Political Economy of Reform* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).

[7] In Argentina, according to the permanent household surveys of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), unemployment increased from 6.5 percent in 1988 to 18.6 percent in 1995. In Venezuela unemployment rose from 6.9 percent in 1988 to 9.6 percent in 1989 and 10.4 percent in 1990, although it fell to 6.5 percent in 1993. See Keila Betancourt, Samuel Freije, and Gustavo Márquez, *Mercado labora: Instituciones y regulaciones* (Labor markets: Institutions and regulations) (Caracas: IESA, 1995), 5. In Mexico, according to the International Labour Organisation, (ILO), unemployment measurements are highly contentious, but open unemployment peaked in 1983 and 1984. See ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* (Geneva; ILO, various years). In addition, the combined official rate of open unemployment and underemployment grew from 6.8 percent in 1989 to 8 percent in 1994. See Carlos Salinas de Gortari, *VI Informe de Gobierno* (VI State of the union) (Mexico City: Presidencia de la Nación, 1994).

[8] In Argentina, hyperinflation cut manufacture real wages by 36.3 percent between January 1989 and March 1991. Even after the success of stabilization, manufacture real wages fell by 12 percent between April 1989 and June 1995. Consejo Ténico de Inversiones, *La economía argentina:. Anuario 1997* (The Argentine economy: Yearbook 1997) (Buenos Aires: CTI, 1997), 65. In Venezuela the real industrial wage fell 35 percent in the 1989–93 period. Unido Industrial Statistics Database, 3-digit (1998). In Mexico real wages in manufacturing had dropped by almost 40 percent between 1982 and 1988, and despite improvements during the Salinas administration, they did not recover their 1982 level. ILO (fn 7).

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ket reforms introduced a high degree of uncertainty about the future positions of union constituencies in the labor market, which often induced them to reject the changes. All these effects were more acute in the sectors that had previously enjoyed high levels of protection from competition (such as the public and the manufacture sectors).

In spite of the effect of market-oriented reforms on unionized labor, incumbent labor-based parties and their allied unions in Venezuela, Mexico, and Argentina had strong incentives to bargain with each other. Both sides preferred to avoid costly militancy and to be governed by labor-based parties rather than by other parties implementing the reforms. Yet, while some of the unions discussed in this study collaborated with their allied parties in government, others engaged in costly militant activities, and some of them undermined the governance of labor-based administrations. What conditions explain labor loyalty to or betrayal of long-term party allies? Furthermore, the success of labor unions in obtaining their objectives was varied, whether they chose restraint or militancy. Why did government officials grant concessions in some cases and not in others?

Interest, Institutions, and Comparative Analysis

Various bodies of literature provide important insights into these questions. Interest-based theories have focused on classes, factors, and sectors as the unit of analysis. These demand-driven theories derive the policy preferences of different actors from their economic interests, explaining policies as a result of these demands.[9] Some of them focus on the effect of globalization and market-oriented reforms on the economic interest of diverse sectors, such as exposed and protected or public and private.[10] According to these theories, the policy preferences of

[9] Jeffry Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45 (Autumn 1991); Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[10] For example, Frieden presents a general argument about sector-driven policy preferences and applies it to unions and exchange rate policies. Frieden (Ibid.); and idem, "Labor and Politics of Exchange Rates: The Case of the European System," in Sanford Jacoby, ed., *The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1995). Peter Swenson focuses on cross-class coalitions based on sector-level preferences with regard to collective bargaining decentralization and state adjustment. Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In, Or Social Democracy Reconsidered," *World Politics* 43 (July 1991). The Latin American literature uses a similar logic to explain populist coalitions between urban workers and industrialists producing for the domestic market based on the transfer of resources from exporting to protected sectors for import substitution industrialization. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina* (Dependency and development in Latin America) (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1969); and Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973).

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employees (and employers) in the internationally exposed (or protected) sectors are based on their economic interests in international markets or their dependence on state subsidies. These theories provide a robust account of the origin of union preferences, based on union interests vis-à-vis economic liberalization. These theories, however, present some empirical limitations for explaining the patterns of interaction in my case studies because I found variation within sectors that share a common economic interest. For instance, although both Mexico and Venezuela are oil exporters and oil production in both is monopolized by the state, their oil workers' unions reacted to management attempts to increase labor productivity very differently.

Interest-based theories overlook the effect of institutions on shaping social demands. Institutional variables influence the bargaining power of unions and their relationship with governments. In particular, explanations based on the economic interest of unions alone cannot account for the influence of populist legacies or of organizations on members who are uncertain about the effect of market-oriented reforms on their future interests. Institutional analyses focus either on "formal-public institutions" that influence the responses of governments to social demands or on "socioeconomic institutions" that shape the distributional pressures from social organizations.[11] Regarding formal-public institutions, the recent literature on the politics of economic liberalization centers on policymakers and looks at the capacity of governments to control social demands that may derail market-oriented reforms.[12] Regarding socioeconomic institutions, the literature on corporatism emphasizes the effect of macrolevel organizational variables, including union internal dynamics and long-term partisan alliances, on union

[11] Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change," in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[12] Volumes by Joan Nelson, Steven Haggard and Robert Kaufman, and Dani Rodrik assume that liberalization has concentrated costs and diffused benefits, making it difficult to organize collective action in support of reform. Nelson, ed., *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, *Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Haggard and Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); idem, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Rodrik "Understanding Economic Reform," *Journal of Economic Literature* 36 (March 1996). Therefore, the management of reform implies the thwarting of societal resistance and the insulation of reformist policymakers. Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy and Carlos Acuña and William Smith also point out the combination of repression, co-optation, and insulation by skillful policymakers for the implementation of market reforms for Latin America. Conaghan and Malloy, *Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Acuña and Smith, "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform," in Smith, Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra, eds., *Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994).

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preferences and strategies vis-à-vis governments.[13] The West European version of corporatism assumes open economies and societal corporatism. The Latin American version assumes closed economies and puts greater emphasis on the use of state institutions to control labor organization.[14]

While interest-based theories disregard institutions, macrolevel institutional analysis does not sufficiently explain variation in union behavior within the same country.[15] My case studies, though, show diversity in the union-government interaction within each country. Hence, following a path set by Pizzorno and Crouch[16] and reexamined by the recent comparative literature on union politics and the effects of globalization or market reforms on different sectors and across different countries,[17] I shift the focus of analysis to unions as organizations and to their interactions with governments in a variety of contexts. I pro-

[13] A number of scholars have analyzed the effect of union density and concentration, centralization of wage bargaining, and partisan affiliation on union behavior. See, for example, Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," *Review of Politics* 36 (January 1974); David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," and Peter Lange, "Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Centralization and Wage Bargaining," *Economic Policy* 3 (April 1988); R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," *American Political Science Review* 85 (June 1991); and Peter Lange and George Tsebelis, "Strikes around the World: A Game Theoretic Approach," in Jacoby (fn. 10).

[14] In Schmitter's original definition, organized interests in "societal" corporatism emerged more autonomously from the state than in "state" corporatism. In the comparative Latin American literature, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier emphasize state "incorporation" of labor, and Francisco Zapata stresses the deeply political character of union activity resulting from the high degree of state intervention. Country studies confirm this view. In particular, these three countries are classified by both Zapata and Collier and Collier as having historically high levels of state intervention and legal benefits for formal workers. Collier and Collier (fn. 3); idem, "Inducement versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" *American Political Science Review* 73 (December 1979); Zapata, *El conflicto sindical en América Latina* (Labor conflict in Latin America) (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1986); and idem, *Autonomía y subordinación en el sindicalismo latinoamericano* (Autonomy and subordination of Latin American unionism) (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993).

[15] Katrina Burgess's dissertation, an institutionalist work on the reshaping of the alliance between organized labor and labor parties, focuses on the external costs created by political parties on the decision making of unions at the national level. Instead, I propose to analyze the internal dynamics of unions and the effect of competition for leadership or for members on their relations with political parties. Burgess, "Alliances under Stress: Economic Reform and Party-Union Relations in Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1998).

[16] Allesandro Pizzorno, "Political Exchange and Collective Identity," in Colin Crouch and Pizzorno eds., *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968*, vol. 2 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978); and Crouch, *Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Fontana Paperback, 1982).

[17] Volumes edited by Miriam Golden and Jonas Pontusson and by Christopher Candland and Rudra Sil provide a nice sample of new work in this direction for the developed and the developing world respectively. Golden and Pontusson, eds., *Bargaining for Change: Union Politics in North America and Europe* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Candland and Sil, eds., *Industrial Relations in the Age of Globalization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

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pose a partisan theory of union-government interactions that can be applied both to national confederations across countries and to individual unions in different sectors within the same country by focusing on the interaction of variables that can be singled out in different contexts. The comparison across countries and sectors allows me to isolate the effect of interest at the sector level and of institutions at the national level.

Patterns of Union-Government Interaction

The interaction between unions and governments involves either union militancy or restraint and the capacity to obtain concessions from the government through these means. Militancy here means union-organized protest that affects labor relations; it is the most usual measurement of union behavior. Militancy can disrupt production and undermine governance, especially of labor-based parties who are in power because part of their electoral appeal is based on their control of labor. Militancy is usually measured by counting the number of strikes, their duration, and their scope. Repertoires of protest vary, however, depending on institutional and cultural legacies. [18] Other means of protest include demonstrations, boycotts, sabotage, hunger strikes, sit-ins, and the like.

The interaction does not end with union militancy or restraint because the government can respond by granting or refusing concessions. Since militancy is costly for unions, union leaders prefer to threaten industrial action rather than actually to exercise it. If the union is strong, this threat should suffice to obtain concessions from the government because conflict also involves costs for the government. Yet, some strong unions choose militancy to achieve their demands despite the cost. Indeed, even weak unions that have more to lose and less to win from labor conflict sometimes opt for "heroic defeats," to borrow Golden's metaphor.[19]

To understand this apparent irrationality in the behavior of unions as well as its effect (if any) on the government granting them concessions, I combined the reactions of both actors into four possible inter-

[18] Due to the effect of institutional and cultural constraints, militancy was measured using diverse forms. For instance, the meaning of a general strike in Argentina, where they have occurred often in the past—even under Peronist administrations—is different from that of a general strike in Venezuela, where there were no antecedents of such means of protest for economic demands. See James W. McGuire, *Peronism without Peron: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997); and Steve Ellner, *Organized Labor in Venezuela, 1958–1991* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1993).

[19] Miriam Golden, *Heroic Defeats: The Politics of Job Loss* (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1997).

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TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF POSSIBLE UNION-GOVERNMENT INTERACTIONS

	No Militancy	*Militancy*
Concessions	Successful restraint or "cooperation"	Successful militancy or "opposition"
No concessions	Unsuccessful restraint or "subordination"	Unsuccessful militancy or "resistance"

actions. Four categories resulted from the combination: successful militancy or "opposition," unsuccessful militancy or "resistance," successful restraint or "cooperation," and unsuccessful restraint or "subordination." The classification is presented in Table 1.

I applied this classification to the main national labor confederations in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, as well as to unions in five economic sectors deeply affected by market reforms: automobile, education, electricity, oil, and telecommunications.[20] The national labor confederations were the Argentine CGT, the Mexican CTM, and the Venezuelan CTV.[21] The individual unions organized sectors that were under state management, with the exception of the automobile sector, which enjoyed preferential protection in all three countries.[22] These sectors were chosen because their previous conditions strengthened their bargaining power during the period of protectionism but made them more vulnerable to economic liberalization and state retrenchment. This research design facilitates comparisons across countries, sectors, and even different levels of union organization and facilitates the isolation of the common effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables in these diverse contexts. Since about half of the unions experienced a change in strategy during the period under dis-

[20] National confederations are multisectoral economy-wide organizations to which industry-specific unions adhere.

[21] In all three countries, I compare the responses of the main national confederations to a set of policies: stabilization, privatization, trade liberalization, social security, changes in the regulations for labor organization, and labor market flexibility.

[22] The unions involved in the study in Argentina were the Union of Automobile Workers (SMATA), the Federation of Light and Power Workers (FATLyF), the Federation of Telephone Workers (FOETRA), the Union of State-Owned Oil Workers (SUPE), and the Argentine Federation of Teachers (CTERA) with its rival unions. In Mexico, the unions in the study were the Mexican Union of Telephone Workers (STRM), the Mexican Union of Oil Workers (STPRM), the Mexican Union of Electricity Workers (SME), the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE), and the local union of Ford Motors Workers at Cuatitlán. In Venezuela, the unions studied were the Federation of Telephone Workers (FETRATEL), the Federation of Electricity Workers (FETRAELEC), the Federation of Oil Workers (FEDEPETROL), the Ford Motors' Section of the Federation of Automobile Workers (FETRAUTOMOTRIZ), and the multiple unions in the education sector. In all these cases, I analyzed the process of industrial restructuring and reform that involved bargaining with the specific union studied.

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TABLE 2
UNION-GOVERNMENT INTERACTIONS BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR

	Countries				*Total*
Sectors	*Venezuela*	*Mexico*	*Argentina*	*Sectoral Variation*	*Cases*
Oil	C[a] → O	S[b] → S	C → C	C=3, O[c]=1, S=2	6
Automobile	C → C	R[d] → S	O → C	C=3, O=1, S=1, R=1	6
Telecom.	C → O	C → C	O → C	C=4, O=2	6
Electricity	C → O	C → O	O → C	C=3, O=3	6
Education	R → R	O → O	R → R	R=4, O=2	6
Nat'l. conf.	O → O	S → S	S → C	C=1, O=2, S=3	6
Nat'l Variation	C=5, O=5, R=2	C=3, O=3, S=5, R=1	C=6, O=3, S=1, R=2		
Total cases	12	12	12		36

[a] C= cooperation (successful restraint)
[b] S= subordination (unsuccessful restraint)
[c] O= opposition (successful militancy)
[d] R= resistance (unsuccessful militancy)

cussion, two observations are reported for each union, thus doubling their number (N=18x2=36) to show the continuity or change in union strategies.[23] Table 2 summarizes all studied interactions by country and sector. The arrows show the passing of time between the first and the second observation. The indicators for militancy and concessions are provided in the Appendix.

Table 2 shows that the case studies provide an array of observations of different union-government interactions with no apparent national or sector-level pattern. It illustrates the need to go beyond country and sector-level variables. The bottom row of the table shows that each of the countries presented at least three different types of interactions despite common national contexts (defined in terms of political institutions and macroeconomic conditions). In turn, the data in the right-hand columns of the table also show diversity in the interactions within each of the economic sectors despite the similarity of interests. In the next section I propose a hypothesis to account for this variation.

A PARTISAN THEORY OF UNION-GOVERNMENT INTERACTION

Union members have different preferences for wages, work conditions, and job stability derived from their diverse labor-market alternatives.

[23] Changes in the independent variable from one category to another were used as cut-off points when possible. When there were no changes in the independent variable, the cut-off was based on two diverse reform initiatives (for example, privatization and restructuring) when possible.

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Union leaders thus aggregate a particular combination of such preferences into specific union demands. Union leaders also organize collective action (either strikes or restraint) and make possible the control of workers' behavior for the intertemporal exchange of current restraint for future benefits.[24] Hence, union leaders, as workers' representatives, are the agents of any exchange with government officials.

Unions, however, are not perfect agents, and the preferences of union leaders need not be the same as those of workers.[25] Union leaders also have their own objectives in the exchange besides those of their constituencies. For example, union leaders may seek ideological or material rewards while acting as workers' representatives, or they may prefer to maximize the long-term rather than short-term goals of workers. It is possible, however, to assume that they want to maximize leadership survival. That is, whatever the objectives of union leaders, their primary constraint is to "remain in power because otherwise they would not be able to pursue their objectives."[26] Hence, while their objectives can be perceived as a cost for their agency role in the exchange, union leaders are constrained by their constituencies' preferences to the extent that they want to avoid being replaced as workers' agents.[27] Union leaders want to avoid replacement by internal or external rivals. They can be replaced by new leaders who propose a different set of union demands (partisan or leadership competition), or their members can leave the union for other unions whose banners have become more attractive for them (union competition).[28]

Previous attempts at leadership survival have led union leaders to build long-term alliances with political parties to complement industrial muscle with political influence. Political parties channeled labor demands through the state and helped mobilize support from other sectors.[29] Partisan alliances built on historical exchanges created loyalty

[24] Pizzorno (fn. 16), 278.

[25] Crouch (fn. 16), 161. The imperfection of the union agency may be a desirable goal for workers that select union leaders not just to carry their demands but also to articulate them and to calculate the benefits of intertemporal exchanges.

[26] Henry Farber, "The Analysis of Union Behavior," in O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, eds., *Handbook of Labor Economics* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986), 1080.

[27] Farber argues that the democratic constraints on the leadership range from cases where the limits are so loose that the leadership can maximize their objective function without regard to the constraints of the political process (dictatorship) to cases where the leadership is severely hampered by the political process and the need to answer the rank and file. Yet, he shows that the possibility of insurgency constrains leaders even in imperfect democracies. Ibid.

[28] In a Hirschmanian sense, replacement by alternative leaders can be assimilated to "voice" within the same organization while the abandonment of the union by members is similar to his concept of "exit." Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[29] J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labour Movements and Political Systems: Some Variations," in Marino Regini, ed., *The Future of Labour Movements* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992).

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bonds between parties and unions, thus influencing both their ability to bargain and the attitudes of union leaders toward incumbent politicians. Thus, partisan loyalty implies that, all things being equal, union leaders should be more willing to restrain their militancy when their allied parties are in the government and to increase it when those parties are in the opposition.[30] It follows that if allied union leaders are replaced by others associated with opposition political parties, the change will affect not only the union leaders but also the terms of union-government interactions.

Strategic politicians consider the effect of partisan loyalty on union attitudes. Loyal unions can facilitate the implementation of government policies and provide electoral support. Incumbent politicians should prefer to reward their loyalty rather than support unions that have no attachment to the governing party[31]—in particular, nonallied union leaders, who have no ideological and electoral attachments to the government and who, therefore, have fewer incentives for restraint. The identity of the party in government thus affects the organizational dynamics of labor unions. Partisan loyalty may facilitate fulfilling constituencies' demands at the time of the original alliance. If, however, market reforms implemented by labor-based parties increase the uncertainty of workers about their future, partisan loyalties can become contradictory with constituencies' demands, thereby affecting leadership survival and the incentives of labor leaders in their interaction with governments.

Partisan or Leadership Competition

Diversity in labor partisan affiliations implies that various parties appeal to organized labor. In Europe these parties tend to be the Communist, the Socialist, and the Christian Democratic Parties. In Latin America strong populist labor parties have historically competed with leftist parties for union influence. The higher costs of leadership competition in a less democratic context also increased the value of subsidies provided by political parties in Latin America. Leadership competition between rivals associated with different political parties could take place within a single union in the form of partisan competition or across diverse unions combining partisan and union competi-

[30] Walter Korpi explains this pattern as the result of a trade-off between industrial and political resources. Korpi, *The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). In the Latin American context, Zapata explains the empirical regularity of political strikes by the influence of the state on industrial relations. Zapata (fn. 14, 1986).

[31] The cost of bargaining with nonallied union leaders is higher due to the lack of mutual trust while part of the agency costs may indirectly feed the coffers of opposition parties.

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tion for membership. A partisan monopoly exists when the union leadership affiliated with the labor party faces no competition, such as in the Mexican telephone union. Partisan competition occurs when activists of diverse parties compete or even share leadership positions through proportional representation in the same organization, such as in the Venezuelan CTV.

In some cases, diverse factions of the same party compete for union leadership. Such competition still implies the risk of the allied union leaders being replaced as representatives. For the incumbent labor-based parties, partisan competition implies the threat of allied union leaders being replaced by hostile activists associated with the electoral opposition. Leadership competition among factions will only imply such a threat if the winning faction is likely to defect from the party and join the opposition.

If allied union leaders perceive that leadership competition grows (for example, by losing local union elections), they will try to recover the following of their constituencies to avoid replacement. If they believe that rival leaders are taking advantage of their restraint vis-à-vis market reforms, their incentives for militancy will increase to avoid replacement. Calls for militancy aim to show their constituencies that they have not "sold-out." Leadership survival increases incentives for militancy—even if it is not the best bargaining strategy considering their available information—because if labor leaders are replaced, they will not be able to continue bargaining.

Union Competition

Union competition, or organizational fragmentation, is the rivalry among unions for the representation of workers in the same sector. Where a union monopoly exists, a single union represents all the workers in the sector. In Mexico, for example, the teachers' union was the only union in the education sector, and teachers had no option but to join. Where there is union competition, however, several organizations vie for the membership of the same workers. In Venezuela, for instance, thirteen federations competed for the representation of teachers by 1991.

Union competition introduces the need to coordinate the action of different unions to organize collective action, whether militancy or restraint. The larger the number of unions competing for the same members, the harder it is to coordinate them for collective action.[32] Union competition makes coordination and its enforcement more difficult by

[32] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 48.

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creating incentives to attract members from rival organizations, thereby increasing coordination costs for unions engaging in collective action.[33] Unions trying to attract members from rival organizations are more likely to differentiate themselves by breaking coordination to become the most appealing to potential members. This situation is heightened if unions have diverse partisan identities that generate not only different attitudes toward the government but also different bargaining costs among competing unions.

In addition to coordination costs, each union is also weaker than a single monopolistic union because each leader controls the militancy or restraint of only a share of the involved workers. As a result, government officials put less value on the exchange with individual unions because they have to enter multiple interactions in their negotiations with the sector, thereby increasing bargaining costs. Thus, although government officials prefer to reward loyal unions, they should be less likely to make concessions to competing unions. Government response to loyal unions, therefore, is more related to the strength of the union than to its militancy.

The Partisan Theory and Union-Government Interactions

The effect of union competition and leadership competition on the interaction between union leaders and government officials varies according to the party in power. When labor-based parties implement market-oriented reforms, allied union leaders are willing to collaborate despite the uncertainty and distress of their constituencies due to their loyalty to long-term allies. Loyal union leaders are predisposed to collaborate and can expect some concessions in return. Moreover, they have better information about the commitments and constraints of their partisan allies and the need to implement these policies.

Yet, when labor-based parties shift their policy, they leave void the populist space of those who disagree with market-oriented policies. Opposition political parties from the left or disgruntled politicians splitting from the governing party (on ideological grounds) can take advantage of the policy shift to occupy that space. This movement may facilitate the growth of militant union activists allied with political parties or partisan factions opposed to market-oriented reforms and may

[33] Miriam Golden shows that coordination in wage bargaining is most likely when union monopoly is high because the competition for members "provides a strong incentive for unions to try to maximize their wage gains in order to retain members or to attract them away from competitors." Golden, "The Dynamics of Trade Unionism and National Economic Performance," *American Political Science Review* 87 (June 1993), 441.

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enhance leadership and partisan competition. Indeed, in Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina, new political parties occupying this populist space emerged.[34] Furthermore, this movement more likely turns factional competition into partisan competition. Partisan competition, in turn, increases the likelihood of militancy. These effects are more likely in sectors where the high uncertainty of workers about the sudden shift from public to private or from protection to exposure is likely to prompt them into militancy. Additionally, market-oriented reforms can sharpen union competition by provoking splits over how to respond or by aggravating the distributive struggle for shrinking resources among rival unions. In their attempts to attract members from rival organizations to increase their representation in these disputes, unions have more incentives to boycott coordination efforts as a strategy of differentiation, thereby weakening all the unions within the sector.

These explanatory conditions are not fixed. The party in power may change with elections. Union competition and partisan competition within the union movement can also change. Governments, though, cannot usually manipulate these variables in the short-term, although their policies can influence their changes. Market reforms in particular can affect all these variables by improving or damaging the electoral opportunities of incumbents, thus affecting the likelihood of challenges to labor leaders and making it harder for unions to coordinate their strategies. If these changes in the explanatory conditions occur, changes in the dependent variable should follow, thereby explaining variations in the union-government interaction during the period under discussion. Table 3 summarizes the expected union-government interactions when a labor-based party implements market-oriented reforms.

"Cooperation," or successful restraint for concessions, is more likely in the absence of union and partisan competition—when only one union organizes all workers and is affiliated with the governing party. Partisan loyalty reduces the incentives for militancy and facilitates bargaining while union monopoly boosts the bargaining power of the union because government officials want the collaboration of a strong and loyal union.

"Opposition," or successful militancy, can more likely be expected in the presence of growing partisan competition and union monopoly—

[34] Market reforms created a new critical juncture in the electoral politics of these countries (together with a simultaneous process of democratization or decentralization) that resulted in the emergence of new parties or divisions in the incumbent labor-based parties. Argentina experienced the emergence of FREPASO or Front for a Country with Solidarity (originating in a splintering of Peronism). Mexico saw the organization of the PRD or Party of the Democratic Revolution (also emerging from a division within the PRI). In Venezuela, Causa R grew to become a national political party and was followed by an array of new political options that reshaped the traditional two-party system.

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TABLE 3
PREDICTED BACKGROUND CONDITIONS FOR LOYAL UNIONS AND LABOR GOVERNMENTS

		Partisan Competition for Leadership	
		Monopoly (one party)	*Competition (many parties)*
Union Competition for Members	Monopoly (one union)	Cooperation (successful restraint)	Opposition (successful militancy)
	Competition (many unions)	Subordination (unsuccessful restraint)	Resistance (unsuccessful militancy)

when leaders affiliated with different parties compete for the control of a single union. Growing partisan competition based on protesting the consequences of the policy shift increases the incentives for "irrational" militancy[35] because allied union leaders are afraid of being replaced and the sections controlled by contenders have already turned militant. Since the union is strong, government officials are more likely to grant concessions so that allied union leaders can show a better record than their contenders.

"Subordination," or unsuccessful restraint, more likely results from competition among different unions affiliated with the governing party. While partisan loyalty facilitates restraint, union competition weakens all unions despite their loyalty. Government officials may also choose to reward only the most compliant unions. This selection should also prompt competing unions to comply to avoid losing resources and becoming less attractive for members than other competing unions.

"Resistance," or unsuccessful militancy, more likely happens when partisan competition and union competition overlap—competing unions affiliated with different parties. Union competition weakens all unions and, together with partisan competition, makes coordination more difficult. Unions associated with opposition parties protest to differentiate themselves from cooperative loyal unions. If they succeed in attracting members due to their bellicose stance, loyal unions will turn more militant to avoid losing members although union competition makes them weak and unlikely to be successful.

[35] Since union monopoly makes the union strong and the government can observe this strength, it seems unnecessary to enter a conflict to show it in terms of the external interaction, but partisan competition prompts union leaders to protest for reasons linked to their internal power.

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Applying the Partisan Theory in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela

According to the partisan theory, union-government interactions in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela should have felt the effects of partisan ties because the incumbent parties were labor-based. In this context, leadership competition should have increased the likelihood of labor militancy, and union competition should have decreased the likelihood of concessions for unions. This section provides a brief description of the dynamics of the case studies, relating them to the predicted background conditions for each interaction, which are summarized in the Appendix.

In Venezuela, although AD historically controlled the CTV, other parties competed for leadership and displaced AD briefly in the 1960s. Also the system of proportional representation reinforced the pluralism of the CTV in its leadership, resulting in the inclusion of minority parties in the executive committee.[36] In 1989, after Pérez announced the reforms, urban riots signaled the general discontent of the population. Union leaders of AD, afraid of losing control of the CTV to opposition parties protesting the reforms, called the first economic general strike in Venezuelan history for May 1989. The tension between partisan loyalty and leadership survival divided the AD union leadership between those with positions in the CTV who were more favorable to the strike and those with party appointments who were more reluctant about it.[37] Pérez's concessions included emergency wage hikes, suspension of layoffs, and retaining price controls for basic staples. In 1990 and 1991, however, Causa R, a new political party, grew rapidly in the union movement by rejecting reforms, especially among public sector workers, further increasing partisan competition. As a result, the CTV called additional protests despite Perez's move to halt the reform of the severance payment system and social security and his acceptance of union demands for the resignation of the labor minister. Hence, union monopoly and increasing partisan competition explain the CTV opposition.

In spite of the national tendencies in union behavior, Venezuela experienced variation in union-government interactions. In the case of the privatization of the state-owned monopoly of telecommunications,

[36] Ellner (fn. 18).

[37] Author's interviews with AD union leaders of different factions confirmed the account of Steve Ellner. See Ellner, "Organized Labor's Political Influence and Party Ties in Venezuela: *Acción Democrática* and Its Labor Leadership," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 31 (Winter 1989).

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the combination of union monopoly and partisan monopoly exercised by the AD union leadership resulted in cooperation. Labor restraint was exchanged for concessions that included employee-owned stock, job stability, and labor directors. Subsequent worker discontent with the privatization, however, resulted in Causa R winning the union elections in the main local union (Caracas) while growing in other regions by protesting market reforms and privatization. As a result, a new AD leadership took control of the union and increased the militancy of the national union against labor restructuring to show their responsiveness to the discontented rank and file. In spite of attempts at broad restructuring, the company could not change work conditions from the privatization agreements. In this case, the increase in partisan competition combined with union monopoly to move the union into opposition.[38]

Very similar dynamics explain the shift from cooperation to opposition in the cases of the electricity workers' union of the state-owned electric company (CADAFE) and of the state-owned oil company (PDVSA). Union monopoly and an unchallenged AD leadership facilitated cooperation when the Pérez administration decentralized CADAFE. Concessions to the union included handsome monetary incentives for transfers, job stability, and wage increases for workers in the interior. Yet, the subsequent discontent of workers also gave the election of the Caracas's union to Causa R, who had led the local union into a wildcat strike. Subsequently, the AD leadership increased the militancy of the union and successfully boycotted industrial restructuring. Again, the increase in partisan competition combined with union monopoly resulted in opposition. In PDVSA, the combination of union monopoly and no partisan competition for the AD leadership favored cooperation in 1991. In return, the union retained hiring prerogatives. Afterward, workers' discontent resulted in increasing partisan competition, not only from Causa R but also from other left-wing parties—the Movement to Socialism (MAS) and the Electoral Movement of the People (MEP). As a result, the AD leadership took a more combative stance against management proposals in 1993 and tried to gain legitimacy by decreasing its discretionary use of hiring prerogatives and obtaining a halt to the reform of commissaries.[39] Thus, partisan competition, along with union monopoly, explains the shift of the union to opposition.

Contrary to the unions in public enterprises, the two remaining cases show a different pattern. The union of Ford Motors, a local union

[38] Union leaders, government officials, and company managers, interviewed by the author, Caracas, June–July 1994, May–July 1996.

[39] Ibid.

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based in Carabobo, opted for cooperation. The union restrained and accepted layoffs and new working rules in return for participation in the selection of those laid off, reincorporated, and trained. In this case, cooperation resulted from the combination of union monopoly and partisan monopoly. In a personal interview, the labor relations' manager said that cooperation for restructuring and training was possible because the AD union leadership did not face competition from left-wing parties.[40] In education, the overlap of union competition and partisan competition in thirteen federations affiliated with diverse political parties and groups resulted in militant but unsuccessful resistance to the administrative reform initiated by Minister Gustavo Roosen. While coordination was difficult, the militancy of the rank and file rewarded the free riding of bellicose organizations. This situation brought the vice minister of education, Francisco Castillo to complain, "I think that there is a competition among unions, where the one that strikes the most is the one that is the most supported by the rank and file."[41] In spite of the differences between these two cases, both sectors contrast with telecommunication, electricity, and oil in that the levels of union competition and partisan competition did not change during the period studied, and neither did the studied interactions.

In Argentina,[42] Peronism's policy shift divided the CGT. All three competing factions, though, remained within the ranks of Peronism. The Menem administration was unwilling to make concessions, in particular to the most "populist" faction, although it provided selective incentives (such as guaranteed monopolies of representation and execu-

[40] Author's interview with Ford's labor relations manager and AD union leader was confirmed by Consuelo Iranzo, Luisa Bethencourt, Hector Lucena, and Fausto Sandoval Bauza. See Iranzo, Bethencourt, Lucena, and Bauza, "Competitividad, Calificación y Trabajo: Sector Automotriz Venezolano" (Competition, qualifications, and work: Automobile sector in Venezuela) (Manuscript, Cendes, 1996).

[41] Cite from *El Nacional*, January 9, 1991. Former Minister Gustavo Roosen and union leaders of FetraMagisterio and Fenatev confirmed this account derived from a press chronology, in interviews with the author, Caracas, June 1996.

[42] The information on the Argentine cases is derived from a press chronology, union annual reports and other documents, interviews with union leaders of all factions, three ministers of labor and other government officials, as well as labor relations managers in the involved companies. The Argentine press chronology was elaborated in the archives of the newspaper *Clarin* and includes newspapers such as *Clarin, La Nacion, La Rozon, Cronica, ElCronista Comercial, Pagina 12*, and *Ambito Financiero*. Union sources included the internal constitution, annual minutes, and balances for the 1988 to 1994 period for SMATA, FATLyF, CTERA, FOETRA, and SUPE. Documents included collective bargaining contracts signed by the unions and approved by the Ministry of Labor, bill proposals, parliamentary information on introduced, modified, and passed bills. Interviews included SUPE and CGT union leader Antonio Cassia (Buenos Aires, 1993, 1995), FATLyF union leader Carlos Alderete (Buenos Aires, 1993), CTA union leader Victor De Gennaro (Buenos Aires, 1995), CTERA union leader Marta Marffei (Buenos Aires, 1995), ministers of labor Armando Caro Figueroa (Buenos Aires, 1994), Rodolfo Diaz (Buenos Aires, 1992, 1995), and Enrique Rodriguez (Buenos Aires, 1992, 1995), managers of labor relations, such as YPF's Roberto Teglia (Buenos Aires, 1995), and Telecom's Juan Giar (Buenos Aires, 1995).

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tive appointments) to the most compliant. Peronist labor unions were unable to halt a new law that introduced temporary hiring and decrees that established wage restraint and deprived them of collecting and administering union health-fund fees. As a result, many important unions moved out of the populist faction, and in 1992 all three factions decided to unify under a leadership dominated by the most cooperative union leaders. Thus, from 1989 to 1992 the combination of partisan monopoly and union competition subordinated Peronist unions to the administration. After its unification, the CGT recovered its union monopoly and maintained its Peronist loyalty, moving from subordination to cooperation. As a result, it was rewarded with concessions that included changes in the reforms of pensions, social security, subsidies for health funds, and the maintenance of legislation on collective bargaining and labor organization.

Argentina also shows diversity in union-government interactions although national institutions and conditions remain the same. Menem also privatized the state-owned monopoly of telecommunications, ENTEL. Unlike its Venezuelan counterpart, the union opposed privatization by increasing its militancy. A combination of union monopoly and leadership competition explains this outcome. Leadership competition in the telephone workers' union increased when a populist faction that opposed market reforms and privatization won control of the union in Buenos Aires (the largest in the federation) and increased union militancy.[43] A monopolistic union, nonetheless, was able to obtain concessions, including the administration and representation of employee-owned stock, handsome retirement packages, and subsidies for the union health fund. After privatization, the loyal Peronist leadership won control of the rebellious locals and curtailed leadership competition. Hence, with the absence of union and partisan competition, the union cooperated with the new private management in discussions of labor restructuring. Concessions at this stage included union participation in training, contracts for union-organized companies, and voluntary retirement packages. The privatization of state-owned electric companies also resulted in initial opposition due to a combination of union monopoly and leadership competition. The local unions, which the populist militant faction controlled and which competed with the

[43] The policy-shift of Peronism encouraged the formation of a splinter group, which together with some left-wing parties, formed, in turn, a new opposition political party in 1992 that would became the FREPASO in 1994. Among its core organizers was a group of union leaders that had broken ties with the Peronist union movement and organized a new small confederation, the CTA (Congress of Argentine Workers) in 1992.

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loyal leadership, joined the CTA in 1992. Since the national federation was a member of the CGT, the dissident unions were expelled. As a result, leadership competition receded. Lacking union competition and partisan competition, the union began to cooperate. In the first period, union concessions included employee-owned stock, subsidies for the union health fund, and contracts for union-organized cooperatives of former employees. In the second period, they included subsidies for union participation in the privatization of companies—public utilities, an energy transmission company, and the concession of a coal mine—as well as voluntary retirement packages.

The cases of the restructuring and privatization of the state-owned oil company (YPF) and of the decentralization of education differed from the previous two examples. In the case of the YPF, the Peronist union leadership faced no competition and had a very close relationship with Menem that facilitated bargaining for concessions, which included subsidies for the union to buy the oil fleet, contracts for union companies employing laid-off workers, and voluntary retirement packages. Thus, leadership monopoly and union monopoly resulted in cooperation. Unlike the oil company, the education sector, as in Venezuela, was fragmented into various unions. Many of them gathered into a national confederation, CTERA, whose leader, Mary Sánchez, was one of the Peronist union leaders who had left the party and the CGT to found the FREPASO and the CTA in protest of the policy shift. Yet, many others unions did not belong to the national confederation and competed with CTERA unions in every province. Many of the non-CTERA unions were Peronist. In this case, the overlapping of union competition and partisan competition coincided with resistance or unsuccessful militancy against the decentralization of education to the provincial level enacted by Congress in 1992. In spite of the restraint of oil workers and of the militancy of teachers that accounted for more than a third of total strikes in 1991 and 1992, in both cases the levels of union competition, partisan competition, and union-government interactions remained the same during the period under discussion.

Lastly, the national union of automobile workers moved from opposition to cooperation in 1991. In this case, union monopoly with no partisan competition made the union's initial opposition unexpected, although the subsequent cooperation coincides with the theory. The increasing militancy of the union until 1991 is related to the rejection of trade liberalization in a heavily protected sector. The consequence of this militancy together with lobbying by business was to persuade the government to grant an industrial regime of protection and gradual

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opening for the sector after 1991. The industry was thus exceptionally successful in shielding itself from the conditions created by a sudden trade opening. After the regime was granted, the government became again an important partner, and partisan loyalties moved the union toward cooperation.

The Mexican cases highlight the importance of contextualizing the explanatory variables within the constraints created by the political regime on the means of expressing militancy and the costs of partisan competition.[44] Yet at the same time, even in the most constrained environment, where the regime is not totally democratic, the interaction between unions and the government varies. This variation cannot be explained by traditional theories based only on the features of the Mexican regime. The Mexican CTM subordinated to Salinas's policies. The only important concession that it was able to obtain was the prevention of labor-code reform. The same variables—partisan monopoly combined with union competition—explain the confederation's subordination and its exception to cooperation in relation to the labor code.[45] The CTM competed with other national labor confederations also associated with the monopolistic PRI. While partisan loyalty reduced their incentives for militancy, government officials manipulated union competition for scarce resources among the various PRI-related national confederations and rewarded the most compliant of them with selective incentives (such as public recognition and favorable treatment in arbitration boards) to weaken CTM claims. The only exception was when the CTM unified with all other PRI-confederations and reduced union competition to boycott the reform of the labor code successfully. The same institutional mechanism that provided a common forum for all of them to unify, an umbrella organization called the Congress of Labor, had previously facilitated union competition because decision making was based on consensus or unanimity.[46]

[44] State imposed limits on strike activity discard the usefulness of using strikes as a measure of militancy but do not imply that militancy does not take place. Mexican workers have held illegal strikes, used strike petitions as a threat to show their militancy, and resorted very often to sit-ins, demonstrations, and even extreme measures such as going naked or on hunger strikes. On repertoires of protest, see the account of Maria Lorena Cook, *Organizing Dissent* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996). For a historial analysis of the evolution of union strategies, see Alberto Aziz Nassif, *El estado mexicano y la CTM* (The Mexican state and the CTM) (Mexico City: Ed. La Casa Chata, 1989); Ilán Bizberg, *Estado y sindicalismo en México* (State and unionism in Mexico) (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1990); and Kevin Middlebrook, *The Paradox of Revolution* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995).

[45] Graciela Bensusán confirms interviews with union leaders and government officials. Bensusán, "Los determinantes institucionales de la flexibilización laboral" (Institutional influences on labor flexibility), *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 1 (1994).

[46] For instance, the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC) and the Revolutionary Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM) explicitly boycotted CTM protest against wage ceil-

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As in Venezuela and Argentina, the state-owned monopoly of telecommunications, Telmex, was privatized in Mexico. In this case, cooperation in relation to both privatization and restructuring corresponds to the overlap of union monopoly and leadership monopoly, which remained unchanged during the entire period studied. The latter, held since 1974 by a charismatic PRI union leader, Francisco Hernández Juarez, who had co-opted the opposition, successfully provided benefits for his constituencies and developed a close relationship with the president, who often used this union as an example of modern unionism. Moreover, since this union was not affiliated with the CTM, it had more room to maneuver and even organized the Federation of Goods and Services Workers (FESEBES), a new labor confederation competing with the CTM.[47] The union obtained employee-owned shares and a labor director in the private company, wage increases, job stability, and the maintenance of work conditions during privatization. Afterward, concessions included participation in joint committees with management for training and restructuring and increases in wage and nonwage benefits.

The union of electricity workers of the Company of Light and Power, which was not a CTM-affiliate either, also joined the FESEBES. Its charismatic union leader, Jorge Sanchez, also had a close relationship with the president. In this case, the absence of union and leadership competition led to cooperation between the union and management. Cooperation led the government to bail out the company, establish guarantees for union survival, and develop joint union-management committees to discuss productivity and financial issues. Unlike Hernández Juarez, though, the loyal leader lost the union elections in 1993 and was replaced by an independent leadership, breaking the loyalty strings. As expected, this situation increased union incentives for

ings in the Congress of Labor and were publicly rewarded by the government. Subsequent exit of unions from the CTM into preferred organizations, most notably the CROC, increased the pressure on its leadership. See my press chronology, which derives from the archives of Entorno Laboral and which includes newspapers such as *La Jornada, Excelsior, El Sol de Mexico, Uno mas Uno,* and *Reforma.*

[47] Ruth Berins Collier and James Samstad analyze the development of the FESEBES and the "new unionism" in "Mexican Labor and Structural Reform: New Unionism or Old Stalemate?" in Riordan Roett, ed., *The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Interviews with union leaders, government officials, and company managers confirmed the numerous accounts on the strategy of this union. For telecommunications, see Enrique De La Garza, "Sindicato y restructuración productiva en México" (Union and labor restructuring in Mexico), *Revista Mexicana de Sociologia* 1 (1994); and De La Garza and Javier Melgoza, "Reestructuración y cambio en las relaciones laborales en la telefonía mexicana" (Restructuring and change in labor relations in the Mexican telephone industry), in Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senen González, eds., *La privatización de las telecomunicaciones en América Latina (Privatization of telecommunications in Latin America)* (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1998). For electricity, see Javier Melgoza, "El SME y la productividad: Los saldos de la negociación" (SME and productivity: Outcomes of bargaining), *Polis* 93 (1994).

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militancy (although less than if the leadership was associated with an opposition party). It also, however, reduced the partisan incentives of the government to grant concessions to the union, which nonetheless included a reduction of productivity targets and the maintenance of job stability. In this case, the tension between partisan loyalty and leadership survival was broken by the replacement of the loyal leader and his succession by an independent and more militant union leadership.

In Mexico, the education sector was not as fragmented as in Argentina and Venezuela. The National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) which also was not a CTM-affiliate, had a union monopoly and was controlled by PRI union leaders. A discontented rank and file, organized by dissidents in the National Coordinating Committee of Education Workers (CNTE), had toppled the previous PRI leadership. The new PRI leader, Elba Ester Gordillo, therefore, had to win legitimacy to avoid replacement. As a result, the SNTE became more bellicose after the change in leadership while including the dissidents within the executive committee through proportional representation and increasing internal debate.[48] In 1991 when the decentralization law was discussed, a leak from the secretary of education mentioned the division of the centralized union. The SNTE not only became more militant but also joined forces with the dissident CNTE. The government responded by granting centralized national work conditions and earmarked budgets for the states as well as salary hikes and nonwage benefits for the union. Hence, the combination of union monopoly and partisan competition resulted in opposition.

The unions of oil workers and Ford automobile workers in Mexico, both CTM-affiliates, provide interesting cases to illuminate the limits of my explanatory framework. In such cases, partisan competition may be punished by a nondemocratic government that can resort to coercion. Both unions faced sharp restructuring due to the opening of their sectors to private capital and international competition. Both attempted to resist the changes and were forced into subordination by the repression of the CTM and the state. The workers of the Ford Motors plant at Cuatitlán rejected restructuring and chose an independent leadership (linked with left-wing parties), which broke the tension between partisan loyalty and leadership survival and brought the local union to resist industrial restructuring—albeit unsuccessfully—in 1988 and 1992. The

[48] Although my account derives from a press chronology and interviews with union leaders, government officials, and experts, the process of modernization and democratization of the union has been widely studied. See, for instance, Cook (fn. 44); and Joe Foewaker, *Popular Mobilization in Mexico, the Teachers' Movement 1977–87* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

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local union not only increased its militancy but also attempted to withdraw from the CTM-affiliated national union. The CTM, upheld by the government and the company, responded to the militant leadership and their supporters with violent repression, forcing the local and the national union into subordination.[49] In the case of the oil workers' union, the PRI union leader had supported the opposition presidential candidate, Cuahutemoc Cárdenas,[50] by delivering votes in the oil regions, although PRI local candidates carried the elections. As a result of the partisan threat, the state gave a fatal blow to the union by putting the union leader in prison under fabricated murder charges and by bringing the union into subordination, thereby shifting the issue of leadership survival from workers to state officials.[51] In both cases, the restrictions on political pluralism of the regime limited partisan competition in the unions and tipped the balance in favor of partisan loyalty by dramatically raising the costs of noncompliance with government officials.[52] The Mexican political regime restricted partisan competition in the union movement, thus limiting the explanatory power of this variable for certain unions. Yet, other non-CTM unions, such as the teachers', telephone workers', and electricity workers' unions—and even the CTM itself—retained their relative autonomy, thus permitting the use of the explanatory variables based on union dynamics to illustrate their interaction with the government.

Table 4 shows the high correspondence between the patterns of union-government interaction presented in Table 2 (and summarized in the Appendix) and the explanatory conditions defined by my partisan theory and presented in Table 3.

This high correspondence between the observed outcomes and the explanatory conditions provides a better account than either macrolevel or sector-level theories for the interactions studied. In a context of al-

[49] Interviews and press releases are confirmed by Marisa Von Bulow, "Reestructuración productiva y estrategias sindicales. El caso de la Ford en Cuahutitlán 1987–1993" (Production restructuring and union strategy: The case of Ford in Cuahutitlán 1987–1993) (M.A. thesis, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-Sede México, 1994); and Jorge Carrillo, "La Ford en México: Restructuración industrial y cambio en las relaciones sociales" (Ph.D. dissertation, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, 1993).

[50] Cárdenas split from the PRI because he rejected the policy shift and failed to be selected as its presidential nominee. He launched a new coalition, later to be renamed as the PRD, and he delivered the strongest electoral blow to the PRI by dramatically reducing its share of votes (and even claiming victory stolen by fraud) in 1988.

[51] Fabio Barbosa gives a graphic account of the process that confirms interviews and press releases. Barbosa, "La reestructuración de Pemex" (The restructuring of Pemex), *El Cotidiano* 46 (March–April 1992).

[52] These two cases related to Burgess's argument about the PRI imposing external costs on union leaders' decisions. Burgess (fn. 15).

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TABLE 4
EXPLANATORY CONDITIONS AND UNION-GOVERNMENT INTERACTION IN ARGENTINA, MEXICO, AND VENEZUELA

Possible Interactions	*Explanatory Conditions Assuming Partisan Loyalty*		*Frequency of Each Interaction in the Study*	*Interactions Corresponding with Explanatory Conditions*
	Partisan Competition	*Union Competition*		
Cooperation (successful restraint)	No	No	13	13
Subordination (unsuccessful restraint)	No	Yes	6	3
Opposition (successful militancy)	Yes	No	12	11
Resistance (unsuccessful militancy)	Yes	Yes	5	5
Totals			36	32

lied labor parties implementing market reforms, partisan competition and union competition influenced the interaction between loyal union leaders and government officials in different sectoral and national contexts. Additionally the explanatory conditions in the studied interactions varied as expected over the short-term, further reinforcing the implications of this explanatory logic.

Other patterns of interaction also deserve attention. In Argentina a pattern of cooperation between unions and government tended to arise mainly from opposition but also from subordination at the national level. In Venezuela a pattern of opposition between the two arose mainly from cooperation, although arriving early in this interaction at the national level. Finally, although Mexico shows a less clear trend, it is where most cases of subordination concentrate. These trends in the interactions studied are related to national institutions that can facilitate the emergence of union competition and partisan competition, thus explaining these patterns.

In Argentina national regulation established monopolies of representation for collective bargaining except in the public administration. As a result, union competition is limited except at the peak level and in the public administration, where the cases of union competition leading to subordination or resistance emerged. The strong partisan identity of labor unions combined with their ability to obtain concessions from the government helped Peronist labor leaders retain control of their unions. In Venezuela collective bargaining rules also facilitated effective union

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monopolies.[53] The education sector was an exception, excluded from collective bargaining and faced with union competition, as in Argentina. The growth of leadership competition that increased labor incentives for militancy in many AD unions is related to the political changes brought about by the combination of market reforms and political decentralization. These changes made room for new political options not only in the union movement but also in the electoral arena.[54] In Mexico the characteristics of the regime allowed the government to overcome the effect of the explanatory conditions in the cases of oil workers and the Ford Motors' workers of Cuatitlán. These cases do not contradict the explanatory logic but highlight its limitation. In the oil workers' union, partisan monopoly and union monopoly had previously led to labor restraint in return for sizable concessions including nonwage benefits for workers, hiring prerogatives, contracts for union companies, and fees over suppliers' contracts for the union. After its leader challenged the election of Salinas, however, the union was forced into subordination. In the case of Ford Motors, when alternative leaders won local elections, breaking loyalty ties and increasing labor militancy, the government and the CTM also forced the union into subordination. Thus, in Mexico the opportunities for leadership or partisan competition were limited in most cases by a regime that had also curtailed political pluralism in the electoral arena.

National patterns also had important policy consequences. The prevalence of opposition in Venezuela weakened the pace of market reforms until they finally were suspended. The predominance of cooperation in Argentina facilitated the rapid implementation of market reforms and the adoption of union strategies more akin to a market economy. In Mexico, although subordination eased the implementation of reforms, it also slowed the adaptation of union strategies to the new environment. In spite of national trends, though, some cases in each country entered into different interactions explained by other combinations of union competition and partisan competition.

At the sector level there were less clear patterns. The cases in the oil and automobile sectors exhibited a large variation in interactions. Telecommunications and electricity do not have a single predominant interaction, but unions in both sectors successfully obtained concessions through cooperation or opposition (and enjoyed union monop-

[53] International Labour Organization, *Relaciones de Trabajo en Venezuela* (Labor relations in Venezuela) (ILO report, 1991).

[54] Not only did Causa R grow in the unions and in the 1994 elections, but also many political outsiders, including current President Chávez, challenged the traditional political parties after that election.

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oly). In the education sector, both resistance and opposition interactions are associated with higher militancy. This finding is consistent with predictions of higher militancy in public-sector workers[55] and with the politicization of the education sector[56] that facilitates the emergence of partisan competition. While partisan competition in Argentina and Venezuela had been an enduring feature of teachers' organizations, in Mexico it took an internal rebellion to allow for increasing partisan pluralism within the union.[57] Thus, although some sector-level patterns emerged, they are insufficient to account for the studied interaction.

Conclusions

This article attempts to complement the focus on policymakers that has predominated the literature on the political economy of market reforms in developing countries by providing some perspective on labor organizations, which have been neglected. The findings underscore the effect of partisan identities on creating a tension for union leaders when their allies implement market-oriented reforms. In my case studies, union leaders, on the one hand, were pulled by their partisan loyalties—based on long-term goals or on their own personal gain. On the other, they had to respond to their constituencies—based on the short-term goal of political survival. Partisan loyalty to governing allies on the part of union leaders increases incentives for restraint, while leadership or partisan competition pushes them toward militancy if demanded by constituencies. At the same time, union competition affects the strength of the union and its ability to obtain concessions from the government. This theory explained most of the interactions in my study between union and labor-based governments implementing market-oriented reforms in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. In these countries, partisan loyalties inherited from the original postwar alliance between the Peronism, PRI, and AD with labor unions had an important influence on the transition to open economies. The interaction of partisan loyalties with union competition and partisan competition, how-

[55] Geoffrey Garrett and Christopher Way, "The Rise of Public Sector Unions, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance, 1970–1990," in Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden, eds., *The Political Economy of European Integration* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995).

[56] Ivan Nuñez, "Sindicatos de maestros, Estado y Políticas Educacionales en América Latina" (Teachers unions, state and education policy in Latin America), in M. L. P. B. Franco and D. M. L. Zibas, eds., *Final do Seculo: Desafios da educacao na América Latina (End of the century: Challenges for education in Latin America)* (Sao Paulo: Cortes Editora, CLACSO REDUC, 1990).

[57] Cook (fn. 44).

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ever, can also influence the attitudes of unions and governments toward each other for nonlabor parties in government. The absence of partisan loyalties can make restraint and negotiations more difficult for unions and governments affecting the influence of leadership competition for militant labor leaders and of union competition in noncooperative unions. Further testing in other cases will show the extensions and limitations of this partisan theory.

If my argument is correct and political actors were aware of the effect of union competition and leadership competition, unions should have tried to affect these variables. In the previous section, I analyze the effect of legal institutions and electoral dynamics in shaping national patterns of union competition and leadership competition and thus union-government interactions. According to Collier and Collier the incorporation of labor shaped both legal institutions and the political system.[58] When the alliance between labor unions and political parties was established, the corporatist labor legislation that emerged shaped the opportunities for union competition and leadership competition because unions sought to strengthen their bargaining power and politicians wanted to reinforce labor loyalties. In Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, the labor legislation included restrictions to exit (ranging from permission to close shops to monopolies of representation) and facilitated the controls over leadership selection by incumbents.[59] At the same time, the partisan loyalties derived from the alliance were reinforced by the delivery of wage and social benefits when labor-based parties were in government.[60] National patterns thus resulted from the diverse emphasis on these variables that emerged from the original alliance. Union competition, however, was "stickier" than partisan competition because it was harder to modify on an individual basis without a legislative reform. This stickiness explains why leadership competition varied more frequently than union competition in the cases studied, making changes in militancy levels more likely than changes in the ability of unions to obtain concessions in the short term.

Although market reforms affect both conditions as analyzed above, changes are not easy to manipulate in the short term. Politicians cannot easily control electoral dynamics unless they resort to repression. Indeed, they are usually subject to the electoral dynamics unleashed by their shift toward the market and by the new alliances that this critical

[58] Collier and Collier (fn. 2).
[59] Collier and Collier (fn. 14, 1979).
[60] Zapata (fn. 14, 1986).

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juncture allowed in the union movement.[61] They could reform the rules for labor organization, but these regulations have remained unchanged in all three countries during the period studied. Reforms to the regulations on labor organization affecting union competition would have also risked changing the partisan ties between labor unions and governing politicians on which incumbents counted to implement their policies and remain in power.[62]

The conclusions of this study resonate with Michels's claim that although organization is the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong, "it is the organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators."[63] He considers, however, that leadership competition should limit the iron rule of oligarchy in organizations because the "ascent of the new leaders always involves the danger, for those who are already in possession of power, that they will be forced to surrender their places to the newcomers. The old leader must therefore keep himself in permanent touch with the opinions and feelings of the masses to which he owes his position."[64] Coincidentally with Michels and Hirshman, this study shows that although union competition provides exit options for workers, it weakens unions. Instead, leadership or partisan competition provides voice options to increase representation but without weakening their bargaining power to the same extent.[65]

Finally, this study suggests that future research should address the interaction between different levels of analysis. Such research would not only look to recover forgotten actors (such as individual unions) from oblivion but also to move beyond the national-level bias to include units of analysis defined at the level of sectors, subnational units, and even organizations. The multilevel research design of this study combined cross-country and within-country comparisons to facilitate

[61] The new political parties emerging during the policy shift—FREPASO in Argentina, PRD in Mexico, and Causa R in Venezuela—built alliances with labor unions. Labor leaders, however, were more aware of the costs of corporatism once the state started its retrenchment, and the terms of new associations tended to be more fluid than in the past, thus affecting the extent of future "loyalties."

[62] Maria Victoria Murillo, "The Corporatist Paradox: Labor Parties and Labor Reform in Latin America" (Paper presented at the conference "Institutional Reforms, Growth, and Human Development in Latin America," Yale Center for International and Area Studies, April 16–17, 1999).

[63] Roberto Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Oligarchical Tendencies in Modern Democracy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 365.

[64] Ibid., 172.

[65] These implications are consistent with Hirschman's claim on the superiority of voice over exit as a mechanism for improvement in certain contexts when exit is not easily available or could provoke the demise of the organization.

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the testing of alternative explanations within a relative small N. In turn, a small N made possible the collection of the data necessary to test causal mechanisms based on organizational dynamics. Theoretically this research design demonstrates the possibility of holding national institutions and macroeconomic conditions constant in comparisons within countries as well as sector-level variables constant in comparisons within sectors. Empirically it provides a better picture of the complex reality of the countries studied and the organizational dynamics of each case while advancing comparative analysis.

APPENDIX:
CLASSIFICATION OF CASES

Venezuela			
Case	*Militancy*	*Concessions*	*Category*
CTV-1 1989–92 (after 1992 coup attempt market reforms are suspended)	First general strike in history in 1989; followed by other two general strikes, public demonstrations, and protests	Emergency wage hike, unemployment insurance, suspension of layoffs for six months, price controls for basic staples; more rigid labor law; no reform of severance payment system or social security institution; inclusion of workers' shares in privatization schemes	Opposition
Telecom. 1991 (privatization)	From five yearly strike petitions in 1989 and 1990 to only three in 1991	Employee-owned stock, labor directors, job stability, stability of collective bargaining contract	Cooperation
Telecom. 1991–93 (restructuring after growth of internal opposition)	In 1992 forty-two weeks were lost on wildcat and legal strikes in five unions of the national federation, and nine unions presented strike petitions; in 1993 twelve unions presented strike petitions	Restructuring only within the limits set by privatization agreement	Opposition

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APPENDIX (*cont.*)

Venezuela			
Case	*Militancy*	*Concessions*	*Category*
Electricity 1989–91 (decentralization of the company)	No strikes in 1989, one in 1990, and none in 1991	Wage increases to the workers in the interior of the country, stability of work conditions across the company, handsome monetary incentives for transfers to the interior; job stability	Cooperation
Electricity 1992–93 (restructuring)	Four legal strikes and a wildcat strike in 1992; drastic increase in strike petitions, boycotts, and work unrest in 1993	Halt to restructuring attempts	Opposition
Oil 1991 (restructuring)	One strike in 1989, none in 1990, and one in 1991	Union allowed to retain hiring prerogatives in exchange for accepting the introduction of merit incentives on wages	Cooperation
Oil 1993 (restructuring)	Five strikes (one wildcat) in 1992 and six wildcat strikes in 1993	Union halts the dismantling of commissaries, but AD union leaders accept a reduction in hiring prerogatives demanded by management and internal competitors	Opposition
Auto 1989–92	No strikes or protests	Union accepts layoffs and introduction of new working methods in exchange for participation in selection of those laid off and trained in new technologies; after recovery, the union continues to participate in selection for training and reincorporation of laid-off workers	Cooperation

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APPENDIX (*cont.*)

Venezuela			
Case	*Militancy*	*Concessions*	*Category*
Education	Strike petitions in the Ministry of Labor increased from nine in 1989 to thirty-one in 1990 and twenty-four in 1991 and dropped to four in 1992 and 1993; strikes also grew from three in 1989 to seven in 1990, eight in 1991, nine in 1992, and seven in 1993; occupation of buildings and street protests as well	No concessions administrative reform	Resistance

Mexico			
Case	*Militancy*	*Concessions*	*Category*
CTM-1	Fall in the number of strike petitions from a yearly average of 9,818 under the previous administration to a yearly average of 7,007	No concessions except halting the labor code reform	Subordination (except on the labor code where the unification of all PRI affiliates resulted in negotiation)
Electricity-1 1988–93 (attempt at privatization or liquidation of company)	From a 1987 strike (the first since 1936) under a previous opposition leadership to a public campaign, including a meeting of twenty thousand electrical workers, and lobbying to congress and to the president; public support for concertation pacts and NAFTA	Bail out of the company and creation of a new public company; monopoly of representation to the union; job stability; new fringe benefits and retirement plan; stability of work conditions and union participation in two union-management committees in charge of productivity and financial analysis; union right to information	Cooperation

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APPENDIX (*cont.*)

Mexico			
Case	*Militancy*	*Concessions*	*Category*
Electricity-2 1993–94 (restructuring)	Rejection of 1993 agreement signed by previous leader, first union to reject signing of the concertation pact in 1994; end of support for Salinas's policies; workers' mobilizations during bargaining in 1994; threats of strike	Reduction of the 1993 productivity targets in 1994, maintenance of job stability	Opposition (loyalty break)
Telecom.-1 1990–91 (privatization)	None	Employee-owned shares; labor director; increase in wages and permanent personnel; job stability; stability of work conditions	Cooperation
Telecom.-2 1992–94 (restructuring)	None	Committees for union participation in training and restructuring of work conditions, wage and benefits hikes	Cooperation
Oil (restructuring)	No strikes	No concessions and loss of job stability, work conditions, and union prerogatives	Subordination
Auto 1989–94 (restructuring)	Tradition of militancy in the 1970s, strike and sit-ins in 1989, plant takeover in 1990, none in 1991; demonstrations, sit-ins, meetings, stoppages, and "going naked" in 1993	Company-imposed conditions despite workers' resistance and sheer repression in 1990 and 1993	Resistance 1988–90 and 1992–93; Subordination 1990–91 and 1993–94

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APPENDIX (*cont.*)

Mexico			
Case	*Militancy*	*Concessions*	*Category*
Education-SNTE (decentralization 1992)	Militancy by dissidents (CNTE) before 1989, but SNTE as well since 1989; militancy by SNTE peaked in 1991 against the fragmentation of the union and together with CNTE, including eight local strikes (besides four by the CNTE), three parades (besides three by CNTE), and many sit-ins, meetings, and a national process of consultation with the rank and file and joint public demands with the CNTE in November 1991	Limits to decentralization with guarantees of national work conditions and salaries by earmarking the state budgets, salary and benefits' hikes	Opposition

Argentina			
Case	*Militancy*	*Concessions*	*Category*
CGT 1 1989–92	From thirteen general strikes (1984–89) to one (1989–92); from 38.5 monthly strikes between January 1984 and June 1989 to 19.9 monthly strikes between July 1989 and March 1992	Unions could not stop hiring flexibility, wage restraint, and the loss of the collection of fees for their health funds	Subordination
CGT-2 1992–95	One general strike and 16.8 monthly strikes between April 1992 and July 1995	Union participation in the privatization of pensions, no reform to labor code, limits of competition for social security provision to health funds controlled by unions, permission for wage bargaining, union and workers' participation in privatization with government subsidies, bailing out of union debts	Cooperation

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APPENDIX (*cont.*)

Argentina			
Case	*Militancy*	*Concessions*	*Category*
Electricity-1 1989–92 (privatization and restructuring)	Eleven yearly strikes in 1992 after a yearly average of less than three strikes in 1984–88	Employee-owned stock, labor directors, voluntary retirements, subsidies for union health fund; start-up contracts of privatized companies for union organized companies hiring laid-off workers	Opposition
Electricity-2 1992–95 (after expulsion of militant local unions)	No strikes by the national federation; (two yearly strikes in 1993–95 by expelled local union)	Subsidies for union participation in privatization of utilities and coal mines; union participation in company defining the spot price of electricity	Cooperation
Telecom.1 1989–90 (privatization and restructuring)	Nine yearly strikes in 1990 is the peak after an average of 4.5 yearly strikes during the previous administration	Employee-owned stock and labor director, voluntary retirements for layoffs, subsidy for the union health fund, executive appointments for the allied leaders	Opposition
Telecom.2 1991–94 (restructuring and outsourcing)	Drop in strikes to one yearly strike	Union participation in training, voluntary retirements for layoffs for the workers in the main companies	Cooperation
Oil-1 1990–91 (restructuring)	Drop in average yearly strikes from 4.6 in 1984–88 to 1.5 in 1990–91	Voluntary retirements for layoffs; subsidies to the union to organize its own health fund	Cooperation

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APPENDIX (*cont.*)

Argentina			
Case	*Militancy*	*Concessions*	*Category*
Oil-2 1992 (privatization)	Yearly strikes averaged 0.5 in 1992–93	Union obtained monopoly of representation despite the existance of private oil workers' union; subsidies to the union to buy parts of the firm sold out by private owners with start-up contracts for hiring laid-off workers	Cooperation
Auto-1 1990–91 (between trade liberalization and the automobile regime)	Militancy increased from an average of 14.2 yearly strikes in 1984–89 to 18.5 yearly strikes in 1990–91	In 1991 unions and producers obtained a regime that protected the industry from competition	Opposition
Auto-2 1992–94 (automobile regime)	Militancy drops to 4.3 yearly strikes in 1992–94	Union and producers obtained the renewal of the automobile regime	Cooperation
Education-1 (decentralization law 1992)	Teachers' militancy was high with forty-four yearly strikes in 1989–94; proportion over total strikes increases to 44.5 percent in 1991 and 35.4 percent in 1992	No concessions	Resistance

SOURCES: Militancy data on Venezuela comes from the annual reports of the Secretary of Labor, a press chronology, and information of the labor relations' departments of CANTV, CADAFE, Ford Motors, and PDVSA. Militancy data on Mexico comes from a press chronology based on the archives of Entorno Laboral and from the Secretary of Labor. Strike data in Argentina is from the annual reports (1984–95) of the Consejo Técnico de Inversiones. Sources for concessions are labor contracts, government and union documents, press chronologies, and personal interviews with actors.

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CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries

By EVA BELLIN*

DO social forces matter in democratic transition? Most of the recent literature on democratization would argue to the contrary. A surge of new research has focused on the role of elites and leadership, the importance of political institutions, and the consequences of strategic choice for democratic reform.[1] Democracy is variously portrayed in these studies as the crafted product of enlightened elites, the path-dependent yield of sticky institutions, or simply a conjunctural outcome. Although social forces are occasionally given the nod by inquiries into the strength of associational life[2] or the role played by coalitions,[3] this research has been overwhelmed by the flood of state-centric work that has dominated comparative politics for the past decade.[4] As Remmer points out, enthusiasm for bringing the state

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[1] See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Guiseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); John Higley and Richard Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Barbara Geddes, "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 28 (July 1995); Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996).

[2] See Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Augustus Richard Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

[3] See Deborah Yashar, *Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997); Gregory Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[4] Recent exceptions include Ruth Berins Collier, *The Contradictory Alliance: State, Labor Relations and Regime Change in Mexico*, University of California Research Series, no. 83 (Berkeley: University of California, 1992); Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney, *Labor and Democratization; Comparing the First and Third Waves in Europe and Latin America*, Institute of Industrial Relations, Working Paper no. 62 (Berkeley: University of California, May 1995).

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back in has pushed society out, largely excluding social forces from comparative analysis.[5]

It was not always so. A long tradition in political science put social forces—and more specifically *social classes*—center stage when explaining democratic outcomes. Both liberals and Marxists writing in the tradition of political economy long pointed to the protagonists of capitalist industrialization as the historical agents of democratization (although there was disagreement over which protagonist played the leading role). Focused primarily on the historical experience of the early industrializing countries of Western Europe, these scholars fell into two schools.

One school, led by Moraze, Hobsbawm, and Moore, identified the capitalist class as the class agent of democracy.[6] Moore summarized this view in his inimitable phrase "no bourgeoisie, no democracy." According to this school, West European democracy was the consequence of capitalists colliding with the absolutist state over the traditional, feudal barriers it posed to capitalist advance. Motivated by this material interest, capitalists mobilized their burgeoning economic power to create parliamentary institutions and impose parliamentary control over the state.[7]

A second school, led by Marshall, Thompson, Bendix, Therborn, and, most recently, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, identified the working class as the class agent of democracy.[8] According to this school, the political achievements of the capitalist class fell far short of democracy. Capitalists, they argued, were primarily interested in establishing liberal forms of rule, not democracy. While capitalists supported the introduction of representative government and the protection of civil liberties, they opposed the extension of political rights to the lower classes—which for these scholars is the mark of true democracy. In-

[5]Karen L. Remmer, "Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: The Resurgence of Institutional Analysis," *World Politics* 50 (October 1997), 57. See also Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[6]Charles Moraze, *The Triumph of the Middle Classes* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968); Eric Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1969); and Barrington Moore, *Social Orgins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[7]James R. Kurth, "Industrial Change and Political Change: A European Perspective," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin American* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

[8]T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Pantheon, 1963); Reinhard Bendix, *Nation Building and Citizenship* (New York: Wiley Press, 1964); Goran Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," *New Left Review* 103 (1977); and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

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stead, it was the working class, organizationally empowered by capitalist development and materially motivated by the desire to seek political redress for its economic subordination, that fought for universal suffrage. As such, the working class was the true champion of democratization in Western Europe.[9]

Despite their differences, however, both schools agreed on at least three central verities of democratic transition. (1) Democracy is neither an evolutionary necessity nor a conjunctural outcome; rather it is the product of *struggle* in which social forces play a central role. (2) *Interest*, not enlightenment, drives regime change. And (3) among the panoply of interests that animate people politically, *material* interests trump all others. This analysis suggests that social forces are most likely to champion democracy when their economic interests put them at odds with the authoritarian state.

But if capital and labor played an important role in championing democratic reform in the early industrializing countries of Western Europe (as the classic works of political economy argue),[10] the question is whether these social forces are likely to play a comparable role in the context of late development. A brief survey of late-developing countries shows wide variation in the enthusiasm of capital and labor for the democratic project. Organized labor has been an enthusiastic champion of democratization in some contexts (Korea, Chile, Zambia) but a more diffident partisan elsewhere (Mexico, Tunisia, Egypt). Private sector industrialists have championed democratization in some

[9] Revisionist historians have taken issue with any simple mythology that ascribes the rise of West European democracy to the work of a single, self-conscious social class, whether capitalists or workers; see Alex Callinicos, "Bourgeois Revolutions and Historical Materialism," *International Socialism* 43 (June 1989). Classes were internally divided, individual classes were often forced into coalitions with others to achieve political success, and other factors (institutional, international) also shaped regime change. The best works of political economy recognize the complexity of this process. In fact, a careful reading of Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (fn. 8) reveals a nuanced argument along just these lines. See Thomas Ertman, "Democracy and Dictatorship in Interwar Europe Revisited," *World Politics* 50 (April 1998).

But acknowledging the importance of preexisting institutions and the agency of elites does not deny the central role played by social forces in democratic transition. Elites do not operate in a vacuum: their political choices are governed not only by ideals and interests but also by social realities (for example, the economic pressure posed by the threat of capital flight; the political pressure posed by the threat of organized and potentially destabilizing popular protest). And institutions are themselves a creation of the political process, subject to change in the face of political pressure and struggle. Democratization itself is an example of institutional transformation, bought through the struggle of opposing interests that are equipped with different resources and agendas. The question is not so much *whether* social forces play a key role in the struggle for democratization as *which* social forces are likely to take up the cause.

[10] Recent studies have challenged this position. See Collier and Mahoney (fn. 4), who argue persuasively that labor played a much more negligible role in the first wave of democratic transition than that proposed by Therborn and others.

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places (Korea by the mid-1980s, Brazil by the late 1980s) but have disdained it in others (Indonesia, Singapore, Syria). Can this variation be explained?

Level of economic development alone cannot account for it. Enthusiasm for democracy among industrialists and labor does not directly correlate with growth in per capita GNP, contra the expectations of old and new versions of modernization theory. In some cases private sector industrialists have proven most enamored of democratic transition precisely in moments of great economic decline (Brazil); in others, they have proven highly suspicious of democratization even in a context of spectacular economic growth (Indonesia, Malaysia). Similarly, some trade union movements have campaigned for democratization at times of great growth (Korea) while others have embraced it in a context of economic catastrophe (Zambia).

Cultural heritage also proves less than decisive. Comparisons drawn intertemporally within country cases as well as between countries with similar cultural endowments reveal dramatic variation in the enthusiasm of labor and industrialists for democracy, even as culture remains constant. Egypt and Tunisia, for example, possess similar cultural heritages (both are majoritarian Sunni Muslim countries, relatively unriven by ethnic cleavage, and saddled with a long history of West European colonialism), yet organized labor exhibits very different attitudes toward democratization in the two countries. Similarly, intertemporal comparison within the cases of Brazil and Korea shows a dramatic increase in industrialists' enthusiasm for democracy over the past fifteen years. Yet one would be hard pressed to argue that this shift was preceded by a revolution in the core cultural endowments of either country.

This article offers an alternative framework for explaining the variation in class support for democratization in the context of late development. Close study of a few core cases, in addition to more cursory examination of several others, helps specify the conditions under which capital and labor are more or less likely to embrace democratization. Although the article subscribes to the central verities of the political economy tradition, it argues that the peculiar conditions of late development often make capital and labor much more ambivalent about democratization than was the case for their counterparts among early industrializers. The theory will specify the conditions that give rise to this diffidence but will also suggest (and empirically anchor) the way these conditions may change to make both social forces more enthusiastic about democratic reform. The general lesson of this examination is

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that capital and labor are *contingent* democrats[11] for the very reason that they are *consistent* defenders of their material interests. Like their predecessors, capital and labor in late-developing countries will champion democratic institutions when these institutions are perceived as advancing their material interests. But the pairing of material and democratic interest is contingent upon specific historical circumstances that are not necessarily replicated in the context of late development. Briefly put, capital and labor's enthusiasm for democracy largely turns on two variables. For capital, the two variables are state dependence and fear; for labor, they are state dependence and aristocratic position. Enthusiasm for democracy varies inversely with class score on these two variables. Where that score is split, class attitude toward democratization is indeterminate and other variables come into play.

To support this argument, the article begins with a discussion of the theoretical logic underlying the contingency hypothesis. It proceeds with empirical investigation of two core cases for capital (Indonesia and Korea) and two for labor (Mexico and Korea)—cases chosen for their dramatic variation on the dependent variable. Additional cases (Mexico and Saudi Arabia for capital; Egypt for labor) are added to correct for collinearity that appears in the two independent variables. Finally, a number of other cases (Tunisia, Brazil, and Zambia) are presented to eliminate rival hypothesis.[12]

Limited space prevents absolute parallelism in the cases investigated for capital and labor; it also precludes recounting the experience of capital and labor for every country mentioned (sixteen case studies in all, not counting intertemporal variation). Fortunately, the logic of comparison does not require exhaustive parallelism. Recounting the tale of some omitted cases (for example, Tunisian capital) would be largely redundant (its experience parallels that of Indonesian capital along our key variables) and would add little leverage to our hypothesis. Re-

[11] Guillermo O'Donnell describes the private sector's commitment to democracy as "contingent"; see O'Donnell, "Substantive or Procedural Consensus? Notes on the Latin American Bourgeoisie," in Douglas Chalmers, Maria de Souza, and Akko A. Boron, eds., *The Right and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1992).

[12] To disprove the hypothesis that cultural heritage determines political disposition toward democracy, Tunisia and Brazil are added to the discussion of labor and capital, respectively. Using Mill's method of difference, comparison is drawn between cases showing overall similarity in cultural endowment (Tunisia and Egypt for labor; Brazil pre- and post-1980s for capital) but possessing a crucial difference in our independent variables, resulting in a crucial difference in outcome. To disprove the hypothesis that economic growth and prosperity determine political disposition toward democracy, Zambia and Brazil are also added to the discussion of labor and capital. Using Mill's method of agreement, comparison is drawn between cases showing overall difference in level of economic growth and prosperity (Zambia and Korea for labor; Brazil and Korea for capital) but sharing crucial similarity in their values on our independent variables, resulting in a striking similarity in outcome.

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counting the tale of other omitted cases (for example, Saudi labor) would only confuse our discussion with exceptional conditions (for example, the fact that the vast majority of workers in Saudi Arabia are nonnationals with short-term horizons in the kingdom and little interest in shaping Saudi political institutions).

Careful case selection cannot eliminate all the methodological problems involved in drawing scientific inference here. The investigation of ten cases does not eliminate the problem of indeterminacy when four independent variables are proposed. Furthermore, case selection on the dependent variable introduces the possibility of biased results. As King, Keohane, and Verba observe, only *random* selection of *many multiple* cases can truly verify theory.[13] Nevertheless, the evidence presented seems sufficient to suggest the plausibility, if not the incontrovertibility, of the contingency hypothesis.

The Theory

State dependence, fear, and aristocratic position shape capital and labor's disposition toward democratization. Each of these variables merits elaboration. With regard to capital, state dependence refers to the degree to which private sector profitability is subject to the discretionary support of the state. Such support is typically delivered in the form of subsidized inputs, protected market position, close collaboration in the definition of economic policy, and state containment of labor and the capital poor. Two quite different state logics may fuel such support. Where the state is developmental (for example, Japan and Korea), it identifies national prosperity with that of the private sector and explicitly sponsors the development of the latter with the aim of achieving rapid economic growth.[14] By contrast, where the state is patrimonial (for example, Indonesia and Senegal), it also identifies prosperity with that of the private sector, but here the state's governing objective is not the achievement of rapid economic growth for the nation as a whole so much as personal gain for state elites.

But whatever the governing logic of the state, sponsorship makes the private sector diffident about democratization because capitalists recognize that their profitability hinges on state discretion. Therefore, in

[13] Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 115–49.

[14] The term "developmental state" was coined by Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982).

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both developmental and patrimonial cases, cozy collaboration with state elites, not public contestation and opposition, is the key to economic success. Where state elites are hostile to the project of democratic reform (and few authoritarian rulers relish the thought of relinquishing unaccountable power), private sector entrepreneurs are careful to keep their distance from it.

Private sector capital is also likely to be wary of democratization for reasons that *do* vary with the character of the state. Where developmental logic rules, relations between the private sector and the state are typically positive and collaborative. So long as the state generally anticipates the interests of private sector capital, capital does not feel compelled to create formal democratic institutions to ensure state accountability. Where patrimonial logic rules, however, private sector profitability typically resides in shady relations with state elites. Under these conditions, transparency, one of the standard selling points of democracy, is likely to prove less attractive to entrepreneurs. In this way, "collaborative profitability" whether governed by patrimonial or developmental logic discourages enthusiasm for democratization among private sector capitalists.

Beyond the logic of collaborative profitability, the second variable that hinders private sector enthusiasm for democracy is fear. Private sector capital everywhere is concerned, first and foremost, with protecting property rights and securing the long-term profitability of its investments through the guarantee of order.[15] But where poverty is widespread and the poor are potentially well mobilized (whether by communists in postwar Korea or by Islamists in contemporary Egypt), the mass inclusion and empowerment associated with democratization threatens to undermine the basic interests of many capitalists. At best, such inclusion threatens to flood politics with "the logic of distribution" rather than the "logic of accumulation."[16] At worst, it potentially confers upon the propertyless the means to overturn the social order. Thus, for many capitalists, democratization is associated with a deep sense of social threat and is regarded with distrust.

Why should state dependence and fear prove to be more significant barriers to democratic commitment among late-developing capitalists than among their predecessors?

[15] See Leigh Payne, *Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

[16] See Thomas Callaghy, "Civil Society, Democracy and Economic Change in Africa: A Dissenting Opinion about Resurgent Societies," in John Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 243.

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First, as Alexander Gerschenkron made clear,[17] late development heightens the dependence of capitalists on the state. Embarking on the process of industrialization in a world already industrialized, commercially integrated, and highly competitive means that private sector capitalists typically seek state help with capital accumulation (since the start-up capital for late industrializers often exceeds the capabilities of individual, first-generation entrepreneurs) and with trade protection (in the form of tariff barriers, import quotas, and so on). Such heightened state dependence makes private sector capitalists all the more wary of embracing political projects unpopular with state elites. By contrast, lower start-up costs and a less integrated international economy made the success of early industrializers significantly less contingent on state support, endowing capitalists with much greater political latitude.

Second, the developmental mission that guides state sponsorship in many late-developing countries also encourages private sector capitalists to cleave to the state and eschew the cause of democracy. Where the state is developmental, private sector capital can expect it to anticipate their interests to a large degree. This contrasts sharply with conditions faced by early industrializers whose feudal state was perceived to be hostile to capital. It was precisely this hostility that fueled capital's democratic conversion during the first transition. But in late-developing countries where the authoritarian state is often seen to be serving the interests of private sector capital, why embrace democracy?

Finally, one might wonder why capital would be more fearful of democracy today than during the first transition. Poverty after all was no less pervasive in eighteenth- or nineteenth-century England than it is today in many late-developing countries, and so the empowerment of the poor should have posed a comparable threat to capital's interests and made early capitalists equally leery of democracy. The difference, however, lies not in the relative number of poor people in society across time but rather in the degree of mass empowerment proposed by the democratic project in each era. During the first transition the hegemonic discourse on democracy had a distinctly liberal cast rather than an inclusionary one. Hence, capital's embrace of democracy was understood to be entirely consistent with exclusion of the propertyless. Since then, however, democracy has come to stand for mass inclusion, making it difficult for contemporary democratic discourse to justify exclusion based on property, race, or gender. The evolution in ideas, then,

[17] Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

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goes far toward explaining capital's divergent enthusiasm for democracy across time. With democratization spelling mass empowerment today, many capitalists in late-developing countries are more diffident about embracing this political project.

What about organized labor? Labor's enthusiasm for democracy turns largely on two variables: state dependence and aristocratic position. State dependence refers to the degree to which organized labor depends on state support for its organizational viability, vitality, and clout. Labor everywhere, with its reliance on *collective* action to establish influence, is much more dependent upon the state than is private sector capital.[18] But beyond this run-of-the-mill dependence, labor's reliance on the state can be deepened by the state's adoption of a corporatist strategy that provides unions with financial and organizational support in exchange for political loyalty and self-restraint. This arrangement provides labor with material benefits far in excess of what its true market power can deliver—but at the price of its autonomy.

Labor's dependence upon the state gives rise to diffidence about democratization for reasons similar to those that operate in the case of capital. Labor comes to fear biting the hand that feeds it, that is, jeopardizing the flow of state benefits by embracing political projects that are certain to evoke the wrath of state elites. To the contrary, organized, state-dependent labor believes its interests are better served by maintaining collaborative, not contestatory, relations with the state.

The second variable modulating labor's enthusiasm for democracy is aristocratic position—the degree to which organized labor is economically privileged vis-à-vis the general population. Where organized labor enjoys such a privileged stance, it is likely to exhibit a degree of "dissolidarity" with the unorganized masses in the informal sector and/or agriculture. Under such conditions, and especially where labor's aristocratic position is a consequence of political intervention rather than a reflection of true market power, labor will perceive its interests to be better served by maintaining a cozy relationship with the state (even if the institutional arrangements are authoritarian), rather than by championing institutions that make the state accountable to mass interests (that is, democracy).

Again, conditions of late development heighten the probability that labor will be state dependent and/or aristocratic and hence more diffident about the democratic project. Late development typically spells structural weakness for labor because it is accompanied by industrial-

[18] Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action," in *Political Power and Social Theory* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1980).

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ization in a context of global capital mobility. This situation universalizes the "reserve army" of labor and undermines the bargaining power of workers. Late timing also means the importation of industrial technology that tends to be capital intensive rather than labor intensive, and this exacerbates the problem of labor surplus and further weakens labor's market position. Such weakness encourages labor to look to the state for political remedies, fostering union dependence and nurturing diffidence about contestatory politics. At the same time, the problems of labor surplus and mass poverty mean that the minority of workers who are organized in the formal sector are likely to be privileged vis-à-vis the majority, an economic privilege jealously guarded by organized labor. The result is that the interests of the unions are quite distinct from those of the unorganized poor, and this discourages the unions from fighting for state accountability to mass preferences.

Of course none of this is cast in stone. Economic growth may absorb labor surplus and diminish labor's structural weakness and dependence upon the state. Economic growth and/or welfarist public policy may reduce mass poverty and diminish capital's sense of social threat. Fiscal crisis or political exigencies internal to the authoritarian state may lead it to reduce its sponsorship of private sector capital, leading capital to reconsider the advantage of coziness over formalized accountability as the surest route to profitability. Under such conditions capital and labor may reconsider the advantages offered by democratic reform. For labor, democracy holds out the promise of civil liberties such as freedom of speech and association—the bedrock of collective action and collective power. For capital, democracy holds out the promise of institutionalized accountability and transparency—the means to more predictable influence over policy for the well organized and the well heeled. Thus, after weighing the costs and benefits, capital and labor may be converted to the democratic cause. But their commitment is always refracted through the prism of interest and can be predicted only on the basis of a clear understanding of this interest and the variables that shape it.

The power of our variables to explain class commitment to democracy will be explored in depth in two core cases each for capital and labor, with more cursory corroboration drawn from six other country cases. Capital's dependence on the state will be measured in terms of dependence on subsidized inputs, protected markets, and cronyistic relations with state elites. Capital's sense of fear or threat will be measured in terms of the pervasiveness of poverty, the organizational

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strength of the capital poor (for example, membership levels in the Communist Party), and past incidence of popular violence. Labor's dependence on the state will be measured in terms of union dependence on state subsidies and union members' access to state-subsidized benefits (for example, credit and housing), as well as the politically manipulated (inflated) setting of wage levels. Labor's aristocratic position will be measured in terms of differentials found between the organized and unorganized in matters of wage levels, access to stable employment, social security, and other nonwage benefits such as legally mandated job security. While these variables are not exhaustive, they anticipate a great deal of the variation found in class commitment to democracy, both among cases and even more powerfully *within* cases across time. A schematic summary of the argument and positioning of the cases is presented in Figures 1 and 2.

Fear	State Dependence: High	State Dependence: Low
High	**Antidemocracy** Indonesia	**Leaning Democratic** Mexico (by the 1970s)
Low	**Ambivalent** Saudi Arabia	**Prodemocracy** Korea (by mid-1980s) Brazil (by the 1980s)

FIGURE 1
PRIVATE SECTOR CAPITAL: CHAMPION OF DEMOCRACY?

Aristocratic Position	State Dependence: High	State Dependence: Low
High	**Antidemocracy** Mexico (CTM) Tunisia	**Leaning Democratic** Null
Low	**Ambivalent** Egypt	**Prodemocracy** Korea Zambia

FIGURE 2
ORGANIZED LABOR: CHAMPION OF DEMOCRACY?

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Capital and Democratization

Indonesia: Patrimonial Capitalism, Fear, and Democratically Diffident Capitalists[19]

Until relatively recently Indonesia was celebrated for its success as one of Southeast Asia's most rapidly growing "tigers." But like many other successful Asian countries, Indonesia put the lie to any assumption that economic growth necessarily spells enthusiasm for democracy among the social classes that are its primary beneficiaries.[20] Specifically, private sector capitalists in Indonesia have proved consistently reluctant to embrace projects to democratize the country. To explain the business community's alliance with authoritarianism, we must explore the historic character of the state's relationship with the private sector and the prevalence of social fear within the business community.

From independence onward the Indonesian state consistently championed the development of private sector capital, especially the development of an *indigenous* (that is, Malay) capitalist class. To this end, the state gave indigenous entrepreneurs preferential access to essential business benefits such as government contracts, licenses, bank credit, and trade protection. It put into effect an "entrepreneurial affirmative action program" designed to boost the number of indigenous entrepreneurs (*pribumi*) by legislative fiat. And it embraced the practice of "bureaucratic capitalism," which permitted public officials to become entrepreneurs even while in office.[21]

State sponsorship of private sector development was patrimonial in nature. Public officials distributed government support to private firms with an eye to securing personal profit and a political clientele. Officials doubling as entrepreneurs used their control over the allocation of licenses, concessions, and credit to promote their own companies—blurring the boundary between the public and private sectors. Nevertheless, the private sector flourished and grew dramatically over the first four decades of Indonesian independence.

[19] This analysis draws extensively on Richard Robison, *Power and Economy in Suharto's Indonesia* (Manilla, Philippines: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1990); Kevin Hewison et al., eds., *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Capitalism* (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1993); Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986); and Andrew MacIntyre, *Business and Politics in Indonesia* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991).

[20] See Jacques Bertrand, "Growth and Democracy in Southeast Asia," *Comparative Politics* 30 (April 1998); David Martin Jones, "Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia," *Comparative Politics* 30 (January 1998).

[21] Robison (fn. 19, 1986), 167; Hewison et al. (fn. 19), 46.

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The character of state sponsorship explains much of the private sector's diffidence about democratization. The fact that licenses, contracts, and credit were distributed on a discretionary basis, with access governed by political logic (or official gain), rather than by publicly formulated, economically rational criteria, meant that entrepreneurs were wise to nurture cozy relations with state elites. The fact that much of the business collaboration between state elites and private sector actors was quite shady in nature, if not outrightly corrupt, made political transparency (a good associated with democracy) less attractive. The fact that many officials doubled as entrepreneurs reassured the business community that state elites would anticipate private sector interests when formulating public policy, obviating the need for more formal mechanisms of accountability. Private sector capitalists thus had reason to be diffident about championing democratization. So long as the state continued to deliver economic prosperity, private sector capital had little incentive to push for political reform.

But if dependence on state support fostered private sector diffidence about democratization, then so did fear, which for the business community in Indonesia had three underlying components. First, there was the problem of widespread poverty and the fact that mass empowerment had historically been associated with threats to the social order. During the late 1950s and early 1960s more than 60 percent of Indonesians lived below the poverty line.[22] Pervasive poverty helped fuel the popularity of a strong Communist Party, with a membership approaching three million by the mid-1960s;[23] by 1965 the party had been implicated in a regime-threatening coup. The sense of revolutionary danger that pervaded Indonesia at the time turned the propertied classes against democratic experiments and pushed them into the arms of authoritarian stability. This was a historic legacy that lingered.

But even after the Communist Party had been decimated by the military in 1965 and rapid economic growth had reduced mass poverty in the 1970s and 1980s, the business community still had reason to fear mass empowerment. From the early 1980s onward the regime's development strategy turned on the exploitation of a docile labor force—which required containment of the masses, not their empowerment.

[22] Hal Hill, ed., *Indonesia's New Order* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 57; World Bank, *World Bank Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 41–43.

[23] The party also organized upwards of sixteen million citizens in its mass organizations of peasants, trade unionists, women, and youth, and in the 1955 national elections it won 16.4 percent of the popular vote, making it one of the big four parties in Indonesia. Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (Boston: Routledge, 1978), 113.

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The growing labor unrest of the 1980s and 1990s only reinforced capital's belief that a repressive state apparatus was essential to economic success.[24]

Finally, the business community's fear of mass empowerment had a third component, namely, ethnic conflict and the tendency for class warfare to take on ethnic coloration in Indonesia. Because the vast majority of domestic capitalists hail from the Chinese minority (while most Indonesians are Muslim Malay), class discontent over inequity and exploitation is frequently channeled along ethnic/religious lines, with protest expressed in the language of Islamic populism and riots directed against the Chinese community as a whole.[25] Violence against the Chinese community has been a recurrent problem, growing in intensity since the 1950s and culminating most recently in the May 1998 "orgy of looting, plundering, and fire-raising" aimed at Chinese businesses.[26] As a result, the Chinese suffer from a sense of social vulnerability that has long led many Chinese capitalists to prize stability over freedom and a strong authoritarian state over popular empowerment.

For these reasons then, private sector capital in Indonesia has historically proven unenthusiastic about democratization. The private sector's dependence upon the state for its profitability, as well as its fear of mass empowerment have long allied it with the authoritarian order.[27] Nor have recent events prodded the political conversion of the private sector. Catastrophic economic crisis in 1997–98 fueled regime change in Indonesia and a tentative transition toward democracy. But it also quadrupled mass poverty (eighty million now live below the poverty line) and sparked violent interthnic strife.[28] Both have fanned the business community's traditional fears about mass empowerment and this, together with concerns about the new regime's (IMF-supported) attacks on business-state cronyism, have left business leaders skeptical about, if not actually hostile to, Indonesia's fragile new regime.[29]

[24] R. William Liddle and Rizal Mallarageng, "Indonesia in 1996," *Asian Survey* 37 (February 1997).

[25] Hewison et al. (fn. 19), 58–60; Robison (fn. 19, 1986), 274–76, 315–20; MacIntyre (fn. 19), 3.

[26] *Country Report, Indonesia, Economist* Intelligence Unit (2d quarter, 1998), 19. For accounts of earlier anti-Chinese violence, see "Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia, 1959–68," in J. A. C. Mackie, *The Chinese in Indonesia* (Sydney: Australia Institute of International Affairs, 1976).

[27] Robison (fn. 9, 1986), 150–52; Jacques Bertrand, "Business as Usual in Suharto's Indonesia," *Asian Survey* 37 (May 1997), 443.

[28] Adam Schwartz and Jonathan Paris, eds., *The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 2–9.

[29] *Country Report, Indonesia, Economist* Intelligence Unit (3d quarter, 1998), 13.

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South Korea: Variation Proves the Rule[30]

The South Korean case, like that of Indonesia, confirms the importance of state dependence and fear for shaping the political disposition of private sector capital in the context of late development. But ultimately, the Korean case provides more compelling evidence of this relationship thanks to its internal variation. During the first few decades of the postwar era, the high level of state dependence and the prevalence of fear within the Korean business community spelled private sector diffidence toward democratization. From the mid-1980s, however, political and economic developments in the international and domestic arenas signaled important changes in the character of state sponsorship, the extent of state dependence, and the prevalence of social fear in the business community. Coincident with these changes, private sector capitalists began to exhibit significant enthusiasm for political reform and democratization. This variation over time provides compelling confirmation of the role played by our two variables in shaping the political inclinations of private sector capital. It also testifies to the intrinsically contingent nature of the political leanings of private sector capital.

For the sake of conciseness and because the logic of this period largely replicates that of the Indonesian case, the analysis of South Korean capital's first four postwar decades is given in brief. At this time the character of state sponsorship played a key role in fostering private sector diffidence about democratization. During the patrimonial rule of Syngman Rhee both the genesis and the success of private sector firms turned on political mediation and access to the state's discretionary favor. Cronyism governed the start of many private sector firms.[31] And preferential access to government-controlled resources (including tax breaks, trade monopolies, foreign-aid disbursement, and low-interest loans) governed private sector growth.[32] Neither nurtured a culture of political contestation or kindled a desire for transparency among

[30] This analysis draws extensively on Carter Eckert, "The South Korean Bourgeoisie: A Class in Search of Hegemony," *Journal of Korean Studies* 7 (Fall 1990); idem, *Korea Old and New* (Cambridge: Ilchokak, Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); Hagen Koo, *State and Society in Contemporary Korea* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Karl Fields, *Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Nora Hamilton and Eun Mee Kim, "Economic and Political Liberalisation in South Korea and Mexico," *Third World Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (1993); George Ogle, *South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle* (London: Zed Press, 1990).

[31] Eckert (fn. 30, 1990), 40; Ogle (fn. 30), 42.

[32] Fields (fn. 30), 31–40; Minho Kuk, "The Governmental Role in the Making of Chaebol," *Asian Perspective* 12, no. 1 (1988), 110–17.

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Korea's business elites. Later, under Park Chung Hee the state adopted a more developmental ethos, but this did not reduce the private sector's dependence. The state retained discretionary control over the distribution of resources, such as credit and foreign currency, that were critical to the private sector, and this continued to nurture a culture of compliance within the business community, as well as a lack of interest in political campaigns that might jeopardize the flow of state benefits.[33]

The state's conversion to a developmental ethos fostered private sector diffidence about democratization in a second way as well. By prioritizing economic development and identifying public welfare with private sector growth, the state proved extremely attentive to capital's interests. Business leaders thus felt little need to push for more formal mechanisms of accountability.

But the private sector's lack of interest in democracy at this time was also fueled by fear, specifically fear of the revolutionary potential of mass empowerment. Korea emerged from the Korean War an impoverished country (an estimated ten million were without homes, adequate food, or medical care),[34] and its poor had historically found revolutionary inspiration (and organizational wherewithal) in a popular and activist Communist Party. Although actual membership in the Korean Communist Party remained small (at between forty and sixty thousand members), the party's extraordinary capacity to organize citizens in a network of youth, labor, and peasant organizations meant it could mobilize hundreds of thousands, if not millions, for communist purposes.[35] Enfranchising the poor thus had the potential to threaten the capitalist social order. The victory of communism in North Korea and the continuing state of war between North and South only heightened the sense of danger felt by capital interests. Private sector capitalists were also disinclined to embrace mass empowerment because of its potential to undermine Korea's development strategy. Like Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s, Korea in the 1950s and 1960s embraced a strategy of export-oriented industrialization whose success turned on the repression and exclusion of labor. Democratization, which potentially might empower labor, loomed as an unwelcome prospect for Korean capitalists.

[33] State monopoly of the banking system (1961–80) and state supervision of access to foreign loans and grants endowed it with substantial financial power; Fields (fn. 30), 95–96, 121.

[34] Parvez Hasan, *Korea* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 26. In 1953 Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world with a GNP per capita of $67 (in 1996 dollars); Byong-Nak Song, *The Rise of the Korean Economy* (Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 60.

[35] Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 268.

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For the better part of the postwar era, then, Korean capitalists closed ranks behind the authoritarian state. By the mid 1980s, however, the political attitudes of capital had shifted, moving away from a culture of passivity and consent and toward frank embrace of political contestation and democratization. The first glimmers of this shift came in 1986–87, when the leading business confederation (the Federation of Korean Industries) advanced a new political agenda, boldly independent of the ruling party.[36] More dramatic evidence came in 1991, when Chung Ju Yung, the founder and chair of the Hyundai group, one of Korea's largest chaebol, established a new political party designed to challenge the ruling DJP. The party managed to win 17 percent of the popular vote in the general elections of 1992, and later that year Chung even made a bid for the presidency.[37] Such assertiveness marked an important departure for capital.

Much of this new political orientation away from complicity in authoritarian rule and toward embrace of democratic contestation and pluralism is explained by the reduction in the private sector's dependence upon, and receipt of, state support, in addition to a general decline in social fear. During the 1980s and 1990s two factors led the Korean state to reduce its sponsorship of private sector industry. First, the worldwide recession engendered by the oil crisis of 1979 created serious difficulties for Korea's highly indebted, trade-dependent economy. The Chun regime was forced to adopt a wide-ranging program of structural reform that decreased state support for the private sector. Credit supplies were reduced, policy loans were eliminated, protection of the domestic market was decreased, and a new trade law ended the long-standing monopoly positions enjoyed by many chaebol in the domestic market.[38] The regime's commitment to economic reform eliminated many of the rents that had long sustained domestic capital in Korea and marked a novel disjuncture in the interests of state and capital.

Second, the country's shift to competitive electoral politics in 1987 created a new political imperative for the regime to woo popular support through political and social reform.[39] As part of its campaign to

[36] Eckert (fn. 30, 1990).

[37] Koo (fn. 30), 47; Fields (fn. 30), 60.

[38] Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon, "The State, Politics, and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea," in Koo (fn. 30).

[39] Eckert (fn. 30, 1990), 377–79. The regime's decision to introduce competitive elections came in response to widespread popular demonstrations for democracy in 1986–87. The pending summer Olympic games, scheduled to be held in Korea in 1988, also subjected the regime to greater international scrutiny and heightened the effectiveness of popular protest. The business community was not at the vanguard of this popular movement. See Hamilton and Kim (fn. 30), 119–20.

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build a popular base, the regime sought to distance itself from big business by attacking the chaebol for corruption and reining in many of their long-standing privileges. The state imposed stricter controls on bank credits and raised inheritance taxes, policies that infuriated the business commuity.[40] In short, structural adjustment and political opening meant that the state would no longer be so reflexively solicitous of business interests. To the contrary, the state directly trampled on business interests, leading many domestic capitalists to view it with increasing distrust. This encouraged business leaders like Chung of Hyundai to look for new ways to make the state more responsive to their interests.

Alongside the reality of declining state support, the private sector's declining *need* for that support also made it more receptive to democratization. During the first postwar decades Korea's late industrialization had spelled private sector dependence upon the state for capital accumulation, entrepreneurial direction, and protection of the local market. But by the mid-1980s many of the grounds for private sector dependence had been eliminated. Korean industry was competitive enough so that state protection from foreign rivals was no longer essential. Korean capital had developed a deep store of entrepreneurial experience, rendering state direction increasingly superfluous.[41] And many of the chaebol were sufficiently large to provide on an in-house basis many of the financial services that the state had previousl supplied.[42] This, together with the liberalization of the banking sector in 1980, the creation of nonstate financial institutions, and the internationalization of financial markets, meant that the business community had access to independent sources of corporate financing beyond the states's control.[43] By the late 1980s the private sector had overcome many of the dependencies associated with latecomer status, and this decreased dependency created new opportunities for capital to break ranks with the regime and embrace political reform.

Finally, a general decline in fear of mass empowerment made business more sympathetic to democratization. By the late 1980s expanding prosperity had decreased the sense that capital and labor were locked in a zero-sum conflict.[44] Although income inequality remained signifi-

[40] Koo (fn. 30), 48.
[41] See Hamilton and Kim (fn. 30), 116; Koo (fn. 30), 47.
[42] Hamilton and Kim (fn. 30), 118.
[43] Koo (fn. 30), 88.
[44] Tat Yan Kong, "Origins of Economic Liberalization and Democratization in South Korea," in Gerd Nonneman, ed., *Political and Economic Liberalization* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 241.

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cant,[45] absolute poverty had largely been eliminated, with less than 10 percent of the population living below the poverty line.[46] Demands for material improvement no longer aroused fears of upheaval. In addition, the global decline of communism reduced the revolutionary implications of popular empowerment, such that domestic mass movements with social welfare agendas were no longer perceived as the foot soldiers of an international revolutionary project. Consequently, capital could be persuaded that mass exclusion was no longer essential to preserving the social order.

Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the extent of capital's conversion to democracy. Its commitment remains contingent on democracy's consistency with its economic interests. And some of these interests (for example, fear of higher wages and lowered profitability of exports) still incline capital toward political repression, especially the containment of labor. But thus far, at least, an overall calculation of interest has not induced capital to abandon support for democracy.

Corroboration from Brazil, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia

The conclusions suggested by the Korean and Indonesian cases for the logic governing capital's contingent commitment to democracy are corroborated by other cases. The Brazilian case, for example, replicates both the intertemporal variation found in Korea, as well as its etiology.[47] Brazil's private sector was closely allied with the country's embrace of authoritarianism in 1964, but by the late 1980s much of the private sector had come to endorse democratization. The reasoning behind this change of heart echoes that of the Korean case.

During the 1960s the private sector was gripped by fear of revolutionary insurgence. Widespread poverty, a radical left eager to mobilize the economically disadvantaged, and a cold war context gave substance to the threat of insurgence. In addition, the private sector, highly dependent on the state for subsidies, contracts, credit, and technology, sought to empower a state that would be responsive to its interests and committed to its growth. Both factors motivated capital to support an

[45] Hagen Koo, "The Political Economy of Income Distribution in South Korea," *World Development* 12, no. 10 (1984), 1030–31. Already by 1978 absolute poverty had declined to 12 percent, down from 41 percent in 1965.

[46] Andrea Savada and William Shaw, eds., *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1992), 177.

[47] This analysis draws extensively on Payne (fn. 15); Fernando Cardoso, "Entrepreneurs and the Transition Process: The Brazilian Case," in Guillermo O'Donnell et al., *Transitions from Authoritarianism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Leigh Payne and Ernest Bartell, eds., *Business and Democracy in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); and O'Donnell (fn. 11).

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authoritarian regime that promised containment of the left and sponsorship of the private sector.[48] By the late 1980s, however, changing conditions had led the private sector to reevaluate its support for authoritarianism. Fear of revolutionary insurgence had dissipated in light of the change in international conditions (the demise of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war) and the deradicalization of the left after two decades of repression. In addition, the authoritarian regime had proven less than fully responsive to capital's interests, privileging public enterprises over private and expanding the state's regulation of the economy at the expense of private sector interests.[49] Thus, both declining fear and declining state support persuaded the private sector to abandon the authoritarian regime and support democratic transition. In this way Brazil's private sector constitutes an archetypical case of contingent democrats. Like their Korean counterparts, they shifted toward an embrace of democracy on the basis of a "utilitarian calculus" of their material interests.[50]

Note that the Brazilian case also helps eliminate rival hypotheses to our theory of democratic contingency. As in Korea, intertemporal comparison within the Brazilian case shows significant variation in private sector enthusiasm for democracy, despite constancy in the country's core cultural endowment. This suggests that cultural heritage alone cannot account for variation in class enthusiasm for democracy. Further, comparison of the Brazilian case with the Korean case reveals significant similarity in private sector enthusiasm for democracy, despite variation in economic context. (Brazil faced economic crisis at the moment of private sector enthusiasm for democracy, whereas Korea was experiencing rapid economic growth.) This suggests that level of economic prosperity alone cannot anticipate variation in class enthusiasm for democracy.

All the cases presented thus far manifest a degree of collinearity between our two independent variables. It is possible, however, to find cases where the two variables do not covary. Where this is true, preliminary evidence suggests that, for capital, state dependence may be a more powerful inhibitor of enthusiasm for democracy. The cases of Mexico and Saudi Arabia support this impression.

Mexico provides a case of *declining* state dependence but *persistently high* social fear for capital. Under these conditions private sector capital

[48] The Goulart regime that existed prior to the 1964 coup was perceived to be unpredictable, incompetent, and inattentive to private sector interests. See Payne (fn. 15), 13

[49] Cardoso (fn. 47), 143.

[50] O'Donnell (fn. 11).

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has been persuaded to embrace democratization.[51] The private sector was long the dependent stepchild of the Mexican revolution. Excluded from any public role in politics but generously nurtured by the state's "alliance for profits," the private sector long acquiesced in the regime's authoritarianism. Beyond dependence on state support, the private sector's alliance with authoritarianism was further fueled by fear. Although the threat of a radical left had largely been shut out by the ruling revolutionary party, the mass poverty and income inequality found in Mexican society were grounds for concern among the propertied classes and reason to support an exclusionary, even repressive, state apparatus.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the rationale for capital's alliance with the authoritarian regime began to unravel. Not that the sources of private sector fear—massive poverty or income inequality—had decreased. If anything these scourges worsened as currency problems and fiscal deficits plunged Mexico into severe economic crisis during the 1980s.[52] Rather, it was the private sector's economic dependence on the state (and its confidence in state sponsorship) that began to decline. At this time there emerged a new group of private sector entrepreneurs who were export oriented and less dependent on state support and protected markets for their prosperity. They resented the state's corrupt intervention in the economy and were vexed by many of its policy decisions, notably the nationalization of banks during the currency crisis of 1982. As private sector entrepreneurs began to question the state's "alliance for profits," an important segment of them also "discovered democracy."[53] They began to push for the democratization of Mexico's political system and spearheaded political pluralization by bankrolling the political party PAN. In the Mexican case decreased state dependence but invariable social threat spelled private sector support for democratization.

In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, state dependence has remained *persistently high* but social threat has *declined*. In this context the private sector has remained largely ambivalent about democratization. The dependence of the private sector on the Saudi state is legendary. Indus-

[51] This analysis draws extensively on Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Business-Government Relations in Mexico: The Case of the Sugar Industry," *Comparative Politics* 13 (January 1981); Roderic Camp, *Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Sylvia Maxfield and Ricard Anzaldua, eds., *Government and Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico* (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1987).

[52] See Sebastian Edwards, *Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Kevin Middlebrook, ed., *Union, Workers, and the State in Mexico* (San Diego: University of California at San Diego Press, 1991).

[53] The phrase is borrowed from Cardoso (fn. 47).

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trial ventures are highly protected and subsidized by the government. Many manufacturing firms register *negative* value added but survive nonetheless thanks to state guarantees of preset profit margins for private sector ventures.[54] The state's "allocative logic"[55] sustains these firms just as it has eliminated a major source of social fear in the Saudi kingdom. Since the mid-1970s the state has funded massive social welfare projects in the country, investing billions of dollars in health, education, housing, and social safety nets to eliminate the problem of mass poverty. Despite this declining social threat, however, the private sector has not judged it advantageous to champion democratization.[56] Although leaders of the business community have expressed an interest in strengthening the rule of law in the kingdom, their political ambitions have fallen far short of democratization. Thus, even as businessmen have circulated petitions calling for due process and a strengthened judicial system, they have continued to declare their fidelity to the Saudi royal family, as well as to the monarchical system of government. Clearly, business elites do not wish to jeopardize their access to state largesse, and this has muted any impulse to push for extensive democratic reform.[57]

As the cases presented thus far demonstrate, private sector capital has shown wide variation in its support for democracy, both across cases and within cases across time. Two variables—degree of state dependence and level of social fear—explain a good deal of this variation. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests an inverse relationship between variables and outcome. That is, as the levels of state dependence and social fear decline, the likelihood that the private sector will embrace democracy increases. Where the score on these two variables is

[54] See Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, *The Rentier State* (New York: Croom Helm, 1987). The dependence of private sector entrepreneurs in nonindustrial ventures (e.g., commerce, real estate, construction) is even more legendary. For a colorful account, see Michael Field, *The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States* (New York: Overlook Press, 1984).

[55] Giacomo Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework," in Luciani, ed., *The Arab State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

[56] See Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Saudi Arabia: A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1993). Of course, the elimination of mass poverty has not eliminated all sources of social threat in Saudi Arabia. Expatriate workers (largely excluded from the state's social welfare benefits), the Shiite minority (which suffers second-class citizenship), and Islamist activists all constitute potential sources of insurrection. Neither of the latter two groups, however, constitutes a popular majority who might use mass empowerment to overturn the status quo. Expatriate workers are not citizens and so would not be empowered by democratization. See R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Journal* 48 (Autumn 1994); Mahdawi al-Rasheed, "Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition," *Current History* 95 (January 1996), 16–22; Peter Wilson and Douglas Graham, *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

[57] On Saudi elites' limited demands for political reform, see F. Greg Gause III, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994).

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split, state dependence proves the more powerful inhibitor of capital's enthusiasm for democracy.

Organized Labor and Democratization

If the preceding empirical investigation makes clear the contingent and instrumental nature of capital's commitment to democratization, further empirical study confirms a similar contingency and instrumentality on the part of organized labor. The two variables governing labor's contingent support for democracy are state dependence and aristocratic position. Again, the evidence suggests an inverse relationship between these variables and enthusiasm for democracy.

Mexico: State Dependence, Aristocratic Privilege, and Democratically Diffident Labor[58]

The Mexican case provides compelling evidence of the *diffident* attitude organized labor may exhibit toward democratization. The leading component of organized labor, the CTM, remained steadfastly allied with the Mexican regime even as that regime's restrictions on civil liberties, repression of the opposition, and repeated noncompetitive elections attested to its authoritarian character. More surprisingly, the CTM persisted in its commitment to authoritarianism even after the regime itself began to move in a more democratic direction.[59] The CTM denounced the regime's legalization of leftist parties in 1977, called for the expulsion of Cardena's reformist movement from the ruling party in 1988, protested opposition successes in the general elections held that year, and refused support to opposition parties in the 1990s. Ponte observes that democratization was organized labor's greatest fear.[60] The question is, why?

Both state dependence and aristocracy prove decisive in explaining the political disposition of the CTM. First, with regard to state dependence, the CTM long enjoyed an authoritarian bargain with the Mexican state. In exchange for the CTM's delivery of reliable political support and industrial peace, the regime provided labor with a host of organi-

[58] This analysis draws extensively on Middlebrook (fn. 52); idem, *The Paradox of the Revolution: Labor, State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Stephen E. Morris, *Political Reformism in Mexico* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Collier (fn. 4); and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (fn. 8).

[59] For explanations of the regime's decision to embrace democratic reform, see Morris (fn. 58), 7–31.

[60] Victor Manuel Durand Ponte, "The Confederation of Mexican Workers, the Labor Congress, and the Crisis of Mexico's Social Pact," in Middlebrook (fn. 52), 94, 101–2. See also Middlebrook (fn. 52), 15; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (fn. 8), 217–19; and Middlebrook (fn. 58), 292, 311.

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zational and material benefits. These included financial subsidies and legal concessions (for example, exclusive domain and closed shop), as well as profit-sharing schemes, privileged access to social-welfare programs, subsidized urban housing and credit, expanded social security, and a nationally defined minimum wage.[61] Although the bargain with labor was lopsided (the state's superior power, both coercive and administrative, enabled it to set the terms of the alliance with labor in a self-serving fashion),[62] the organizational and material benefits delivered by the state *far exceeded what labor could have procured on its own.*

The structurally weak position of organized labor in the Mexican economy made political sponsorship by the state essential for labor's attainment of basic material and social rights.[63] Many factors (for example, high rates of unemployment, geographic dispersal of the labor force, small worker concentration per firm, low overall levels of unionization, and global pressures) undercut the structural position of organized labor in the Mexican economy.[64] Sponsorship by the state compensated for some of this weakness. But the logic of state sponsorship hinged on the persistence of an *authoritarian* bargain in Mexico and, more specifically, on the leverage that labor enjoyed as a key guarantor of popular support for the regime. Because democratization presented the regime with new ways to forge political legitimacy and build popular support, it threatened to rob the labor confederation of its key political trump (and its certainty of political sponsorship). As such, it proved less than attractive.

In addition to labor's dependence on state sponsorship (and the linkage of state sponsorship to an authoritarian system of rule), labor's diffidence about democratization was also a function of its "aristocratic" position in the Mexican economy. Despite decades of development-minded governments, poverty remained rampant,[65] unemployment and

[61] Collier (fn. 4), 59, 83; Ponte (fn. 60), 100; Lawrence Whitehead, "Mexico's Economic Prospects: Implications for State Labor Relations," in Middlebrook (fn. 52), 73.

[62] Middlebrook (fn. 52), 9; Whitehead (fn. 61), 75.

[63] Victoria Murillo, "A Strained Alliance: Continuity and Change in Mexico," David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies Working Paper no. 96–3 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1996); Middlebrook (fn. 58), 288.

[64] Much of this structural weakness was a consequence of (or at least reinforced by) the late timing of Mexican industrialization. Late timing resulted in an immature industrial sector, still overwhelmingly composed of small, geographically dispersed firms. It led to the importation of turnkey projects from industrialized countries whose capital intensity did little to absorb labor surplus. It meant industrialization in the context of global capital mobility, reducing the leverage of local labor. For more, see Middlebrook (fn. 58).

[65] In 1989, 23 percent of Mexicans still lived below the poverty line and 7.3 percent lived in "extreme poverty." Sebastian Edwards, *Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

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underemployment remained high,[66] and the informal economy continued to account for a large proportion of the country's economic activity.[67] In this context unionized workers in Mexico's formal economy occupied a privileged economic position, enjoying access to stable employment, as well as nonwage benefits that far exceeded those enjoyed by the vast majority of their compatriots. These benefits included privileged access to state-subsidized housing, health care, financial credit, and retirement funds.[68] This privilege disjoined labor's interests from those of most other poor Mexicans and gave organized labor little incentive to join forces with other subordinate strata to make the state accountable to mass interests. To the contrary, organized labor had an interest in preserving its special relationship with the state, even if that meant bolstering an authoritarian regime. Thus, the CTM refused to support Cardenas and other left-leaning candidates in their campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s and continued to support the PRI in an effort to sustain the status quo.[69]

In short, diffidence about democracy has been the mark of leading trade unions in Mexico like the CTM. State dependence and aristocratic status go far toward explaining their reluctance to break with authoritarianism.[70]

Korea: State Persecution, Economic Exclusion, and Democratically Committed Labor[71]

In contrast to the Mexican case, organized labor in Korea has long been at the forefront of the struggle for democratization. Authoritarian rule in Korea was interrupted twice during the postwar era, and on both occasions organized labor played an active role in the popular movements

[66] In 1995 urban underemployment reached 25.9 percent and official unemployment figures for urban areas clocked in at 6 percent. See *The Economist: Country Profile, Mexico* (1996–97), 48.

[67] In 1996 the informal sector was the source of jobs for between 20 and 30 percent of the Mexican labor force. *The Economist: Country Profile, Mexico* (1996–97), 10; *Country Report, Mexico, Economist* Intelligence Unit (1st quarter, 1997), 21.

[68] Middlebrook (fn. 58), 221. Wage concessions won by the CTM generally translated into higher minimum wages that benefited all workers, not just union members. See also Wounter van Ginneken, *Socio-Economic Groups and Income Distribution in Mexico* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 68–69.

[69] Ponte (fn. 60), 102.

[70] A counterhypothesis suggested by an anonymous reader argues that internal trade union democracy, more than state dependence or aristocratic position, might be the better predictor of organized labor's support for democracy. But the fact that democratically inclined trade unions have made pacts with authoritarianism when handicapped by structural weakness makes me skeptical; Ponte (fn. 60), 87, 100; and Enrique de la Garza Toledo, "Independent Trade Unionism in Mexico," in Middlebrook (fn. 52), 159, 174. Additional research is necessary to test this counterhypothesis.

[71] This analysis draws extensively on Eckert (fn. 30, 1990); Ogle (fn. 30); Koo (fn. 45); Frederic Deyo, *Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

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agitating for reform.[72] In 1960 workers followed student-initiated protest, organizing scores of strikes and demonstrations that called for an end to corrupt government.[73] Similarly, during the 1980s workers joined forces with students, intellectuals, and church activists to pressure the regime to reform.[74] In contrast to Mexico's CTM, organized labor staunchly allied itself with the cause of democratization in Korea. What explains this divergence in labor's behavior?

The degree of labor's state dependence and aristocratic privilege prove important. Overall, labor did not enjoy a dependent relationship with the state in Korea. Labor's relative independence was a consequence of both state policy and labor's own market position. With regard to the state's posture toward labor, Korea stands in stark contrast to Mexico. In Mexico the regime's "revolutionary" origins inclined it toward alliance with the working class, and an import-substituting strategy of industrialization (that persisted well into the 1970s) provided it with sufficient economic space to accommodate labor's demands. In Korea, by contrast, the regime's emergence in a cold war context and its experience of civil war with the North made it extremely sensitive to the threat of communist overthrow. This spelled hostility toward organized labor, which was perceived as a potential vehicle for communist infiltration. In addition, the regime's early embrace of export-oriented industrialization put a premium on low-cost, quiescent labor, setting the regime at odds with organized labor.

Given these conditions, ruthless repression of labor (not cozy corporatist alliance) emerged as the defining mark of the regime. From the goon squads who hounded labor activists during the U.S. occupation to the legal emptying of the labor movement during Syngman Rhee's reign to the mass arrests of union militants under Park Chung Hee to the espousal of torture and "purification camps" under Chun Doo-Hwan, every postwar government in Korea repressed labor, often brutally.[75] Labor therefore had little incentive to side with the regime and every reason to push for reform that would make the state more responsive to mass interest.

Lack of state support thus gave labor both the independence and the interest to embrace the cause of democratization. But labor's inde-

[72] For historical details, see Eckert (fn. 30, 1990), 352–56; and Hamilton and Kim (fn. 30), 118–21.

[73] Ogle (fn. 30), 13–16.

[74] Eckert (fn. 30, 1990), 380; Jeonge Taik Lee, "Dynamics of Labor Control and Labor Protest in the Process of EOI in South Korea," *Asian Perspective* 12 (Spring 1988), 149; Koo (fn. 30), 39; Ogle (fn. 30), 116.

[75] For details of this repression, see Ogle (fn. 30); Koo (fn. 30); Lee (fn. 74); and Deyo (fn. 71).

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pendence was also fostered by its market position. In contrast to the Mexican case, where high levels of unemployment, low levels of industrialization, and low skill levels spelled a structurally weak position for labor (and hence dependence on state propping), labor in Korea enjoyed a relatively strong structural position. Korea's rapid growth rate and the dramatic expansion of industry led to an increasingly tight labor market that strengthened labor's negotiating muscle.[76] In addition, the regime's shift into heavy industry reinforced labor's position by creating enormous industrial sites that concentrated workers and facilitated trade-union organizing. Furthermore, by focusing on industries that relied on skilled labor, this shift in strategy insulated labor from competition with the poorest of the poor in the global proletariat.[77] In short, Korea's development path favored labor with independent structural power, and this meant labor could look to itself rather than to state propping to advance its interests. This also freed labor to embrace political campaigns not favored by state elites.

Finally, Korean labor also scored low in terms of aristocracy. For all its growing structural strength, labor hardly enjoyed a privileged economic position in Korean society. Wages remained deplorably low, lagging far behind productivity gains and substantially trailing wages in many service sectors.[78] Working conditions were appalling.[79] And working hours were interminable.[80] This hardship was especially difficult for workers, given the material progress made by so many other sectors in society.[81] Workers "came to see themselves as the principal victims of economic development,"[82] not as the beneficiaries of aristocratic privilege. Worse still, the harsh treatment of workers was the deliberate intent of the regime, which saw the extreme exploitation of labor as the cornerstone of its development strategy. In contrast to the situation in Mexico, organized labor in Korea had no special, politically

[76] Koo (fn. 45), 1030; Deyo (fn. 71), 24.

[77] Wage comparison was made with workers in Europe and the U.S., not Bangladesh.

[78] Throughout the 1970s only 10 percent of workers in manufacturing and mining earned incomes equal to the minimum living standard set by the government. Only 50 percent made even half of that standard. Ogle (fn. 30), 76. See also Kong (fn. 44), 240. For figures on the failure of wages to keep pace with gains in productivity, see Hak-Kyu Sohn, *Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea* (London: Routledge, 1989), 234, n. 81. For wage differentials between industrial workers and workers in the service sector and agriculture, see Young-Ki Park, *Labor and Industrial Relations in Korea* (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1979), 102; and Young-Bum Park, *Labor in Korea* (Seoul: Korea Labor Institute, 1993), 59.

[79] Manufacturers routinely ignored even the most basic health and safety regulations; Ogle (fn. 30), 77.

[80] Manufacturing workers averaged the longest workweek in the world, officially clocking in at fifty-four hours per week (though some argue that sixty hours per week was a more common average). Ogle (fn. 30); Deyo (fn. 71), 98.

[81] Kong (fn. 44), 226–37.

[82] Lee (fn. 74), 144.

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mediated privilege to conserve and therefore every reason to support democratization of the political system.

In the Korean case low scores on state dependence and aristocratic position help explain organized labor's interest in and capacity for embracing democratization.

Corroboration from Zambia, Egypt, and Tunisia

The importance of state dependence and aristocratic position for shaping labor's commitment to democracy is further corroborated by evidence from Zambia, Egypt, and Tunisia. The Zambian case confirms that low scores on both these variables incline labor toward championing democratization.[83] The Zambian trade union movement (ZCTU), long one of the strongest in sub-Saharan Africa, was based primarily in copper mining. This sector provided the lion's share of the country's foreign exchange and government revenues. During the 1980s, however, a steep decline in international copper prices plunged the country into economic crisis. Workers experienced a huge erosion in wages, eliminating any vestige of aristocratic privilege.[84] The state, moreover, did nothing to insulate labor from the crisis but rather embarked on an energetic campaign of labor repression.[85] In this context of low aristocracy and negative state sponsorship, Zambia's labor movement emerged as one of the most enthusiastic campaigners for democratization. The ZCTU threw its support behind the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, organizing strikes, mobilizing an extensive network of trade-union committees, and providing key leadership for the cause.[86] Like Korea, Zambia provides an example of a trade-union movement that once cut loose from the moorings of state support and exposed to harsh economic conditions emerges as a major champion of democratic reform. The Zambian case is also useful because it helps eliminate the rival hypothesis that links enthusiasm for democracy with economic growth and prosperity. In Zambia labor's activism on behalf of democratization came precisely at a time of great economic crisis. Compare this with the Korean case, where labor's agitation for democratization developed in a context of economic prosperity.

[83] This analysis draws extensively on Paschal Mihyo, "Against Overwhelming Odds: The Zambian Trade Union Movment," in Henk Thomas, ed., *Globalization and Third World Trade Unions* (London: Zed Books, 1995), 201–14.

[84] Low- and middle-income workers saw their wages decline by an average of 55 percent during the 1980s. See Mihyo (fn. 83), 203.

[85] Ibid., 208.

[86] Ibid., 201. For more, see L. Rakner, *Trade Unions in Processes of Democratization: A Study of Party Labour Relations in Zambia* (Bergen: Michelsen Institute, 1992).

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In contrast to the Zambian case, the experience of organized labor in Tunisia replicates the pattern of the CTM in Mexico and shows that high scores on state dependence and aristocratic position can spell labor diffidence about democratization.[87] Organized labor (the UGTT) in Tunisia long enjoyed a collaborative, if troubled, relationship with the state. The state favored the trade-union movement with financial subsidies, a relatively generous legal context, and a host of wage and nonwage benefits for its members, in exchange for labor's political alliance.[88] These benefits privileged organized workers vis-à-vis workers in the country's massive and unorganized informal sector, and they far exceeded what labor would have commanded unassisted. But though the state favored organized labor in this way, it brooked no hint of political independence on the part of the UGTT and answered even the most minor challenge to state hegemony with brutal and unrelenting repression. As a result, the trade-union movement has distanced itself from the country's fledgling movements for democracy, denying them both financial and symbolic support.[89] In addition, the UGTT has consistently thrown its support to President Ben Ali, despite his regime's increasing repressiveness and authoritarianism. Labor's desire not to upset the apple cart of state patronage and privilege has prevented it from embracing the campaign for democratization.

The cases cited above have shown a fair degree of collinearity between state dependence and aristocratic position. In Egypt, however, the state dependence of the labor movement remains *high* but its aristocrat privilege is *declining*.[90] The labor movement was long party to a corporatist bargain with the Egyptian regime, exchanging worker restraint for essential material and organizational benefits from the

[87] This section draws extensively on Eva Bellin, "Stalled Democracy: Capitalist Industrialization and the Paradox of State Sponsorship in Tunisia, the Middle East, and Beyond" (Book manuscript), chaps. 4, 5.

[88] For example, throughout the 1990s the regime intervened in national wage negotiations to bolster the position of labor and guarantee wage gains that, while not dramatic, far exceeded what labor could command on its own. For more, see Bellin (fn. 87); and Christopher Alexander, "State, Labor, and the New Global Economy in Tunisia," in Dirk Vandewalle, *North Africa: Development and Reform in a Changing Global Economy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

[89] For example, the UGTT has refused to publish any of the reports or declarations of Tunisia's Human Rights League (the crusading force for civil liberties in the country) in the trade union newspaper; nor has it ever publicly endorsed the league's work.

[90] This analysis draws extensively on Marsha Pripstein Posusney, *Labor and the State in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Bianchi, "The Corporatization of the Egyptian Labor Movement," *Middle East Journal* 40 (Summer 1986); idem, *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Ellis Goldberg, "The Foundations of State-Labor Relations in Contemporary Egypt," *Comparative Politics* 24 (January 1992).

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state.[91] Both sorts of benefits spelled aristocracy and dependence for organized labor, and this politically mediated privilege wedded the trade-union movement to the authoritarian status quo, making it unreceptive to democratic reform. Thus, when Sadat began to move Egypt toward a multiparty system in the early 1970s, trade-union leaders vigorously condemned the plan because it threatened to reduce the influence they had enjoyed under the country's single-party system.[92]

Recently, however, organized labor has begun to shift its stance on democratization. In the last decade international pressure to undertake structural adjustment has forced the regime to retreat from its historic bargain with labor. Specifically, the regime has begun to reform the labor code in ways that will ax organized labor's most treasured advantage (job security), and it has endorsed privatization schemes that will contract the sphere of labor's political protection.[93] With the essence of labor's aristocratic privilege now under attack, trade-union leaders have begun to express support for democratization.[94] Persistent dependence makes the labor movement hesitant about dramatically endorsing political reform (for example, it has not formed an independent labor party to contest the ruling party), but declining aristocracy (and hence the declining value of the authoritarian bargain) makes labor receptive to reform, so long as it comes at someone else's initiative. All told, organized labor has shifted from candid negativism to an ambivalent attitude toward democratization, with a declining score on aristocratic privilege the best explanation for this change of heart.

Conclusion

The case studies presented in this article demonstrate that capital and labor are contingent, not consistent, democrats. This contingency, moreover, is not random. Support for democratization turns on whether capital and labor see their economic interests served by the authoritarian state. This, in turn, is shaped by two key factors for each social force. For capital, democratic enthusiasm hinges on its level of state dependence and fear of social unrest. For labor, democratic enthusiasm hinges on its level of state dependence and aristocratic position in soci-

[91] These included financial subsidies to the union, prestigious political positions for union leaders, and nonwage benefits for workers such as job security, social security benefits, and generous leave policy (maternity).

[92] See Bianchi (fn. 90, 1986) 438; and idem (fn. 90, 1989), 138.

[93] See Marsha Pripstein, "Egypt's New Labor Law Removes Worker Provisions," *Middle East Report* (May–August 1995), 52–53.

[94] Bianchi anticipated this development as early as the mid-1980s. See Bianchi (fn. 90, 1986), 443.

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ety. The relationship is an inverse one, with higher values of dependency, fear, and aristocracy translating into reduced enthusiasm for democratic reform. In many late-developing countries a number of factors—including extensive state sponsorship, the structural weakness of social forces, pervasive poverty, and the evolution of democratic discourse—have led capital and labor to ally with authoritarian states rather than championing democratization. This experience diverges from that of the earlier industrializers—or at least from the historical myth of the early industrializers—and has political consequences that challenge the expectations of classic liberal and Marxist analysts.

At the same time, capital and labor's alliance with authoritarianism is not carved in stone. The political disposition of capital and labor is governed by interest. As political and economic conditions change, interests may change and alliances may be recalculated. Our case studies suggest some of the conditions that may prompt such realignment. The logic of international economic integration may force the state to reduce its sponsorship of social forces (Korea, Egypt). Or robust growth may eliminate mass poverty and the pervasive sense of fear within the propertied class (Korea). Under these conditions capital and/or labor may perceive democratization in a new light and choose to embrace it. The intertemporal variation found within cases like Korea, Brazil, and Egypt makes this possibility clear.

Predicting societal pressure for democratization, then, turns on the analysis of these variables. Capital and labor may well be champions of democracy, but for contingent reasons and not by universal dictum. The particular conditions of late development may dampen social forces' enthusiasm for democratization. But contingency also spells the possibility of democratic enthusiasm as conditions in late-developing countries change.

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THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By DANIEL PHILPOTT*

SOME recent trends in international relations—the United Nations' imprimatur for intervention in the politics of broken, war-torn, malnourished, and dictatorial states, the formation of the European Union in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty—depart notably from what international relations scholars refer to, out of common grammar and historical consensus, as the Westphalian system of sovereign states.

When a political order ruptures, its rival inhabitants will seek out its origins—conservatives, to fortify the system's pedigree; revolutionaries, to reveal its flawed foundations; scholars, to descry the sorts of winds that brought the order and the sorts that might carry it away. This article takes on the scholar's task—if the crumbling order is Westphalian, then how did it come to pass?—and it proposes that a crucial spring of our state system was the Protestant Reformation. Religious ideas, it is argued, are at the root of modern international relations. The Reformation was not Westphalia's sole cause; long-term material trends contributed, too. But if ideas did not act alone, they were yet indispensable: no Reformation, no Westphalia.

The claim is a counterfactual one. Had the Reformation not occurred, a system of sovereign states would not have arrived, at least not in the same form or in the same era. Skeptics imagine an alternative world in which the Reformation never happened, yet one in which

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Westphalia nevertheless arrived when and how it actually did and was brought by the same forces that social scientists most commonly identify to explain the rise of individual states—shifts in economic and organizational structures, in trade, class, societal coalitions, wealth, technology, military might, the institutions of domestic coercion, and the international balance of power. But such a world, it is argued here, could not have yielded Westphalia.

The Reformation's indispensability emerges most saliently through the following correlation: those polities that experienced a Reformation crisis were the same ones that adopted an interest in Westphalia; those that saw no such crisis did not. In plumbing the causal logic behind this correlation, I argue that the intrinsic content of Protestantism itself points to sovereignty. Then, considering the diverse historical pathways taken by Germany and France, I show how Protestant ideas led to interests in Westphalia. I also argue that such strong correlations do not obtain in the skeptic's world; that is, polities favoring Westphalia failed to acquire more powerful state institutions, arms, and wealth prior to their interest in Westphalia, while there were relatively powerful and wealthy polities that opposed Westphalia. Indeed, much of the material growth and decline that helped to realize Westphalia—the "military revolution," for instance—was itself due in important part to the Reformation. Geographical and temporal correlations, combined with the historical accounts of how separate polities arrived at an interest in a system of sovereign states, together make the case for the efficacy of the Protestant Reformation.

The argument presented here contributes to international relations scholarship in three ways. First, it accounts for the origin of Westphalia, of the very authority structure of the system of sovereign states. International relations scholars have long granted that a state system exists and have sought to theorize its laws and patterns of war, peace, and commerce. Recently, though, several scholars in the field have come to emphasize the "constructed," historically contingent character of the international system itself—an emphasis echoed in the article. A few of these constructivists have even begun to chart the genesis of the system's very political authority.[1] It is these rules that define au-

[1] These include Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the States System," *World Politics* 39 (October 1986); John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993); Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). On the works of the constructivists more generally, see Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,"

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thority—or sovereignty—in the international system whose origins I want to explain.

A second contribution is a corresponding view of what fueled this epochal change—the kinetic energy of ideas. Most scholars of the origins of the state, including those who have addressed the states system, have privileged material changes, and their work has yielded a vast new understanding of how the state and the state system came to be.[2] But few of them have looked to ideas, still less to religious ideas, as a crucial source. Should it prove efficacious, the Reformation would warrant recognition as a kind of historical cause that merits more attention in the international relations literature.

Yet the very premise of the argument that Westphalia is the origin of modern international relations has itself recently come under attack, prominently from Stephen Krasner.[3] The third contribution, then, is an updated and qualified defense of this conventional wisdom. As this premise undergirds the first two contributions, its defense is the first task of the essay.

Westphalia as Origin

In his classic 1948 article, the international legal scholar Leo Gross calls Westphalia "the majestic portal which leads from the old world

International Organization 41 (Summer 1987); idem, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992); idem, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88 (June 1994); John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998); Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50 (January 1998). For works on sovereignty and its history, see John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Ruggie (fn. 1, 1993); Kratochwil (fn. 1); Thomas J. Bierksteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Bartelson (fn. 1); Daniel Philpott, "Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History," *Journal of International Affairs* 48 (Winter 1995); Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (April 1988); F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Janice Thomson, "State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research," *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (June 1995); Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, *Law, Power, and the Sovereign State* (University Park: Penn State Press, 1995); Barry Buzan, "The Idea of 'International System': Theory Meets History," *International Political Science Review* 15 (July 1994); Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[2] I refer to these works in fnn. 47–50.

[3] Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

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into the new world." Hans Morgenthau and other leading political scientists echoed Gross, rendering Westphalia metonymy for the modern international system.[4] Why the audacious ascription? Westphalia, such scholars hold, defined an international scheme of constitutional authority that centered upon sovereign states—polities with supreme authority located within a bordered territory.[5]

Recent iconoclasm, however, challenges Westphalia's "majesty." Krasner, for instance, argues that before Westphalia, Europe was substantially modern—states with sovereign privileges already existed—and that after Westphalia, Europe was persistently medieval: the Holy Roman Empire and several compromises of sovereignty, including minority agreements for religion, remained. On the trek to modernity, then, Westphalia was not a continental divide but just another hill.[6] The iconoclasm is strong, not easily dismissed.

Westphalia's prestige can be rescued, but only with a new defense that is more subtle and qualified than the conventional wisdom. The nub of the Westphalian claim: before 1648, as long as the Thirty Years' War was still smoldering, political authority in Europe was essentially incompatible with sovereign statehood, whereas afterward sovereignty generally prevailed. I argue, however, that Westphalia signals the consolidation, not the creation ex nihilo, of the modern system.[7] It was not an instant metamorphosis, as elements of sovereign statehood had indeed been accumulating for three centuries. Even modernity's victory after Westphalia must be qualified, for some medieval anomalies persisted. But consummate fissures in history are rare, and Westphalia is as clean as historical faults come.

Politics after Westphalia appears sharpest in relief against the Europe of the High Middle Ages, between the eleventh and thirteen centuries. In the *Respublica Christiana*, there was no supreme authority

[4] Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948," *American Journal of International Law* 42 (January 1948); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 328–30.

[5] Sharing my general definition of sovereignty are, among others, Spruyt (fn. 1), 34–36; Ruggie (fn. 1, 1993), 148–52; James (fn. 1); Hinsley (fn. 1), 158; Morgenthau (fn. 4), 32–38; Robert O. Keohane, "Sovereignty, Interdependence, and International Institutions," in Linda B. Miller and Michael Joseph Smith, eds., *Ideas and Ideals: Essays on Politics in Honor of Stanley Hoffmann* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 92–93; J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 13; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 96. For skeptics of attempts to define sovereignty, see Bartelson (fn. 1); E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Stanley Benn, "Sovereignty," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 7 (1967); L. Oppenheim, *International Law,* vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, 1905); Richard Falk, "Sovereignty," in *Oxford Companion to Politics of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

[6] See especially Krasner (fn. 3), 235–64.

[7] For a similar view, see Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (London: Leicester, 1977); and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 161–83.

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within a territory, manifestly no sovereignty.[8] This dispersed authority, of course, did not last forever. The European landscape came gradually to be filled with sovereign states over the next three and a half centuries. By the eve of the Reformation in 1517, monarchs in Britain, France, and Sweden had established supremacy over the church and other territorial rivals, while in Italy, a small system of sovereign states had survived for a century.

But Europe's metamorphosis into modernity was far from finished. At roughly this time the Italian states system was conquered from without, and Charles V became both king of Spain and emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, acquiring substantial, but not sovereign, powers in lands extending from the Netherlands to Austria. The church was still temporally formidable, too, with its vast holdings of land a major source of wealth and power. Within the empire alone the church held one-third of the land overall, including one-fourth of the property in the cities.[9] Its archbishops and bishops occupied political offices. The church partially governed education, raised considerable revenues, helped administer poor relief and other public affairs, and most of all, often with the cooperation of temporal rulers, monitored the religious allegiance of its members. Having sworn allegiance to the pope, to upholding the faith, Charles V served as the temporal enforcer of ecclesiastical orthodoxy, the commander of Catholic armies.[10]

[8] Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978); Georges Duby, *La societé aux XI^e et XII^e siècles dans la région maconnaise* (Paris: Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1953). For a challenge to the consensus among medieval historians that the Middle Ages generally lacked sovereignty, see Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800–1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992). For responses to Fischer, see Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization* 47 (Summer 1993); Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," *International Organization* 51 (Autumn 1997). On the nature of political authority during the Middle Ages, see J. R. Strayer, *The Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); J. R. Strayer and Dana Munro, *Middle Ages, 395–1500* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959); Brian Tierney, *Crisis of Church and State* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); John H. Mundy, *Europe in the High Middle Ages, 1150–1309* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Walter Ullman, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974); Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ruggie (fn. 1, 1986), 141–48; Spruyt (fn. 1), 34–36; Michael Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, U.K.: At the University Press, 1964).

[9] Steven Ozment, *The Age of Reform, 1220–1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 48; Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 1–24; H. G. Koenigsberger, *The Habsburgs and Europe, 1516–1560* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971); Jean Bérenger, *History of the Habsburg Empire* (London: Longman, 1994).

[10] On the implosion of the Italian states system, see Wight (fn. 7); Tilly (fn. 7), 77–78. On Charles V's powers, see Kann (fn. 9), 1–24; Koenigsberger (fn. 9); Bérenger (fn. 9); Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch*

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Later in the century sovereignty made gains, but these were frail and reversible.[11] Most importantly, the 1555 Peace of Augsburg allowed German princes to enforce their own faith within their territory according to the formula *cuius regio, euis religio* (whose the region, his the religion).[12] But Augsburg did not last. Endless clauses and mutual dissatisfaction with the agreement brought war, expanding eventually into the titanic Thirty Years' War. Not until the close of this war did a proscription of such intervention become accepted and respected and practiced—not, indeed, until 1648.

What, then, was this Peace of Westphalia of 1648? Although the component treaties of the settlement, Münster and Osnabrück, never explicitly mention sovereignty, an analysis of the treaties' text, of the intentions of its framers, and of state practice following Westphalia shows the settlement to be a fulcrum, not just a milepost, in the evolution of the sovereign states system. This is apparent in two respects: in the respective status of states and imperial institutions and in the matter of religion.[13]

Although Westphalia was officially a new set of laws for the Holy Roman Empire, which lasted until 1806, in effect the settlement bequeathed to states absolute sovereign authority.[14] In the wake of Westphalia states became the chief form of polity in Europe and faced no serious rival in the Holy Roman Empire—this is the heart of the claim about historical change. The United Provinces and the Swiss Confederation gained effective independence. The German states regained

Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 9–40; Pieter Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555–1609* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1932); Gerald Strauss, *Law, Resistance, and the State: The Opposition to Roman Law in Reformation Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, vol. 1 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959); John Gagliardo, *Germany under the Old Regime, 1600–1790* (London: Longmans, 1991); Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1947).

[11] Koenigsberger (fn. 9); Barraclough (fn. 10), 355–405; Holborn (fn. 10), 284–338.

[12] Holborn (fn. 10), 243–46; Barraclough (fn. 10), 371.

[13] Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 72. For the text of the Treaty of Münster, see Fred Israel, ed., *Major Peace Treaties in Modern History, 1648–1967* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967); for the Treaty of Osnabrück, see Clive Parry, ed., *The Consolidated Treaty Series* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1981). On the settlement in general, see Fritz Dickmann, "Rechtsgedanke und Machtpolitik bei Richelieu: Studienen neu endeckten Quellen," *Historische Zeitschrift* 196 (April 1963); idem, *Der Westphaelische Frieden* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1965); Fritz Dickmann et al., eds., *Acta Pacis Westphalicae* (Münster: Aschendorff Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962); George Pages, *The Thirty Years War*, trans. David Maland (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London: Routledge, Kegan, and Paul, 1997); J. V. Polisensky, *The Thirty Years' War*, trans. Robert Evans (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); and T. K. Rabb, ed., *The Thirty Years' War: Problems of Motive, Extent, and Effect* (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1964).

[14] On the settlement in general , see Dickmann et al. (fn. 13); Dickmann (fn. 13, 1965 and 1963); Pages (fn. 13); Parker (fn. 13); Polisensky (fn. 13); and Rabb (fn. 13).

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their "ancient rights" against the empire and acquired the right to form alliances outside the empire.[15] The communications between diplomats at Westphalia are laced with references to state autonomy, the equality of states, an equilibrium of states, and even an early version of collective security—all notions that are unintelligible apart from a sovereign states system.[16] Following Westphalia, states became virtually uninhibited in their internal authority. Imperial institutions functioned as a forum for German cooperation, but they did not abridge sovereignty. The emperor himself retained significant constitutional powers only because he and his successors were Habsburgs, but the Habsburgs themselves were effectively reduced to just another sovereign, within their central European lands.[17]

Politics and religion provided the other major context in which Westphalia effectively ushered in state sovereignty. Here, too, the text of the treaties does not explicitly establish sovereignty—at least not in the exact form of Augsburg in 1555, which granted German princes authority over religion in their lands. Instead, princes agreed to allow designated proportions of Catholic, Lutherans, and Calvinists to live and practice their faiths in their territories, and to refrain from attempting to convert one another's subjects.[18]

But the crucial question for sovereignty is not whether princes signed agreements regarding their internal affairs; modern states, after all, frequently agree to regulate prices or pollution within their borders without compromising their sovereignty. Rather, the issue is whether any institution outside the state was vested with the constitutional authority to execute, judge, or legislate about these agreements about religion. Here, the text of the treaties calls for arbitration of religious disputes, but through compromise, not majority decision, thus leaving

[15] Israel (fn. 13), 27; Osiander (fn. 13), 46–47.

[16] On the views of the diplomats, see Osiander (fn. 13), 27, 41, 77–89; William F. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1972), 283–349; Michael Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1958); idem, *Essays in Swedish History* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), 82–110; Carl J. Burckhardt, *Richelieu and His Age* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1970); Robert Knecht, *Richelieu* (London: Longman, 1991); Armand-Jean du Plessis Richelieu, *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu: The Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections*, trans. Henry Bertram Hill (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981).

[17] Exceptional were the imperial circles, regional organizations of princely states that revived in the late seventeenth century and whose members would at times combine their military forces under a single command. But this exception was limited: the strong form of military cooperation was limited largely to the circles of Franconia and Swabia, composed only of small German states, and it lasted only from 1697 to 1714, when states defended themselves against the invasions of Louis XIV. See Roger Wines, "Imperial Circles, Princely Diplomacy, and Imperial Reform, 1681–1714," *Journal of Modern History* 39 (March 1967), 27–29. More generally, see Kann (fn. 9), 52, 54; Osiander (fn. 13), 46; Barraclough (fn. 10), 381–87; and Gagliardo (fn. 10).

[18] Osiander (fn. 13), 40; Holborn (fn. 10), 368–69.

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the sovereign right of assent virtually intact.[19] But given the outlooks of contemporary statespersons and diplomats and considering subsequent practice, these procedures would mean little. Historians of the period commonly agree that even in the late stages of the Thirty Years' War, political leaders had lost their religious zeal and ceased to contest religion as a political affair.[20] There is also little record of any religious matter being adjudicated through imperial institutions. Finally, for over a century and a half after Westphalia, unlike after Augsburg, neither princes nor the emperor intervened to contest religion within another prince's territory. Even though future European treaties compromised sovereignty on behalf of religious minorities, never again would intervention for religion play anywhere near the role that it did between 1517 and 1648. Although religion was occasionally a partial contributor to war between states, in general, religion ceased to be a casus belli.[21]

It is in the context of the political history of the mid-sixteenth to mid-seventeenth century that one best discerns the enormous historical significance of state sovereignty. Religious war and its attendant abridgments of sovereignty were the chief sources of contention in European politics for over a century, but after Westphalia this centrally defining form of conflict ceased. International pronouncements and practices then evolved to legitimate and deepen Westphalia's achievement. First in Europe and then gradually elsewhere states became the only polity to exercise significant executive, legislative, and judicial power within a territory. Over the coming century philosophers like Emmeric Vattel and Christian Wolff came to recognize this reality in articulating doctrines of international law and state legal equality; states themselves solidified it by creating diplomatic offices and practices appropriate to a system of states. European states also developed standards of recognition by which polities would be accepted as members of the system only if they displayed essential attributes of statehood.[22] Finally, states came to espouse nonintervention as a cornerstone of international diplomacy.[23] All of this is what makes Westphalia revolutionary.

[19] Osiander (fn. 13), 40–42.

[20] Parker (fn. 13), 196–97; Holborn (fn. 10); Barraclough (fn. 10); Rabb (fn. 13); David Maland, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Macmillan, 1966); Kalevi Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 46–59.

[21] Holsti (fn. 20), 46–59; Osiander (fn. 13), 49; Barraclough (fn. 10), 381–87.

[22] On recognition practices, see H. Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law* (Cambridge, U.K.: At the University Press, 1947).

[23] See R. J. Vincent, *Non-Intervention in International Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

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The Origin of Westphalia

But if Westphalia was an origin, what was the origin of Westphalia? That the Reformation elicited Westphalia is a claim about a contradiction between the existing order and iconoclastic ideas. Such a contradiction must have developed between 1517, the beginning of the Reformation, and 1648, the year of Westphalia. The fact that in 1517 Europe was ebbing away from sovereignty as Charles V consolidated his lands intimates that during this period some novel source of gravity arose to reverse history's tide back toward sovereignty. We can locate this reversal at the strewn dates when several European polities expressed their initial interest in a system of states. An account that looks to ideas will note that in many of these cases this interest appeared roughly when Protestantism did. Even skeptical accounts cannot deny this coincidence, but they would portray it as little more. Believing material structures inexorable, they would minimize the turn back from modernity and consider Charles V to be but the final paroxysm of a dying Middle Ages. Interests in sovereign statehood, in their view, were the culmination of centuries of material change. And most social scientific accounts of the state and the state system indeed claim the sufficiency of material change.

I am not the first to point out the influence of the Reformation upon Westphalia; some historians and a few social scientists have done so as well.[24] But none of them has described the mechanisms of this influence systematically or demonstrated its independence from material forces.

My own work, heeding the normal entanglement of ideas and material forces, argues for the Reformation not as a sole cause but as a central cause, by which I imply the following counterfactual claim: had the Reformation not occurred, a system of sovereign states would not have developed, at least not in the same form or in the same era as it did. More precisely, were it not for the Reformation, persistently medieval features of Europe—the substantive powers of the Holy Roman Empire and its emperor, the formidable temporal powers of the church, religious uniformity, truncations of the sovereign powers of secular rulers, Spain's control of the Netherlands—would not have disappeared when they did, to make way for the system of sovereign states.

[24] For historians, see Holborn (fn. 10); and Barraclough (fn. 10). For social scientists who acknowledge the influence of the Reformation and treat it briefly, see Bruce Porter, *War and the Rise of the State* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 68–69; and Hall (fn. 1), 51–67. Other scholars mention the role of other nonmaterial factors such as philosophical discourses, property rights, and the rise of Roman law. See Ruggie (fn. 1, 1993); and Bartelson (fn. 1).

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To be valid, a counterfactual claim of this sort must follow a "minimal-rewrite-of-history rule," posing an alternative world where the alleged cause is extracted while other events and conditions remain intact. It must also meet a "cotenability" criterion, positing a theory of how, in this plausible alternative world, the remaining events and conditions might have brought about the same result.[25] Otherwise, the counterfactual is no more than an implausible straw man. It is not hard to envision an alternative world, one without the Reformation. It is precisely the one described by the dominant structural materialist accounts, a world where the state and the states system form completely apart from Protestantism.

But while such a world meets the standard of plausibility, it is not compelling. Without the Reformation, history would have looked different. In essence, medieval impediments to a sovereign state system would not have disappeared when they did but only much later. Nor would they have receded as sweepingly. Protestant ideas—continental in geography and encompassing in their content—challenged all temporal powers of the church and the empire. Sweeping causes produced sweeping effects. Were it not for the Reformation, the recession of the Middle Ages would likely have been staggered, this feature disappearing at one time, that feature disappearing decades or a century later. Material accounts themselves support this claim, for they show different states developing at different times.[26] With Hendrik Spruyt, I argue that "competitor" institutional forms persistently challenged the sovereign state long after the High Middle Ages, right up to the consolidation of the state. Spruyt places this consolidation roughly at Westphalia but does not treat the Reformation as an important explanatory cause.[27] My argument is that apart from the Reformation, institutional eclecticism would have continued long after Westphalia.

Had the Reformation not brought about the state system at Westphalia, much subsequent history would have been different, too. For out of the religious wars wrought by the Reformation came the hollowing of the Holy Roman Empire, the rise of the eighteenth-century balance of power, the Enlightenment, and the increased separation of

[25] On these criteria, see Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, "Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics," in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 21–25. With regard to the "minimal-rewrite-of-history rule," I will ultimately argue that even structural material forces were themselves shaped in part by the Reformation and were thus not independent of it. I claim here only that a world in which they were independent is plausibly imagined and indeed posited by most of the social scientists whom I address.

[26] See Tilly (fn. 7).

[27] Spruyt (fn. 1), 153–80.

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religion and politics. Had these events not occurred, much else would have been different, too, and so on, with the trajectory of each historical branch becoming ever more speculative.[28] In reasoning counterfactually, we cannot be precise about this alternative, imaginary world. We can claim only that if a system of sovereign states had arrived within it, we would not call that system Westphalian but would instead associate it with some later century, some unimaginably different combination of wars and historical forces.

How can we demonstrate the dependence of Westphalia's timing and sweep upon the Reformation? The method here focuses on interests in Westphalia as they developed (or failed to develop) in separate polities, thus simplifying the complex causes of a continent-wide event and identifying an array of separable cases that can be compared across time and space.[29] Some of these polities—the German states and the northern provinces of the Netherlands—were protostates, partially independent: for them and for all those similarly situated, Westphalia meant independence. Others—France and Sweden—were already independent. Their interest took the form of sovereign statehood for the rest of Europe. All of these polities, as I show, developed their interest in sovereign statehood as a direct result of a crisis brought on by the Reformation. Using a positive strategy, I demonstrate the tight causal link between Reformation crises and the development of these interests. Then, negatively, I expose the weak connection between the same interests and structural material trends, which shape the skeptic's imaginary counterfactual world. If they fail to explain interests in Westphalia, then the imaginary world is not a compelling one. What the two strategies together support is a claim for what James March and Johan Olsen call a "historically inefficient" path to Westphalia, that is, an explanation of how norms and institutions develop in a way that cannot be predicted from prior environmental conditions, here, material ones.[30] Only an unexpected revolution in ideas can explain Westphalia.

[28] On counterfactuals, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991); and Tetlock and Belkin (fn. 25).

[29] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba refer to this strategy as "making many observations from the few"; see King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 217–28. Tetlock and Belkin (fn. 25) propose that this method can be used compatibly with and within counterfactuals (pp. 30–31). It meets what they call the "projectability" criterion.

[30] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998), 958.

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Two Roles of Ideas

Like scholarship on the Reformation, theories of the social influence of ideas are hardly new—Weber's essay on Protestantism is an example of both. Recently, though, scholars of international relations and comparative politics have led a revival of interest in ideas.[31] In explaining how the Reformation brought about Westphalia, I draw upon their work and that of earlier scholars in arguing that ideas exert power and mold political interests through two separate roles.[32]

In the first role, groups of people adopt new ideas into their identities. They undergo "conversion" and come to want what ideas prescribe. Identity here refers to a person's conception of which of his characteristics make him distinct from others according to his social role: is he a Lutheran, a Catholic, a German nationalist?[33] Identities are made up in part of ideas, which people hold stably over the long term. A person with a Protestant identity, for instance, persists in holding Protestant ideas. But identities can change and do so when people come to hold new ideas and self-conceptions.

That ideas form identities may seem like a trivial claim. Or even true by definition: do not ideas themselves compose identities? The claim becomes more meaningful, though, if we understand it as one about how people arrive at their new identities, that is, through reasoned reflection upon ideas' propositions about what is intrinsically valid, whether theoretically or practically. Such "reason of reflection" contrasts indeed with significant skeptical alternatives. It denies that people might adopt ideas as mere "hooks"—as the means to an entirely separate end, for example, wealth and position.[34] This approach disputes

[31] For general accounts of the trend, see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 3); Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Peter Hall, ed., *The Political Power of Economic Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Wendt (fn. 1, 1994 and 1992); Mark Blyth, "Any More Bright Ideas? The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy," *Comparative Politics* 29 (January 1997); John Kurt Jacobsen, "Much Ado about Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy," *World Politics* 47 (January 1995); Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[32] I propose my framework as a useful one for explaining the revolution at hand, not as the only process by which ideas operate. For portfolios of pathways and mechanisms, see Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 8–26; and Katzenstein (fn. 31), 52–65. I am not proposing a general theory that denotes the conditions under which ideas will have influence; rather, the argument is a theory of the causes of revolutions in sovereignty (revolutions in ideas) and not one of what causes revolutions in ideas.

[33] For a definition of identity, see Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein (fn. 31): "the images of individuality and distinctiveness ('selfhood') held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant 'others'" (p. 59).

[34] Kenneth Shepsle, "Comment," in R. Noll, ed., *Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

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even a somewhat stronger role for ideas, that they "resolve uncertainty" about the means by which material ends are to be pursued but do not shape the content of ends themselves.[35] It also proposes identity change as more than a psychological mechanism for processing information.[36] Reason of reflection is identity change of the most fundamental sort.

My argument is not that reason of reflection is the only way in which people arrive at identities. The skeptical alternatives are plausible and doubtless actual; any major social revolution in identities quite probably involves some combination of the alternatives and reason of reflection. What I dispute is that identity change reduces to any of the skeptical alternatives. And I hypothesize that reason of reflection was a crucial motor behind the Protestant Reformation. Evidence for it lies in the correspondence of identity change with the rise of social circumstances that, by their very nature, promote reflection—the sermon, the pamphlet, the printing press, changes in theology, and the crisis in the Catholic church, among others. Evidence against a skeptical reduction lies in the lack of a tight link between such identity change and changes in the sort of social circumstances that foster the novel pursuit of separate, material ends, for example, class revolution.[37]

But shaping group identities is not enough. Popular conversion alone does not explain how ideas bring leaders of principalities or states to campaign or move troops on behalf of new international constitutions or how ideas hamper or overthrow obstructing leaders. In the second role of ideas, as social power, converts to new identities attempt to alter the costs and benefits to their prince, parliament, president, or anyone else who can deliver or hinder the new constitution. To this end they use carrots and sticks in the form of traditional political currency: votes, taxes, bureaucratic power, the threat to rebel, and so on. In this sense, the second role of ideas resembles rational choice theory, as people pursue their demands by altering the opportunity costs of those in a position to bring about their ends. What is distinctive here is that those wielding these tools are converts to new identities composed of ideas that define their preferences. Ideas here are manifestly more than mere legitimations for the pursuit of wealth or power and more, too, than "focal points" in bargaining.[38] The new social power is evidenced when

[35] Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 16.

[36] See Brian Ripley, "Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory," *Political Psychology* 14 (September 1993).

[37] On processes of social construction, see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Finnemore and Sikkink (fn. 1), 913.

[38] Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 17–20; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," in Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 3); Shepsle (fn. 34); for a key source on social power, see also Mann (fn. 31).

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resultant outcomes (like interests in Westphalia) correspond in time and place to the strategic actions of bearers of identities asserting the demands implied by those identities.

Together, the two roles are the mechanism of contradiction between the new ideas and the old constitution, the fuel that spurs ideas from the heads of intellectuals to fresh international orders. The roles say little, though, about the people and the institutions involved. Ideas are not choosy about the "courier" that delivers them into politics; the roles are about processes, not actors. The cases at hand involve intellectual communities, transnational networks, ruling elites, and all classes of citizens who exercise their power by changing their pattern of religious participation, joining Protestant armies, threatening rebellion, and otherwise creating incentives for leaders to pursue Westphalian sovereign statehood.[39] These actors and forms of power express new kinds of interest differently in different polities through (1) "Reformation from below," in which social groups pressured elites; (2) "Reformation from above," in which elites played a stronger, more proactive role; and (3) the "politique solution," in which Protestant reformers did not succeed in creating a Protestant state but coaxed a social compromise that entailed the political secularization embodied in Westphalia.[40]

Each of the two roles of ideas—as changing identities and as wielding social power—echoes the commitments of constructivist scholars. In explaining how interests are shaped, some constructivists embrace the first role of ideas as transforming identities. Far more, though, stress the second role, of how actors or institutions whose identities are defined by ideology and culture then exert social power to shape the state's interests.[41] The framework employed here acknowledges and combines the two strands. Like the constructivists, this account also takes issue with those rationalist theories—neorealism and neoliberal-

[39] On intellectual communities, see Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992). On transnational networks, see Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," *International Organization* 47 (Summer 1993); and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). For an example of the influence of publics, see David Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[40] On causal pathways, see Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 24–26; and Katzenstein (fn. 31), 52–65.

[41] In the first category, see Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," *International Organization* 51 (Summer 1997); Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52 (Summer 1998); Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo," in Katzenstein (fn. 31); Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Finnemore and Sikkink (fn. 1), 898. In the second category, see, for examples, the essays in Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 3); and most of the essays in Katzenstein (fn. 31).

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ism—that assume that states have fixed identities and interests, usually material, and that they pursue these interests through rational calculations of ends and means. Rather, states' identities and interests are shaped through their social environment.[42] But we should not draw too sharply the contrast with rationalist accounts, the more sophisticated versions of which do take account of the role of identities, norms, and social contexts.[43] It is only with those rationalist theories that take a structural materialist form that constructivism and the account presented here part ways. Most accounts of the formation of the state and the states system indeed express such a materialist rationalism.

In one respect, though, I propose to extend the constructivist agenda by explaining international constitutive normative structures (here, the structure of sovereign constitutional authority) as the result of the actions of agents (here, states). Although constructivists acknowledge the importance of sovereignty as a constitutive norm, they typically treat it as a determinant of state identities and behavior, and not as their product.[44] There are exceptions to this thinking, however, most prominently Rodney Bruce Hall's *National Collective Identity*, a work that traces the relationship between national identity and the international system from early modern Europe through the First World War. Broadly sympathetic to Hall, my argument focuses on what he calls "territorial sovereignty" and its origins in the Protestant Reformation, an event that he treats far more briefly than I do.[45] Friendly commentators on constructivism call for just the sort of theoretical development that authors like Hall have begun and that I seek to further: Jeffrey Checkel urges an explanation of how agents shape normative structures; Janice Thomson commends an account of the origins of norms of sovereignty.[46]

[42] See Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (fn. 33), 58–60.

[43] Such versions adopt a variety of strategies, ranging from showing how utility functions are specified by ideas, culture, or psychological schema, to asserting the rationality of the attempts of "norms entrepreneurs" to construct common knowledge and alter others' utility functions in accordance with their commitments, to devising models of how ideas modify the pursuit of rational action as "focal points" or "resolvers of uncertainty," and to charting the social context of rational action. See Finnemore and Sikkink (fn. 1), 909–15; Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 31), 3–30; Miles Kahler, "Rationality in International Relations," *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998), 933–38; March and Olsen (fn. 30), 952–54; Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); idem, *Political Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For a more skeptical view of the reconcilability of constructivist and rationalist traditions, see Ruggie (fn. 1, 1998), 883–85.

[44] See the essays in Biersteker and Weber (fn. 1); Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (fn. 33), 45–46; Ruggie (fn. 1, 1993); Ruggie (fn. 1, 1998), 870; Wendt (fn. 1, 1992), 412–15.

[45] Hall (fn. 1), 51–58.

[46] Checkel (fn. 1), 340–42; Thomson (fn. 1). See also John Gerard Ruggie's comment that "[s]ocial constructivists in international relations have not yet managed to devise a theory of constitutive rules"; Ruggie (fn. 1, 1998), 872.

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Structural Skepticism of the Reformation's Influence

Wary of these alleged workings of ideas are critics who would explain polities' interests by appealing instead to various material structures. These are those social constraints on the behavior of individuals and groups that do not consist of ideas themselves—technology, institutions of coercion and taxation, class, societal coalitions, the international distribution of military and economic power, and the like. According to these critics, polities developed an interest in a sovereign state system when they accrued the power inhering in arms, wealth, stronger extractive bureaucracies, and the like. Interests, that is, followed from power and, in turn, enabled polities to prevail over rival institutions like the Holy Roman Empire. Westphalia was merely the set of norms that legitimated their ultimate victory.

According to some versions of this structuralism, the state prevailed because it was the institution best suited to fight wars. Examples are the work of Charles Tilly and of the theorists of the "military revolution," the early modern transformation of military technology and organization that rendered states the most optimal institution for bearing the cost and scale of warfare.[47] Other versions see the state triumphing because it could best produce wealth, through its ability to assure property rights, extract taxes, and commit credibly to trade agreements with other states. Hendrik Spruyt, for instance, argues that an explosion of trade during the Middle Ages shifted social power toward the towns, which then allied with monarchs to create state institutions that could best foster commerce.[48] In still other versions, the state developed out of changes in the early modern class structure.[49]

Finally, there are realist accounts of the triumph of the state. This, at first, may seem misleading: does not realism assume that sovereign

[47] Otto Hintze, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Richard Bean, "War and the Birth of the Nation-State" *Journal of Economic History* 33 (March 1973); Porter (fn. 24); Tilly (fn. 7). The exception is Hall (fn. 1), who treats the Reformation as an important source of territorial sovereignty. Porter is also a qualified exception here, for he acknowledges the partial explanatory role of the Reformation. See Porter (fn. 24), 68–69. The locus classicus on the military revolution is Roberts (fn. 16, 1967), 195–225. An impressive recent work on the long-term political results of the military revolution is Brian Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), esp. 56–74. For a critique of the military revolution thesis, see Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Military Revolution,' 1550–1660: A Myth?" *Journal of Modern History* 48 (June 1976); and idem, *The Military Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[48] Douglass C. North and R. P. Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Spruyt (fn. 1).

[49] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); N. K. Anderson, "The Reformation in Scandinavia and the Baltic," in G. R. Elton, ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

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states already exist? Strictly, yes, but we can still find accounts closely resembling realism that tell how the European balance of power shifted away from the empire, Spain, and the Habsburgs and toward an alliance of France, Sweden, and the partially independent German and Dutch protostates. Westphalia merely ratified the victory of this alliance.[50] In sum, any account rooted in ideas must answer all of these forms of skepticism.

Evidence for the Reformation as Origin of Westphalia

Reformation crisis as used here means a deep and contested social struggle between advocates of a Protestant political order and advocates of a Catholic political order within a polity, sometimes involving widespread violence but always involving a demand on both sides for uniformity of faith. It was through such a Reformation crisis that polities came to develop an interest in sovereign statehood. The social struggle is what unfolded through the two roles of ideas. But to know how Protestant ideas wielded influence, we must first know what Protestant ideas were and why they were politically potent. The case for the influence of the Reformation begins with the answers to these questions.

The Political Theology of the Reformation

Though voluminous and complex and rendered variously, Reformation theology uniformly asserted a common doctrine about what the Christian church was not: a visibly united institution under a single human authority. At least for Martin Luther, it was simply the aggregate of doctrinally authentic local churches.[51] This ecclesial theology had enormous institutional implications—confiscating the church's large tracts

[50] See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 31–73; Aristide R. Zolberg, "Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link," *World Politics* 33 (January 1981), 253–58; Ludwig Dehio, *The Precarious Balance*, trans. Charles Fulman (New York: Knopf, 1962); S. H. Steinberg, "The Thirty Years War and the Conflict for European Hegemony," in Rabb (fn. 13); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[51] Martin Luther, *The Freedom of a Christian*, trans. W. A. Lambert and ed. H. J. Grimm, in *Luther's Works*, vol. 31 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957); idem, *Bondage of the Will*, trans. Philip S. Watson and Benjamin Drewery and ed. P. S. Watson, in *Luther's Works*, vol. 33 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972); Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Euan Cameron, *The European Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 99–198; Heiko Oberman, *Luther: Man between God and the Devil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Steven Ozment, *Protestants: The Birth of a Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 43–86; Louis Bouyer, *The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism* (London: Harville Press, 1955).

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of property, ending the emperor's authority to enforce religious uniformity, forbidding ecclesiasts from holding temporal offices, and eliminating the ecclesiastical powers of the pope and emperor.[52]

But such relinquished powers could not be left adrift. They were assumed by the secular authorities—in Germany, by princes; in the Netherlands, by the Estates-General; in Sweden and England, by the king. This new separation of functions also sprang from Luther's "Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms and the Two Governments," his political theology. God created two earthly orders with two forms of government. One was the realm of the spirit, the site of the relationship between Christ and the believer's soul; the other was the realm of the world, the order of secular society, governed through civil magistrates, laws, and coercion. The reformers demanded a separation. Thus, the pastors of the church were not to perform the duties of public order, just as magistrates, princes, and kings would not preach or perform the sacraments.[53] In separating the two realms, Reformation political theology essentially prescribed sovereignty, even though neither Luther's tracts nor John Calvin's *Institutes* outline a Westphalian system of sovereign states. For secular authorities within the empire the remaining temporal prerogatives of the church filled out their portfolios of power. The point is essential: sovereignty was implied in the very propositions of the Reformation.

The church condemned Luther at the Diet of Worms of 1521; a decade later Charles V sent his troops to quell the heresy, an imperial endeavor that would continue at least through the 1630s. Facing armed threat, the reformers now found even more reason to ally with and give full sovereignty to the secular rulers, whose armies could protect them. Reformation theology, then, led to sovereignty not only directly, by prescribing it, but also indirectly, by motivating Charles V to quash its challenge and by prompting reformers, in turn, to seek protection. Although physical protection considered in isolation is hardly a theologically laden desideratum, the reformers' need for it is scarcely intelligible apart from their heretical beliefs, which alone had elicited the emperor's armed response. Sovereign statehood was the carapace that would stanch the Counter-Reformation.

[52] Cameron (fn. 51), 145–55.

[53] Ibid., 152–53; Martin Luther, *Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved*, trans. Charles M. Jacobs and ed. Robert C. Schultz, in *Luther's Works*, vol. 46 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967); idem, *Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed*, trans. J.J. Schindel and ed. W. I. Brandt, in *Luther's Works*, vol. 45 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967); Ozment (fn. 51), 122–40; Skinner (fn. 51), Romans 13.

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Another important feature of the Reformation was the novelty of its political propositions in the history of European Christendom. Such originality parries a methodological objection: if it was heretical theological ideas that led to Westphalia, then why did previous heresies not have the same political effect? Indeed, to the contrary, heresies of the preceding three centuries—the Lollard movement in England, the Waldenses in southern Europe, and the Hussites in Bohemia—did not imply the same political ideas. The earlier movements challenged church doctrines and practices, to be sure, but did not advance a political theology that undermined the church's hierarchical or temporal powers.[54] True to the argument, different ideas with a different content produced a different political result.

The Correlation between the Reformation and Polities' Interests in Westphalia

If Reformation theology and sovereignty are connected intrinsically and conceptually, they are also connected historically and causally. Thus, every polity that came to have an interest in a system of sovereign states had experienced a strong Reformation crisis, whereas in every polity that fought against a sovereign states system, the Reformation won few converts. The correlation also involves timing: most of the polities that acquired an interest in a system of sovereign states usually did so within a generation of the arrival of Protestantism in their land; most of them had shown little inclination toward a system of sovereign states before Protestantism arrived. These correlations anchor the argument.

The first three columns of Table 1 show this correlation simplified. Column 1 lists the major polities in Europe during the century prior to Westphalia. Column 2 displays whether the polity adopted an interest in a system of sovereign states and if so, when. Column 3 then displays whether and when a polity experienced a Reformation crisis. Column 4 generalizes about the timing and nature of the growth in the state's institutions. Columns 2 and 3 show that the presence and timing of a Reformation crisis correspond strongly with a political interest in Westphalia. In the four chief polities (or region of polities, in the case of Germany) that fought for Westphalia in the Thirty Years' War—Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and France—an interest in a system of sovereign states arose within a generation of its Reformation crisis. Though not integrally involved in the armed conflict for Westphalia, England, Denmark, and Transylvania, too, experienced a Refor-

[54] Cameron (fn. 51), 70–78.

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TABLE 1
THE TIMING OF INTERESTS IN WESTPHALIA AND THEIR ALLEGED CAUSES

(1) Polity	*(2) Interest in Westphalian System of Sovereign States*	*(3) Reformation Crisis*	*(4) Growth in Material Power*
German Protestant states[a]	1520–45	1520–1540s	gradual in 16th century; sharp after 1650
German Catholic states[a]	none	weak, remaining minority status	gradual in 16th century; sharp after 1650
Netherlands (United Provinces)	1581	1560s	sharp beginning in 1590s
Sweden	1540s	1520s	gradual after 1600; sharp between 1672 and 1718
France	1620s	1560s–1598	gradual and halting after 1600; sharp after 1650
Spain	none	none	sharp from 1470s to 1550s
Italy	none	none	1400s, growth of city-states, approximation of sovereign states system until 1527
Poland	none	spread of Protestantism but no crisis	little significant growth
Habsburg Hungary	none	mild spread of Protestantism but no significant crisis	little significant growth
Transylvania	1618	1550	little significant growth
Denmark	1538	1520s and 1530s	little significant growth
England	support for European Protestants short of all-out war, 1560s–1648	1530s	significant growth through 16th century

[a]Some German states switched between official Catholic and Protestant status as a result of war and political bargaining between the 1555 Peace of Augsburg and 1648. I label the states here according to the status they first assumed during the Reformation crisis of 1520–45.

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mation crisis and supported the anti-imperial powers diplomatically. Important, too, is the fact that none of the Catholic polities, the Catholic German principalities, Spain, Italy, or Poland, developed any interest at all in a system of sovereign states. They remained allies with the empire.

Princes and kings came to pursue an interest in a system of sovereign states when and where a Reformation crisis took place. This is important evidence, but circumstantial. Who, then, were the players, what were the events and institutions, through which the two roles of ideas advanced?

Conversion to Protestantism, the first role of ideas, is evidenced in the new religious practices of those who adopted the Reformation. Protestants attended churches where preachers taught Protestant theology; they conducted mass, confession, and the other sacraments as the new teaching prescribed; the more unruly of them smashed icons and rioted against Catholic churches; they refused to obey the sanctioning authority of Rome. But what brought them to conversion? It was the theology of Martin Luther that led most immediately to the Reformation crisis. Luther did not create his ideas de novo but was influenced by late medieval theology, especially nominalism. His own spiritual crisis was an important precipitant, too, as his ideas circulated quickly and alarmingly first through the monasteries, then through the clergy and missionaries, then to congregations—a pattern of diffusion replicated throughout Europe, in the many versions that Protestant ideas assumed.[55]

Two main conduits, both of them fairly novel, aided this dissemination—the sermon and the pamphlet. Protestant theology and worship placed new importance on the pastor's conveyance of the Word, an imprimatur of authority that attracted its hearers to its injunctions.[56] In the same period the print media burgeoned. Between 1517 and 1520 Luther's followers printed thirty of his writings in well over three hundred thousand copies, pamphlets devoured in the universities and by clerics, who then spread their ideas through word of mouth to larger audiences. Pamphlets proliferated in other locales as well.[57] Both modes of communication, sermon and pamphlet, were received in virtually all

[55] Ibid., 99–110.

[56] Robert Wuthnow, *Communities of Discourse* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 131.

[57] Ibid., 129–40. On the importance of print media, see Elizabeth Eisenstein, "The Advent of Printing and the Protestant Revolt: A New Approach to the Disruption of Western Christendom," *Annales, E.S.C.* 26 (1971); Richard G. Cole, "Propaganda as a Source of Reformation History," *Lutheran Quarterly* 22 (1970); C. S. L. Davies, *Peace, Print, and Protestantism* (London: Paladin, 1977).

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sectors of society, but most enthusiastically by merchants and artisans, who made up the majority of Protestants.

Other social precipitants abetted the Reformation, too. Most obvious and familiar was the perceived corruption of the medieval church. In Germany, where the Reformation began, this perception was stronger than anywhere else in Europe and had been growing steadily over the decades prior to the Reformation.[58] Intellectual, theological movements also corresponded to the Reformation. Christian humanism and nominalism, both precursors of Reformation theology, were most widespread in Germany, Switzerland, and the Low Countries, where the Reformation happened earliest and most intensely, and had been steadily building over the previous two centuries.[59] The influence of other factors—the printing press, literacy, the intensity of central papal and imperial control—is witnessed in urban settings, where the Reformation was most successful.[60]

Reformation scholars also emphasize a separate urban factor, the economic interests of the rising bourgeoisie. The debate over the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, of course, dates back to Friedrich Engels and Max Weber; it is not one that I intend to join here. Few Reformation historians today, though (even among the recent generation that emphasizes the social causes of Protestantism), argue that Protestant ideas were reducible to, rather than the product of, a complex interaction with class and economic interests. Few would argue away the autonomy of Reformation ideas.[61]

Once converted, Protestants then brandished their social power—the second role of ideas—in diverse ways. Since the church's authority depended most directly on the believer's practice, its authority was most

[58] Steven Ozment, *The Age of Reform, 1220–1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 222–23; Ozment (fn. 51), 9–86; Cameron (fn. 51), 20–37, 79–93.

[59] Alistair McGrath, *The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); idem, *Reformation Thought: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Heiko Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); idem, *Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence of a New Intellectual Climate in Europe*, trans. Dennis Martin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[60] Wuthnow (fn. 56), 25–51; Andrew Pettegree, *The Early Reformation in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Bernd Moeller, *Imperial Cities and the Reformation*, trans. H. C. Erik Middlefort and Mark U. Edwards, Jr. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972); Thomas Brady, "In Search of the Godly City: The Domestication of Religion in the German Urban Reformation," in R. P.-C. Hsia, ed., *The German People and the Reformation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

[61] On Reformation historiography, see Steven E. Ozment, ed., *Reformation Europe: A Guide to Research* (St. Louis, Mo.: Center for Reformation Research, 1982); Hsia (fn. 60); Wuthnow (fn. 56), 25–51; Pettegree (fn. 60); and Bob Scribner, Roy Porter, and Mikulcs Teich, eds., *The Reformation in National Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

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directly undermined when believers simply practiced heterodoxy. Protestants attended churches where preachers taught Protestant theology; they conducted mass, confession, and the other sacraments as the new teaching prescribed; the more unruly of them smashed icons and rioted against Catholic churches; and they refused to obey the sanctioning authority of Rome.[62] Defiant practice was itself a form of social power.

Practical dissent ultimately required a coarser power, too. Protestants took up arms against the emperor on behalf of the prince who would ally with them, and they rebelled against the resistant prince. Merchants, laborers, artisans, peasants, and nobles of all ranks offered their military service in one of these ways. In every case any form of social power had to provide the prince, king, or magistrate with the incentive and means to seize the church's lands and temporal powers and perhaps also to fight the emperor. If the head of a polity himself converted, then he could exercise the social power of ideas by virtue of his position.[63] He could enforce doctrinal uniformity within his territory, appoint new church leaders, nullify the authority of the Roman hierarchy, disband the monasteries, seize church property, and raise troops to fight the empire. But even if he did not convert, out of either obstinacy or indifference, he might still further the Reformation in these ways, either because he feared the rebellion of converts or because he saw an opportunity to gain wealth and power through allying with them. Whether he was pious, rapacious, opportunistic, or afraid, it was only because of the extensive Protestant social power arrayed around him that a leader could successfully defy the church.[64] The social power of position wielded by heads of polities, along with the social power of defiant religious practice, of rebellion, and of military service, together constituted the social power of the Reformation.

This is a general account of how Reformation ideas, through their two roles, brought polities to their interest in sovereign statehood. Different polities, though, experienced variations on this narrative. They followed three causal pathways, each of which helps us to see more precisely how and through whom conversion and social power operated: Reformation from below, Reformation from above, and the politique solution. Figure 1 presents a schematic summary of each of the path-

[62] Cameron (fn. 51), 99–110, 199–318; Ozment (fn. 51), 43–86.

[63] For an example of the influence of a ruling elite, in this case Gorbachev, who himself converts to and empowers new ideas, see Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in Katzenstein (fn. 31).

[64] Cameron (fn. 51), 199–318.

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1. Reformation from Below (Germany, the Netherlands, Transylvania)

Pathway of Conversion

Reflection of theologians → monasteries and universities → ordinary clergy → conversions in a broad array of sectors, including ruling elites

Pathway of Social Power

Broad array of Protestant social sectors, especially urban middle classes, exercising social power of defiant religious practice, resistance, and participation in armed forces (social crisis) ⟶ elites → the polity's interest in Westphalia

2. Reformation from Above (Sweden, England, Denmark)

Pathway of Conversion

Reflection of theologians → monasteries and universities → missionaries → ordinary clergy ↓ conversions in a broad array of sectors, including ruling elites

Pathway of Social Power

Protestant ruling elites exercising the social power of their position (social crisis) ⟶ the polity's interest in Westphalia

↕

broad array of Protestant social sectors, empowering and empowered by ruling elites (social crisis)

3. The Politique Solution (France)

Pathway of Conversion

Reflection of theologians → monasteries and universities → missionaries → ordinary clergy ↓ conversions in a broad array of sectors, including nobility

Pathway of Social Power

Protestants in broad array of sectors exercising social power of armed resistance → interest in secular politique solution among powerful Protestant and Catholic elites → politique compromise whose foreign policy power includes an interest in Westphalia

FIGURE 1
SCHEMATIC SUMMARY OF EACH PATHWAY

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ways, showing the chain of events through which the two roles of ideas unfolded. Reformation from below and the politique solution are then illustrated through the cases of Germany and France, respectively. Reformation from above and the experience of other European polities listed in Table 1 are described more briefly.[65]

GERMANY: REFORMATION FROM BELOW

In Germany, the Reformation began; in Germany, it first had political effects. Between 1523 and 1546 princes and magistrates scattered across more than half of the German-speaking territory, including Swiss and Austrian regions, secularized and seized church lands, cutting off the local church hierarchy from the commands of Rome and effectively creating a territorial church. Prepared to fight for what they seized, they resolved to defend an interest in sovereignty. As Figure 1 shows, ruling elites are the final link in the causal chain that ends with this interest; they are the ones whose position conferred upon them the social power to take it up. Rulers came to such interests only amidst the widespread conversion to Lutheran ideas, as converts were practicing religious defiance, threatening rebellion, and joining armed forces against the empire.[66]

Within a decade of Luther's public dissent in 1517, German rulers began to wrest extant prerogatives from imperial powers. These rulers, from three hundred separate polities in Germany, were an eclectic group of city leaders, nobles, knights, princes, and sometimes imperial electors. In Luther's own region of Saxony, for instance, the elector John placed church lands under state control, replaced Catholic bishops with a "visitation" committee of electoral councillors and theologians, and began to enforce devotional uniformity, improve the standards and conduct of the clergy, and oversee the moral and spiritual affairs of the laity.[67] Much the same occurred in dozens of cities and principalities across Germany between 1523 and the late 1540s, by which time the German Lutheran Reformation finally ceased to expand. The princes often took greater control over the church than

[65] The method here corresponds to the technique of "process tracing" in Alexander George's method of structured focused comparison; see George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul G. Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1979).

[66] Holborn (fn. 10), 37–51, 137–39, 158, 162, 374; Owen Chadwick, *The Reformation* (London: Penguin, 1964); John M. Todd, *Reformation* (New York: Doubleday, 1971), 230–39; A. G. Dickens, *Reformation and Society in Sixteenth Century Europe* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1966), 87–106; G. R. Elton, *Reformation Europe, 1517–1559* (London: Collins, 1963); Barraclough (fn. 10), 262–67.

[67] Elton (fn. 66), 56; Chadwick (fn. 66), 67–71; Todd (fn. 66).

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Luther had intended, although he was generally supportive of their appropriation. He actively assisted Elector John of Saxony in placing church governance in secular hands. Where princes made Protestantism official, they generally also made it uniform, requiring worship in a single church, outlawing dissent, and making Protestantism constitutive of their order's legitimacy. During the rest of the sixteenth century the reliance of Protestant churches on the prince only grew stronger.[68]

How did prince and town leaders come to wrest such power, create such an order? Only in response to what came first from below. Conversion in Germany was paradigmatic, flowing from theologians to monastery to university to clergy to congregation, involving the sermon, the pamphlet, and all of the circumstances that generally obtained in conversion across Europe, as described above and illustrated in Figure 1. The figure also illustrates the exercise of social power. In virtually every German city or principality that became Protestant, the Reformation first spread popularly, to merchants, laborers, shopkeepers, farmers, and sometimes nobles; only afterward did town councils or princes ally with reformers. Wherever Protestantism spread, it brought defiant religious practice almost immediately: priests and parishioners adopted new rites and rituals, ignored the commands and excommunications of their superiors in the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and often rioted and staged public protests. It was a popular movement that the ruler could ally with to his benefit or ignore at a cost.[69]

Converts also exercised more direct political power, according to patterns that varied from region to region. In many northern cities the most important converts were merchants and craftsmen who were excluded from political privilege. Once they converted, they attempted coups, exerting the social power of rebellion, often winning over acquiescent city leaders. The Reformation also reached the rural proletariat, which rose up in the peasant rebellions of the mid-1520s but was cruelly and summarily defeated in battle by the nobility, indeed with Luther's encouragement. In other cities, in central and southern Germany and northern Switzerland, a "civic reformation" took place in which conversion occurred across several layers of society, but most crucially among literate and influential economic elites. Through city politics, these elites succeeded in overcoming the opposition of other elites in persuading city leaders to support the Reformation. In almost every

[68] Barraclough (fn. 10), 374.
[69] Cameron (fn. 51), 199–318.

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German principality that became Protestant and supportive of Westphalia, monarchs converted only after vast swaths of their publics had already done so themselves. In every Protestant polity, too, once the Reformation became official, converts exercised social power by joining armed forces to fight the empire. By contrast, in those German polities such as Bavaria that remained officially Catholic and allied with the empire throughout the sixteenth century, the Reformation spread comparatively little among the populace, was not taken up by heads of polities, and was fought by Catholics who correspondingly populated Catholic armies.[70]

Once polities began to become officially Protestant, Emperor Charles V and the stalwart Catholic princes were forced to respond. After several failed attempts at reconciliation during the 1520s, Catholic forces prepared to take up arms against Protestantism. The Protestant principalities organized into the Schmalkaldic League for defense, and Charles V determined to end the schism. From then on both sides would fight and a unified empire was doomed. In these struggles Protestant converts exercised social power by joining armies and fighting for their polity once it had become officially reformed. Of course, Catholics exercised similar social power by fighting for their ruler—those princes and magistrates who did not go along with the Reformation. Hesse, Brandenburg, Electoral Palatinate, Saxony, and tens of other principalities and cities became officially Protestant; rulers in Bavaria, Austria, and elsewhere remained Catholic; some regions switched back and forth during the sixteenth century. The 1555 Peace of Augsburg proved only a temporary truce, not a lasting solution. "Since conversions and reconversions continued to occur after 1555, Germany's confessional map resembled a periodically changing checkerboard into the time of the Thirty Years' War," historian John Gagliardo writes. Only after Westphalia would the sovereignty of German states rest unchallenged.[71]

In German polities, then, the Reformation came from below, with conversions across societal sectors and social power exercised through defiant religious practices, threats of rebellion, politics within cities and principalities, rulers asserting the power of their position, and broad participation in the armed forces. The timing of interests in sovereign

[70] Ibid., 210–92; on threat theory, see Stephen Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[71] Holborn (fn. 10), 137–39, 158, 162, 284–95, 374; Chadwick (fn. 66), 67–71; Todd (fn. 67), 230–39; Dickens (fn. 66), 87–106; Elton (fn. 66); Barraclough (fn. 10); Gagliardo (fn. 10), 14; Cameron (fn. 51), 210–91.

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statehood testifies to these influences. German assertions of sovereignty during the 1520s, 1530s, and 1540s corresponded remarkably well with the furious advance of the German Lutheran Reformation during this same period. Prior to Luther's defiance of 1517, German rulers had not threatened or hinted at a takeover of the church's temporal powers, though they had long appealed to German nationalism and brought hostile grievances against the church and empire before imperial diets. Not until after Luther rebelled did the first German ruler take up the cause and then not until his own subjects had first taken up reformed teachings. In Germany the coincidence in timing between the Lutheran Reformation and interests in sovereign statehood was virtually exact.[72]

Geographic comparisons also corroborate the same relationship between confessional loyalty and political interests. With very few exceptions, polities that were officially Protestant fought for sovereign statehood and independence from the empire, whereas officially Catholic polities remained loyal to the empire. In two periods of German war, between the 1530s and the 1550s and then from the 1580s through Westphalia in 1648, alliances of Protestant polities fought alliances of Catholic polities and the empire. Alliance patterns consistently followed confessional lines, even when a polity changed religious hands; typically, it would then also change its alignment. Apart from the spread of Protestantism, there appears to be no geographical pattern as to which polities became Catholic and which became Protestant. There is no pattern, for instance, that corroborates a proximity-of-threat hypothesis drawn from international relations scholarship, one that would predict lands on the border of Habsburg Austria to remain Catholic in order to attain safety from the Holy Roman Empire, and more distant, buffered lands to become Protestant. In fact, both Protestant and Catholic lands bordered Austria and were scattered throughout Germany without apparent geostrategic pattern.[73]

Against this case for ideas, the most immediately obvious skepticism claims instrumentality—that secular rulers used the Reformation to legitimate their seizure of sovereignty and their acquisition of the church's remaining powers and wealth. According to this line of thinking, the Reformation exercised little social power over rulers. For four reasons, though, such motives are not a persuasive substitute for ideas. First, Reformation historians reveal the rapacity of some princes and

[72] Holborn (fn. 10), 37–51; Barraclough (fn. 10), 363–67; Gagliardo (fn. 10), 2–4.
[73] See Cameron (fn. 51), 199–313.

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rulers but also assert the veritable devotion of others. Elector Frederick the Wise, for example, supported and harbored Luther shortly after his famous defiance of the pope and emperor at Worms, a time when Luther had few other powerful public supporters.[74]

But even if one were to assume that every prince was motivated by familiar material desiderata, the argument encounters a second objection: it is unclear that ecclesial booty was a rational desideratum at all. Several historians of the Reformation agree that most reforming princes failed to acquire great wealth from church lands. Many, such as Frederick the Wise, risked their power, even their lives, for their stand. That the benefits outweighed the costs was hardly clear.[75] But even assuming that all rulers who sided with the Reformation did so for instrumentally rational, material reasons, there is a third problem: the explanation does not account for the sorts of social power that enabled princes to seize the church's powers and wealth. Who fought in their armies? Who occupied the churches and disobeyed the bishops? Rulers' motives alone fail to explain this. One needs to take account of the sources of their popular support.

The fourth—and most damaging—problem with the argument is, again, one of timing. It fails to explain why, if secular powers were motivated by what they stood to gain materially from church goods, they chose to seize sovereignty at this particular time and only in certain places. Why did some European princes and nobles rebel against the emperor, while others, similarly rich and empowered, remained loyal? And why did rebellious rulers not pursue sovereignty one hundred years earlier? Late medieval theology, after all, abounded with ideas that challenged traditional authority and that might well have served as legitimating rationales.[76] The argument from motives alone has little capacity to explain the historical specificity—the timing or the pattern—of rulers' interests in Westphalia. As I have argued, the presence or absence of Reformation ideas explains these interests quite well. The two roles of ideas tell the story behind these interests. In Germany it was a story of reformation from below.

FRANCE: THE POLITIQUE SOLUTION

France defined its interest in a European system of sovereign states quite differently than Germany did. As it was already a sovereign state,

[74] Ibid., 101–3.

[75] Ibid., 294–99; F. L. Carsten, *Princes and Parliaments in Germany from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959); A. G. Dickens, *The German Nation and Martin Luther* (London: Edward Arnold, 1974); Brady (fn. 60).

[76] McGrath (fn. 59); Oberman (fn. 59).

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it came to fight for sovereign statehood for the rest of Europe, entering the Thirty Years' War in 1635 to bring the defeat of the Holy Roman Empire's remaining sovereign powers in 1648. France nonetheless retained its Catholic monarchy. The lesson: a state need not become officially Protestant in order to pursue an interest in sovereign statehood; rather, it need only experience a Reformation crisis. As politique doctrine prescribed, France would allow religious toleration within the realm, while pursuing a secular, sovereign states system, friendly to its security in Europe.

The Reformation had roiled France in the last three decades of the sixteenth century and corresponds closely to France's inclination toward a European system of sovereign states. As in Germany, the Reformation came from below, but it led not to an independent Protestant state but to a sundering civil war, one that in turn evoked the novel, secularizing compromise solution proposed by the politique party. Figure 1 shows this novel pathway of social power.

It was during the early seventeenth century that France first adopted its interest in Westphalia. Although the Habsburg threat dated back to 1519, the French opposition took different forms during different periods. Between 1522 and 1559 France fought to prevent a Habsburg invasion and to expand its buffer zone, but it did not seek to eliminate the empire or the church's temporal powers. Between 1560 and 1598 France imploded in civil war, allowing it scarcely any foreign policy except for a brief defensive war against Spain during the 1590s. In the quarter century after 1598 civil war ceased within the realm, while France remained at peace with Spain and hesitant to intervene in the religious fracases stirring in the empire between 1610 and 1624. It was not until the age of Cardinal Richelieu, a politique who became chief royal adviser in 1624, that France adopted an offensive policy of weakening and then destroying the empire and the Habsburgs and fighting for the sovereign rights of German princes—an interest in European sovereign statehood.[77]

Calvinism evoked this new interest in two ways. Most importantly, the social power of its armed uprising gave rise to the politique ideology, which supported a system of sovereign states. In the 1550s, acting out the first role of ideas, an international network of Calvinist mis-

[77] John Lynch, *Spain under the Habsburgs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); H. G. Koenigsberger and George L. Mosse, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968); J. H. Elliott, *Europe Divided, 1559–1598* (London: Collins, 1968), 11–29; Osiander (fn. 13), 27–29; Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellianism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History*, trans. Douglas Scott (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 1; Church (fn. 16), 283–340, 480–82; Richelieu (fn. 16).

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sionaries converted French hearers through the sermon, the pamphlet, and favorable circumstances similar to Germany's. As Figure 1 shows, this pathway of conversion was similar to that in Germany, except for the addition of missionaries. Although Protestantism in France was not indigenous, it was successful. Thus, at the onset of the civil wars in the 1560s, 10 percent of the French people and 40 percent of the nobility were Calvinist.[78] The nobles who converted allied immediately with the congregations, some out of conviction, some out of desire for church property, some out of both. Like the Protestant German princes, they confiscated church lands, gained control of local and provincial governments, and then fought off Catholic princes and armies supplied by the congregations.[79]

Between 1562 and 1598 Calvinism spread, Huguenots revolted, a Catholic League formed in response, and eight civil wars ensued. The political costs and incentives facing nobles and kings were radically altered. Nobles could ally with Huguenots or fight them off. If they allied, they could gain wealth, office, and armies, but they would then have to wage war against Catholic nobles and their armies. Kings, almost all of them Catholic, now had to choose between fighting Protestants or tolerating them. Fighting would mean raising armies and using them internally, not abroad; toleration would mean losing the crucial political support of Catholic nobles. After the St. Bartholomew's massacre of the Huguenot leadership of 1572, kings typically issued edicts of toleration only when their resources had been stretched too thin from battling Protestants. Vulnerable paucity, though, was fairly common. Kings relied heavily upon the nobility, to whom they sold offices for revenues and armies, and enjoyed the support of only that faction whose favor they could curry at any one time. Ideas created conflict; conflict sapped the king's resources.

But the same conflict gave rise to the idea—the politique idea—that proved its solution. After thirty years of war had destroyed civic unity and prevented an active foreign policy, the politique option gained in stature and made possible the accession of Henry of Navarre, a quintessential politique. As King Henry IV, he signed the compromise Edict of Nantes, granting Huguenots liberty of worship in specified regions, but not universal toleration. The politics of toleration was not intrinsic to either side's ideals. Although some Calvinists called for religious toleration, many others, including Calvin himself, sought a uniformly Reformed state. In opposition, orthodox Catholics fought to

[78] Porter (fn. 24), 73.
[79] Dickens (fn. 66), 164–87; Elliott (fn. 77), 116–25.

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preserve the France of "un roi, une loi, une foi." The politiques still desired religious uniformity yet countenanced toleration in the interests of social peace, to avoid ruin. The foreign policy counterpart of politique doctrine was *raison d'état*, also an expression of toleration and a privileging of state security. In place of lingering fealty to Christendom and the Habsburgs, France would pursue a sovereign states system, an arrangement that would curtail transnational authority and allow it to achieve the balance of power that would best preserve its security. This new stress on security as an end and Westphalia as a means arrived through religious war.[80]

The second way in which Calvinists influenced French policy was through their continued struggle for toleration, since they were discontented with the terms of Nantes. The kings' ability to fight the Habsburgs always depended inversely on Huguenot strength: when Huguenots surged, armies were diverted inward; when Huguenots were quelled (by royal force) or contented (with a new edict of toleration), kings could fight the Habsburgs more vigorously. The defeat of the Habsburgs and the advancement of a system of sovereign states, then, required two conditions: a politique in office and the Huguenots in abeyance. Illustrating the first condition, French foreign policy closely followed the ideology of the most powerful faction in the government during the next half century. When traditional papist *dévots* held power between 1610 and 1624, France remained sympathetic to the empire but militarily uninvolved in the growing continental conflict between Catholics and Protestants. In 1624, though, the politique Cardinal Richelieu took office as chief royal adviser and architect of foreign policy and sought to change course. But before he could commit France irrevocably to the struggle against the Habsburgs, he had to defeat a Huguenot revolt in the mid-1620s. By the 1630s he was ready to pursue war with Habsburg Austria, Spain, and the empire, seeking a comprehensive design for a community of sovereign states to replace the Holy Roman Empire—an aim that no French king had ever before pursued. In France, then, the Reformation's influence was more indirect. It created not a confessional Protestant state, but a politique ideology that called for a system of sovereign states.[81]

[80] On the religious wars in France, see James Westfall Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France, 1559–1576* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1909). On the politiques, see Skinner (fn. 51), 249–54; and William Farr Church, *Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth-Century France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), 194–271. On Bodin, see Jean Bodin, *On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from Six Books of the Commonwealth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Julian Franklin, *Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory* (Cambridge, U.K.: At the University Press, 1973).

[81] Richelieu (fn. 16); Church (fn. 16).

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THE REST OF EUROPE

In detailing the cases of France and Germany, I have shown how Protestant ideas, in their two roles, elicited an interest in Westphalia via two distinct historical pathways. While France was alone in its politique pursuit of sovereign statehood, other polities such as the Netherlands corresponded to the German model of Reformation from below. There, the ruling nobility decided to declare independence from Spain in 1581 only reluctantly and amidst pressure from revolting Calvinists.[82] Transylvania's sixteenth-century Reformation was closer to the German model and allied itself with the anti-imperial forces in the Thirty Years' War.[83]

A third pathway is simpler and can be more easily described: Reformation from above. Here, the monarch, without strong incentives from below, exercised the social power of his position to make the Reformation official in the churches (thereby furthering conversion), seize Catholic lands and powers, and support the Reformation elsewhere in Europe. Even in these cases conversion still occurred across societal sectors, and converts wielded social power from their defiant practice and participation in the armed forces. Figure 1 shows this reciprocal support and empowerment. So monarchs did not act alone, but in comparison with other cases, they exercised much more power and initiative.

Sweden is archetypical. The Lutheran Reformation was officially established by King Gustav Erikkson in the 1520s with the cooperation of, but hardly pressure from, theologians, clergy, and the urban populace. Sweden came to support the sovereignty of German princes shortly thereafter, allying with them diplomatically during the 1540s. A century later, in 1630, Sweden entered the Thirty Years' War against the empire, led by the devout Lutheran king Gustav Adolph.[84] In England, Henry VIII largely initiated the Reformation in the 1530s, acting far more instrumentally than Gustav Adolph would later on, but also benefiting from the societal spread of Protestantism. Though England's own civil wars kept it out of the Thirty Years' War, its foreign policy closely followed confessional lines. As long as its monarchs were Protestant, it generally gave economic aid, arms, and assistance in dy-

[82] Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 126–68; idem, *Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-1659* (Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1990), 52–53; Lynch (fn. 77); Geyl (fn. 10); Israel (fn. 10), 106–230.

[83] Parker (fn. 13), 155.

[84] Michael Roberts, *The Early Vasas: A History of Sweden, 1523–1611* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 68–70; N. K. Anderson, *The Reformation in Scandinavia and the Baltic*, in G. R. Elton, ed., The *New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 146–53; Roberts (fn. 16, 1967), 78.

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nastic intrigue to its Protestant brethren in the Netherlands and Germany, while it consistently opposed the empire, even defeating the Spanish armada in 1588.[85] Denmark followed a path similar to Sweden's. There, a Lutheran Reformation succeeded by the mid-1530s and was followed quickly by alliances with warring German Protestant princes.[86]

Obversely, in those polities that fought for, or at least aligned with, the empire, the Reformation never managed to make so much as a chink in Catholic piety, practice, and authority. I have noted that in Germany, officially Catholic polities aligned with the empire from the inception of the Reformation up through Westphalia. Most striking is Spain, whose dynastic links with the empire and zealous advocacy of Catholic uniformity in Europe made it the most pro-Catholic polity on the continent. It was the European polity least penetrated by the Reformation. The Reformation mostly failed, too, in the Italian city-states, which remained aligned with the empire during most of the wars of the Reformation. The Italian link is not diminished by the fact that Italian city-states themselves constituted an effective system of sovereign states during the fifteenth century. My argument is not for the necessity of the Reformation in eliciting any system of sovereign states but for its necessity in eliciting Westphalia, a system that the Catholic, post-Renaissance Italian states did virtually nothing to bring about. Finally, Poland and Habsburg Hungary, too, were enduringly Catholic and enduringly loyal to the empire. Poland intervened on the imperial side several times during the Thirty Years' War. Although the Reformation spread significantly within these realms, it never captured the crown or sparked a social crisis like that in France. They complete the continental correlation between Reformation crises and interests in Westphalia.

The Reformation and the Thirty Years' War

The social power of Protestants, then, was coincident with and plausibly connected to the development of an interest in sovereign statehood in all of the polities that together defeated the empire during the Thirty Years' War. But the explanation is incomplete without an account of how these polities actually achieved Westphalia once they had developed an interest in it—through ultimate military victory. Virtually every historian of the Thirty Years' War agrees that ongoing disputes between Catholics and Protestants in Germany and Bohemia were the

[85] Cameron (fn. 51), 381–88.
[86] Ibid., 272–74.

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original cause of the war, even as religion became intertwined with other stakes: the ambitions of the military entrepreneur Wallenstein, who amassed immense wealth and lands fighting for the Habsburgs, the fate of Spain as a great power, the sea power of the Netherlands, and the strategic position of Sweden. Most historians would agree, too, that by the last decade of the war religious passions were spent and rulers continued to fight on for wealth and territory. But how states entered into the conflict in the first place is inexplicable apart from the power of Protestant ideas.[87]

Skepticism of Protestantism's Social Power

Structural material explanations challenge the assertion "no Reformation, no Westphalia." The prominence of these explanations makes skepticism of the Reformation significant; that is, it is plausible that ideas were superfluous. But, as I argue, the ultimate inadequacy of these explanations leaves our proposed counterfactual claim about the Reformation intact.[88] The discussion of the German case considered one version of materialism based on skepticism about motives. A more compelling alternative to ideas would not focus on motives, however, but would propose a different sort of social power that better explains the timing and geography of interests in sovereign statehood. It would look instead toward how over the course of centuries states accrued military, economic, and extractive bureaucratic power and saw the growth of their treasuries and their systems of commerce and law. Here, the story of Westphalia is the story of the state, how it grew, and how it triumphed over rival institutions—the Holy Roman Empire, the Hanseatic League, and the Italian city-states.[89] The Peace of Westphalia merely ratified this victory.

Most of the many social scientists who have told the story of the state identify its origins in changes in economics, organization, military technology, or the international distribution of power and in the very activity of war. Here, I do not want to assess the relative merits of these accounts; rather I treat them as a common source of skepticism about the social power of ideas. If the growth of the state turns out wholly to explain the system of sovereign states, then the exact causes of this growth can be debated. But a general statist account can be taken to hold that in a grand historical trajectory running from the High Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, France, England, Sweden, Prussia, other

[87] For histories of the Thirty Years' War, see fn. 13.
[88] See Tetlock and Belkin (fn. 25), 21–25.
[89] Spruyt (fn. 1), 22–33.

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German states, and the Netherlands grew into statehood and adopted an interest in a sovereign states system through some combination of material forces. Certainly, there is significant truth in this epic. State growth began well prior to the Reformation, and theorists of state building explain much of it with scant reference to the Reformation. But did the rise of the state power and institutions alone bring about Westphalia? To make this case, such accounts must show that state growth steamed ahead inexorably until the day when polities adopted their interests in a Westphalian system. The Reformation, meanwhile, occurs on the sidelines, its social power redundant or irrelevant.

Returning to Table 1, column 4 shows that the growth of state institutions generally fails to correspond with interests in Westphalia. Over the course of the fifteenth century, admittedly, state institutions across Europe secured stable power over their citizens and notable autonomy from the church, following civil war and conciliar controversy. But the momentum abated. The period between 1500 and the end of the Thirty Years' War is one that several leading early modern historians characterize as one of crisis, war, and monarchical trepidation.[90]

Despite their claims to godlike status, monarchs were continually assaulted by aristocrats who revolted and often resisted the extraction of their revenue. In the first half of the seventeenth century the central state apparatus did expand somewhat in France and Sweden, but revolts and calamity also continued, especially in France. It was not until after the Thirty Years' War that "bureaucratic-military absolutism," epitomized by Louis XIV, finally developed. It was then that the military revolution—itself brought on by the Thirty Years' War—elicited the sharp expansion of the state in France and Prussia and that monarchs came to enjoy the stability and state apparatus which their forebears desired.[91]

But contrast this timing with the development of their interests in a system of sovereign states. In Germany state institutions grew gradually over the sixteenth century, but it was not until the latter half of the seventeenth century, after the Thirty Years' War, that absolute monarchy developed, most prominently in the Brandenburg-Prussia of Frederick the Great. German rulers adopted their interest in Westphalia in

[90] David Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Geoffrey Parker, *Europe in Crisis, 1598–1648* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979); Trevor Aston, ed., *Crisis in Europe, 1560–1660: Essays from Past and Present* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965); J. H. Elliott, "The Decline of Spain," in Aston; John H. Kautsky, *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 341–46.

[91] Downing (fn. 47).

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the 1530s.[92] Sweden mimicked Germany, achieving the zenith of its power between 1670 and 1718, long after its interest in sovereign statehood had been realized.[93] Similarly, the Netherlands' golden age of commerce and rapid military expansion began in the 1590s, after its declaration of independence.[94]

In France the politique vision of *raison d'état* not only inspired France's contribution to Westphalia but also called for building the crown's powers within the realm. After its civil war died down, the French state grew in its financial and tax-raising apparatus and in its military might. Under Richelieu, its armed forces increased from twelve thousand men in 1629 to two hundred thousand during its intervention in the Thirty Years' War. Yet even then, the crown was weakened by the nobles' constant opposition to reform and taxation and by several uprisings during the 1630s and 1640s. It was not until the reign of Louis XIV and his minister Colbert after Westphalia that France experienced its military revolution and succeeded in raising revenues from the nobility to wage hegemonic war. This was decades after it had developed an interest in a sovereign state system.[95]

The notion that Westphalia is a mere corollary of the Leviathan's bursting forth stumbles in the face of history's timing. Bodies politic were interested in Westphalia before their institutions experienced their dramatic adolescent growth. But the problem of timing is also one of suddenness, not merely sequence. In each case where rulers came to advocate Westphalia, little such talk had been heard even a generation earlier. If the gradual growth of states over centuries explains Westphalia, then why did not their interests also grow gradually, alongside

[92] Ibid.; Gagliardo (fn. 10); Barraclough (fn. 10), 376–80; Carl Cipolla, ed., *The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Glasgow: William Collins Sons, 1974); Gerald Strauss, *Law, Resistance, and the State: The Opposition to Roman Law in Reformation Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Moeller (fn. 60); Carsten (fn. 75), 165–78.

[93] Parker (fn. 47, 1976), 206; Roberts (fn. 16, 1967), 78.

[94] Parker (fn. 47, 1976), 206; Israel (fn. 10), 106–230; Jan DeVries, *The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500–1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Henri Pirenne, *Early Democracies in the Low Countries: Urban Society and Political Conflict in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); J. W. Smit, "The Netherlands Revolution," in R. Forster and J. P. Greene, eds., *Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); Geyl (fn. 10).

[95] Parker (fn. 47, 1976), 206; Richard Bonney, *Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624–1661* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); idem, *The King's Debts: Finance and Politics in France, 1589–1661* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); idem, *Society and Government in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624–1661* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1988); Church (fn. 16), 81–102, 283–340; Elliott (fn. 77), 11–29; Martin Wolfe, *The Fiscal System of Renaissance France* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1972); Porter (fn. 24), 74; Victor L. Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, trans. D. McN. Lockie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Robin Briggs, *Early Modern France, 1560–1715* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); David Buisseret, *Sully and the Growth of Centralized Government in France, 1598–1610* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1968).

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their institutions? This abruptness suggests another form of social power at play.

Even more damning than timing is Spain. Like other European states, Spain gained strength in the fifteenth century, unifying its territory and experiencing, by some measures, the earliest and most rapid growth of any contemporary European state. It expanded its military from 20,000 troops in the 1470s (smaller than England's or France's) to 150,000 in the 1550s (three times that of France), established an overseas empire that fed it hordes of silver and gold, and enlarged its treasury and royal bureaucracy.[96] Yet the Spanish colossus never sought or fought for a Westphalian system of states and was indeed its arch-opponent, regarding it as heresy. If state growth leads to an interest in Westphalia, then why did not early modern Europe's strongest state develop such an interest? The Spanish state's legitimacy was bound to what remained of medieval Europe: it was pervasively Catholic and the imperial ruler of the Netherlands, its king was the Holy Roman Emperor for the first half of the sixteenth century, and afterward it was still closely tied to the imperially linked Habsburg dynasty. This geographic comparison, too, challenges the story of Westphalia as a mere spinoff of the state's coming of age.[97]

Not only does the state's growth fail to supplant the Reformation as an explanation for Westphalia, but, as this period's embattled politics reveal, this growth itself was deeply shaped by the Reformation. From 1530 to 1648 armed conflict raged continuously at least somewhere in Europe. Most of these conflicts were caused in large part by the dispute between Protestants and Catholics—the most prominent crisis of the period. In most European polities that experienced it, the crisis itself was the chief brake on state growth. In the Netherlands, Prussia, and France it even wrought civil war. It was as a solution to this chaos that leaders embraced the strong secular state. It was also amidst religious war that technological developments led states to expand their militaries, necessitating in turn the need for state institutions to raise the money and the troops to support it. The military revolution, an imminent source of absolutism, arose from wars caused by the Reformation.

Admittedly, factors besides the Reformation helped to bring about Westphalia. During the first half of the seventeenth century Spain suffered bankruptcies and decline, Sweden rose, the Netherlands flour-

[96] Parker (fn. 47, 1976), 206.

[97] J. H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716* (London: Edward Arnold, 1963); Elliott (fn. 90); Henry Kamen, *Spain 1469–1714: A Society in Conflict* (London: Longman, 1983); J. H. Elliott, *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

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ished economically, and the empire became overextended, fighting not only Protestants but also the Turks. But if ideas were not a sole cause, they were more than just another of many, inextricably interwoven causes. The tightness of the geographic and temporal link between ideas and interests in Westphalia, the pathways that expose the cogs and pinions of the influence of ideas, the weak connection between structural material trends and political interests, the partial effect of ideas upon these trends—together, these factors argue that without the Reformation, an international system would have arrived at a very different time, under very different circumstances, in some alternative historical universe.

The Significance of the Argument

The world of sovereign states that emerged at Westphalia was one that realists from Hobbes to Waltz would so enduringly describe, one in which the campaigns of polities to alter religious practice and belief within the borders of other polities came to appear strange, even difficult to imagine. Religion itself, of course, was far from a permanently spent force in international politics; many analysts point to a recent resurgence.[98] Religious conflict appears strange, rather, only in its early modern role, as a major challenge to the legitimacy of the modern international system. Perhaps this strangeness helps to account for the materialist cast of most contemporary social scientific accounts of how this world came to be. But if what I have argued is correct, the realist world itself did not evolve solely from material factors. It was the result of much more: a new conception of humanity's relationship with God.

The case for this new conception has implications for the field of international relations. It adds to a growing corpus of work that asserts the influence of ideas, culture, and norms in shaping international politics. It aims to prove the power of a very large and powerful idea, the Protestant Reformation, and to propose pathways of influence through which the Reformation shaped polities' interests in Westphalia—their adoption of it and their ability to achieve it. The deeper importance of the argument, though, lies in the importance of the event about which it argues. That Westphalia is the founding moment of the international system is old wisdom here renewed. An explanation of this moment is

[98] See Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995).

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an explanation of the revolution that so enduringly constituted the international social world.

As Westphalia today becomes riven, insights into its origins are all the more momentous. If ideas were a crucial source of the system of sovereign states, they could well be the source of contemporary trends away from sovereignty such as internationally sanctioned intervention and the expansion of the European Union. We can imagine hypotheses: intervention results from the growth of human rights and democracy during the cold war; European integration originated in the post–World War II popularity of European federalism, itself rooted in Christian Democracy and Catholic social thought. Of course, there are material explanations for both trends, so the role of ideas would have to be established. If proven, however, the influence of ideas in both cases would be significant not only for causal debates but also as a case of historical return. In both cases sovereignty becomes restricted on behalf of values that are universal and transcendent— precisely what was lost at the Peace of Westphalia.

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Review Article

THE MANY VOICES OF POLITICAL CULTURE
Assessing Different Approaches

By RICHARD W. WILSON

Richard J. Ellis and Michael Thompson, eds. *Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997, 252 pp.
Michael Gross. *Ethics and Activism: The Theory and Practice of Political Morality*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 305 pp.
Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996, 367 pp.
Ronald Inglehart. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in Forty-three Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, 453 pp.
David I. Kertzer. *Politics and Symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the Fall of Communism*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996, 211 pp.

THE popularity of political culture has waxed and waned, yet it remains an enduring feature of political studies. In recent years the appearance of many excellent books and articles has reminded us of the timeless appeal of the subject and of the need in political analysis to account for values and beliefs. To what extent, though, does the current batch of studies in political culture suffer from the difficulties that plagued those of an earlier time? The recent resurgence of interest in political culture suggests the importance of assessing the relative merits of the different approaches that theorists employ.

Establishing Evaluative Criteria

The earliest definitions of political culture noted the embedding of political systems in sets of meanings and purposes, specifically in symbols, myths, beliefs, and values.[1] Pye later enlarged upon this theme, stating

[1] Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 513.

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that political culture "encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. . . . [It] is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics." And as he concluded: "A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system."[2] Political culture thus never addresses individuals or societies singly. It holds that individuals are the fundamental units of societies and does so in a way that embraces the attributes of both personality and social systems. Assumptions emphasize different factors, such as how individuals and/or groups are socialized, how different individuals organize their thinking about rules and norms, how discourse affects the legitimacy of political institutions, how and why individuals orient their thinking and communication in terms of salient myths, rituals, and symbols, and how moral criteria are apprehended and with what consequences for political behavior. Because these assumptions vary in importance depending on intellectual taste and training, it is impossible to speak of a single political culture approach. Rather, different approaches have been utilized to solve different problems and to suit different methodologies.

In seeking to assess the claims of these various approaches one needs a measure against which they can be evaluated. To this end, I suggest beginning with a critical component of all political culture studies—preference formation and, more specifically, how culture constrains preferences and how preferences affect culture. The nature of preferences is an irreducible, necessary, and shared focus of all political culture analyses; the critical factor underlying preference stability is the social and psychological constraints that act upon it. Concomitantly, what happens to preference stability when these constraints become inoperative is also of crucial importance.

One way to conceptualize preference stability is through a modification of the law of relative effect.[3] If we posit that (R) is the rate of expressing a preference, (k) is the maximum possible rate in these terms, (s) is the satisfaction from making choices in terms of this preference orientation, and (sa) is the satisfaction from making choices in terms of alternative preference orientations, then the hypothesis states that

$$R = \frac{k(s)}{s + sa}$$

[2] Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), 218.

[3] Peter du Preez, *A Science of Mind: The Quest for Psychological Reality* (London: Academic Press, 1991), 101–2.

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This equation tells us that as (s) increases so will (R), dramatically. But to the degree that (sa) is important with respect to (s), then (R) will fail to materialize to any significant degree. As hypothesized here, the probability of (R) being high—that is, the constraints that maintain a significant degree of (s) are high—is related to the following factors:

— the degree of congruence in the cognitive and affective valences of society's members
— the degree to which the norms and symbolic referents that coordinate social interaction are based on mutually reinforcing definitions and are widely accepted as legitimate
— the degree of congruence in individual and social interpretations of reality
— and, at the individual level, the degree of consistency in response repertoires

Such constraints obviously have an impact on the value of (k), the maximum possible rate of expressing a particular preference. When these constraints are weak or nonexistent with respect to (s) and/or when entirely different criteria become significant as constraints on preferences, the probability of (sa) being large relative to (s) is likely. In this circumstance social (and cultural) disorganization will be marked, as groups and individuals struggle to maximize alternative preference orientations through peaceful discourse, street demonstrations, revolution, and so on.

This essay begins by assessing five different books, each representative of a political culture approach—the five approaches that largely define the theoretical space of current political culture studies. In exploring how (s) and (sa) are conceptualized in each approach, the relationship between them, and the affect that this has upon (R), it becomes clear that while each approach has its strengths, not all are equally effective in explaining rates of preference formation (R). This is a key point, for if political culture is to have utility in political analysis it must be able to explain why and when people choose particular courses of action over others and the likelihood that these choices will be widely shared. The second part of the essay considers the difficulty political culture theorists have in confronting the relationship between preference formation and political cultural norms. Finally, the essay briefly highlights some promising avenues for future research.

Assessing Political Culture Approaches

To compare political culture approaches, one needs to assess how they identify and measure the relative magnitudes of (s) (the satisfaction from making choices in terms of a particular preference orientation)

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and (sa) (the satisfaction from making choices in terms of an alternative preference orientation). This yields a critical measure of theoretical adequacy: how well an approach can determine (s) and (sa), identify constraints on their formation, and establish a plausible connection between constraints and satisfaction.

Each of the books reviewed deals broadly with the question of political transformation, utilizing different criteria to explore this phenomenon. In evaluating the approaches attention is paid to how alternative ways of assessing preferences affect our understanding of political change.

Political Culture Approaches in the Anthropological Tradition

The Hermeneutic or Interpretative Approach

One powerful framework of explanation is grounded in the anthropological tradition of fieldwork and immersion in community life.[4] Many political scientists consider these studies to be especially appropriate for areas lacking survey data and for studies of local communities; this type of work has produced many useful concepts and midrange theories that are as applicable to national polities as they are to local levels. The focus on the symbolic dimension of politics, including the role of myth and ritual, has been applied to analyze nineteenth-century Bali and to explain changes in societies as diverse as contemporary Poland and Israel.[5] Derived from both a Weberian concern with the meaning of social action and a phenomenological focus on the socially constructed nature of knowledge and society, culture in this approach is defined as the collective meanings that groups create, share, and symbolically express. There is commonly a myth of origin, which relates how a people came to be or how a nation was created. Ideologies, the more particular interpretations of these wider cultural themes, tend to be more conscious and rationalized versions that give legitimacy to the claims of

[4] See, as examples, Lowell Dittmer, "Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," *World Politics* 29 (July 1977); Murray Edelman, *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Laura Desfor Edles, *Symbol and Ritual in the New Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); James W. Fernandez, *Persuasions and Performances* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); Bruce Kapferer, *Legends of People, Myths of State* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1988); Sally F. Moore and Barbara G. Myerhoff, *Secular Ritual* (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1977); Sherry B. Ortner, *High Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[5] Myron J. Aronoff, *Power and Ritual in the Israel Labor Party* (Armonk, N.Y.; M. E. Sharpe, 1992); Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); and Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State-Socialism in Poland* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993).

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different groups.[6] Although studies using this approach employ a variety of methodological techniques, participant observation remains a central one, and surveys are generally supplementary. As a consequence, the approach interrelates well with studies that seek explanations for community fragmentation or cohesion in situations where dramatic macrolevel political change is occurring.

David I. Kertzer in *Politics and Symbols* develops an interesting and informative account of the demise of the Italian Communist Party. So swiftly did this occur that many of the party faithful were shocked and dismayed. Although as early as the 1960s trust in the USSR as the leader of the world's proletariat had eroded, by the mid-1970s both Italians and foreigners were predicting that the party might even come to hold a majority in the national government. Nonetheless, the party's momentum began to slacken, such that by 1989 events in Eastern and Central Europe accelerated the belief of the party secretary, Achille Occhetto, and of others that bold action to transform the party was required. This transpired in November 1989, with Occhetto's announcement of the *svolta*, or turnabout—the need to change the name of the party and create a new-style leftist political entity.

Kertzer spent a year in the working-class quarter of Bologna talking with those involved, attending meetings, visiting cafes, and participating in protest meetings and rallies. Occhetto's statement had clearly provoked a crisis resulting in huge defections from the party and a drop in the share of the party's vote, from 30 percent in 1985 to 24 percent in 1990 (p. 14). The name of the party and the use of its emblems and symbols were hotly contested by a powerful secessionist group, and there soon developed a battle over the party's history, its myths, and the construction of a new postcommunist identity. This conflict was the basis for Kertzer's "concern . . . with the role of symbolism and the manipulation of history in the Communist struggle" (p. 15), and he turned his focus to "the evolution of the party's Communist identity" (p. 15).

The twin processes of mythologization and ritualization, says Kertzer, create history. The party's identity was bound up in a mythologized past associated closely with the resistance against fascism. The events of this struggle, not always depicted by the faithful with accuracy, were used by communists over the years to construct the themes of an evil conspiracy, the existence of a savior, and the coming of a golden age. When the members of the party discovered that they no longer had a name (that is, Communist), the situation signified as well the loss

[6] Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Publishers, 1989), xv–xvi.

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of the symbols, myths, and rituals associated with that name, for all were inextricably intertwined. Notwithstanding, in the ensuing political struggle both Occhetto and his opponents drew on the symbolism of the party while redefining both the party's symbols and its history to suit tactical needs.

The analysis of symbols is central for Kertzer because he believes that politics is at root a symbolic activity. This led him to explore how important symbols (for example, the red flag and revolutionary martyrs) are constructed and altered and how some symbols become legitimate and others are rendered illegitimate. Crucial to understanding the importance of symbols is the nature of ritual defined as "any symbolic behavior that is socially standardized, repetitive, and meaningful. Indeed, it is through ritual that symbols come to be defined, diffused, and energized" (p. 123). Prior to the *svolta* it was ritual that had promoted solidarity by legitimating "a symbolic descent from common ancestors whose mythic status [was] promulgated through rites" (p. 125). As a consequence, standing at the heart of the conflict over the transformation of the party was a struggle over the symbols on which rites were based.

Kertzer claims that "the emotional dimension is central" (p. 156), but nowhere is there a discussion of the psychological mechanisms that link emotions to preferences in a way that can help explain why preferences do or do not change. The result is an interesting account, but aside from the author's assertions no convincing argument is advanced about how "emotions" stimulate the process of identification with myths, symbols, and rituals. Missing is the critical why. Instead, one comes away with a plausible but nevertheless fundamentally narrative explanation of the unique features surrounding the transformation of the Italian Communist Party.

The hermeneutic approach looks to uncover constraint, in the form of myth, ritual, and discourse, largely through immersion in community life (where possible) and by "thick" description, relying heavily on semiotic analysis. There is no explicit psychological dimension. Rather, causal relationships are validated through observation of repetitive patterns: habits and habit complexes at the individual level and customs and custom complexes at the social level. Conceptualizing (s), the satisfaction derived from making choices in terms of a particular preference orientation, and (sa), the satisfaction gained from making choices in terms of an alternative orientation, is done largely by reference to variables at the social level (for example, shared adherence to a common myth of origin) and is achieved by expert interpretation based on ob-

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servations of individual and mass behavior in actual social contexts. Satisfaction is inferred from public activity while the degree of constraint, linked to (s) and (sa) respectively, is determined by the inferred strength of enduring predispositions, loyalties, and so on regarding political life.

THE "CULTURE THEORY" APPROACH

The culture theory approach has evolved from the anthropological tradition, in particular, from the work of Mary Douglas.[7] It explicitly eschews direct reference to individual psychological variables and focuses instead on typological distinctions between subgroups said to exist in every polity. These groups are differentiated by two criteria: (1) the extent to which individual behavior within the group is socially prescribed (termed "grid") and (2) the degree to which persons are locked into membership in their group (termed "group"). Based on the relative strength of these criteria, ideal subcultures are identified according to behavior patterns that vary from *apathetic* (fatalism: high grid, low group), to intense concern for *hierarchy* (collectivism: high grid, high group), to *competitive* (individualism: low grid, low group), to *equalitarian* (egalitarianism: high group, low grid), and, finally, to *autonomous* (retreatism: neutral group and grid). The importance of actual subcultures in any society is ascertained by research into the prevalence of these behavior patterns, with the ways that subcultures interact providing the theoretical basis for understanding the political life of a society. In studies of political change this approach is especially well suited for analyses of contestation. Coalitions and more loosely knit groupings are identified in ways that differ from standard sociological (for example, class) or psychological (for example, relative deprivation) formulations.

Through its impossibility theorem culture theory posits that in any society there are exactly these five theoretically identified social relationship patterns—no more and no less. As individuals transact with each other, they come to know more clearly what they want and choose the pattern that is most congenial for them; subsequent preferences are then derived from and constrained by the particular social relationship

[7] See, as examples, Mary Douglas, ed., *Essays in the Sociology of Perception* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982); Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, *Risk and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Richard J. Ellis, *American Political Cultures* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990); Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preferences," *American Political Science Review* 81, no. 1 (1987); idem, "Indispensable Framework or Just Another Ideology? Prisoner's Dilemma as an Antihierarchical Game," *Rationality and Society* 4, no. 1 (1992).

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pattern a person has identified with. Even as each way of life is dynamically stabilized, however, individuals may shift away from allegiance to one pattern as a consequence of a cumulative mismatch between the promise and the performance of a particular relationship pattern. Microculture is thus the type of choice (that is, hierarchical, equalitarian, and so on) that is associated with a particular relationship pattern, whereas macroculture is the relative strength of the patterns.

Toward the end of his life Aaron Wildavsky became a leading proponent of culture theory, arguing against the assumption that history is merely narrative and that culture is simply national, religious, ethnic, racial, or organizational distinctions that defy common measures. *Culture Matters*, edited by Richard J. Ellis and Michael Thompson, is a collection of essays written in honor of Wildavsky, although only half of them are related to culture theory.

Wildavsky believed that a theory should be judged not against an impossible ideal but in comparison with rival theories. The article by Gunnar Grendstad and Per Selle, "Cultural Theory, Postmaterialism, and Environmental Attitudes," does just that, attempting to compare culture theory with alternative approaches. Employing an elaborate test of a public opinion survey conducted in Norway, they found that Ronald Inglehart's[8] hypothesized connection between environmentalism and postmaterialism was a move in the right direction but that the strength of the relationship was weak to nonexistent. In contradistinction they note that the egalitarian subculture, when operationalized, is able to explain far more variation in environmental attitudes (pp. 162–63). Indeed, materialism-postmaterialism were the weakest predictors of environmental attitudes, leading Grendstad and Selle to conclude that Inglehart was either wrong about the relationships or that his measures of materialism and postmaterialism are inadequate (p. 165). While this is but another of the numerous challenges posed to Inglehart and rebutted by him, it does provide support for the predictive capability of culture theory.

Of critical importance in assessing culture theory's claims is the adequacy of its explanation of political change. Charles Lockhart deals with this issue in "Political Culture and Political Change," maintaining that cultural biases are vulnerable to dissolution. According to the theory's postulates, all people must be associated with a subculture of their choosing. As circumstances change, however, a cumulative mismatch

[8] Ronald Inglehart, "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity," *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 4 (1981).

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between performance and expectations may cause the adherents of any particular cultural bias to alter their preferences. A theory of "surprise" (akin to cognitive dissonance) underlies the shift from one bias to another as changing circumstances foster new institutional relationships, which in turn reshape perceptions. Nonetheless, despite the fact that change is said to be inherent and that shifts may alter the relative influence of rival subcultures (important, for example, for understanding the rapid transformation in the balance of cultural biases in Germany following World War II), fundamental changes in cultural commitments are infrequent. The adherents of a subculture are more likely to change institutional arrangements to support their biases than to do the converse (p. 95).

Change is thus conceptualized by culture theorists as "inherent in the different competencies and biases of different cultures" (p. 99). Nowhere, however, is there a good psychological explanation for why people select a particular bias in the first instance or what the intensity of their attachment to that bias is.[9] Rather, preferences are said to derive from choosing a particular way of relating with others. The analyst determines the distribution in society among preference orientations by identifying patterns of social interaction. The strength of the approach therefore is in its division of individuals into subcultural types, which are then used to explain preferences, while its weakness is the lack of a psychological mechanism to explain why particular preference orientations were chosen to begin with. A more complete explanation can be found only by drawing upon other general theories that divide people into cultural types.[10]

Despite the feeble psychological dimension of culture theory, experts are able, through immersion in community life, to identify at the macrolevel the preference orientations associated with (s) and (sa), assess their relative strength, and determine qualitatively the relative weighting of a dominant (s) and a "counterhegemonic" (sa). Changes in the relative strength of (s) and (sa) are revealed by shifts in their salience. While the theory claims more than it delivers, it minimizes the ad hocism and problems of verification that are the weaknesses of the hermeneutic approach. It directs research toward the discovery and relative weighting of preferences that are theoretically postulated. By so

[9] For an attempt to incorporate psychological variables, see Karl Dake, "Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 22, no. 1 (1991).

[10] Alan Page Fiske, *Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations* (New York: Free Press, 1991).

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doing it clarifies the dilemmas that are embedded within any overall cultural configuration and theoretically accounts for change. Understanding the macropolitical changes that occur as a consequence of preference alterations at the microlevel is as yet poorly conceptualized, however.

Political Culture in the Psychological Tradition

The Social Character Approach

An alternative interpretive approach traces its roots to national character studies and to anthropological studies in culture and personality.[11] Personality variables, drawn frequently but not invariably from Freudian formulations, are utilized as the major means for typing significant value orientations. Thus, societies are described in terms of the unique ways that their members view authority relations, are committed to particular religious/ideological views, fear social disorder, are excessively dependent, and so forth. Case-study analysis of social norms and behavior reveals contextually how the tensions that are associated with particular orientations are conceptualized and resolved. The approach thus supplements contemporary efforts to unravel why regimes make the transition to (or from) democracy and why populations suddenly explode into revolutionary activity.

It is false, immoral, and dangerous to believe in the universality of Western culture, argues Samuel P. Huntington in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (p. 310). This central thesis meshes with his primary theme "that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post–Cold War world" (p. 20). According to Huntington, there are currently seven or eight major civilizations. By studying the interactions among them, he believes, researchers can produce a simple map for understanding the international politics of the late twentieth century.

For Huntington the "central elements of any culture or civilization are language and religion" (p. 59), with language second only to religion

[11] See, as examples, Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967); Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996); Alex Inkeles, *Exploring Individual Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Thomas A. Metzger, *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Lucian W. Pye, *The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); and Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 1996).

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as a defining feature (p. 70). The relationship of religion to culture is asserted repeatedly (pp. 42, 47, 254), although the connection is never proved and subtle nuances are entirely dispensed with. Thus, Western Christianity confronts Greek Orthodoxy, Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, as well as curious hybrids—the civilizations of Japan, Latin America, and Africa. So complete at times is the identity drawn between religion and culture that the very term culture often seems superfluous.

Huntington has an exceptionally gloomy view of the world. Within the United States he sees fundamental conflict between the multiculturalists and the defenders of Western civilization (p. 307). Outside the United States, according to Huntington, the power of non-Western civilizations is increasing while that of the West is declining. He contends that the ability of the West to impose its ideas about human rights and democracy is fading, although the evidence on this point is certainly controversial. The most troubling aspect of Huntington's worldview is the psychology that he imputes to the members of what are presumably irreconcilable civilizations. Conflict, he says, is ubiquitous, for "it is human to hate. For self-definition and motivation people need enemies: competitors in business, rivals in achievement, opponents in politics. They naturally distrust and see as threats those who are different and have the capability to harm them" (p. 130). Thus he concludes that if Chinese power is expanding and that of India is growing then "conflict seems highly probable" (p. 244).

Nothing appears as menacing for the West, however, as the looming confrontation with the Islamic world. In the 1990s nine of twelve intercivilizational wars (as of the time of writing) were between Muslims and non-Muslims, a fact that presumably bodes ill for any peaceful accommodation among civilizations. This, unfortunately, is not the worst of it, in Huntington's view: there is now a Confucian-Islamic connection that threatens ultimately to sweep the West to its doom.

Much of this account borders on one-sided conjecture. No one would dispute the often thorny relations between the United States and China or the difficulties that Muslims and non-Muslims alike have faced with Islamic fundamentalists. Yet as Huntington's critics have pointed out, he ignores the huge differences among peoples within his civilizations and the fact that to greater or lesser degrees all societies are experiencing similar developmental pressures. Huntington, however, believes that there is little or no evidence to support the idea of significant convergence in values and beliefs among the world's populations (p. 59)—this despite the fact that a walk down a major street in any

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world city reveals that in the conflict between "Jihad and McWorld" it is by no means clear that Jihad is winning.[12]

Frightened and angry people populate Huntington's civilizations. They are referred to en masse as Chinese, Muslims, and so on, and their preferences are similarly imposed upon them. Huntington knows there are significant internal differences, but his definition of culture as derived basically from religion and language allows little room for nuanced interpretation or for understanding cultural change, as the latter would necessarily be tied to the dynamics of linguistic and religious change. Indeed, given his focus on conflict and his perception of the sinister nature of religious fundamentalism, there is little possibility for any significant cultural change that would ameliorate the clash of civilizations.

This approach links the anthropological and psychological approaches but shifts its emphasis from symbolic interpretation and the analysis of discourse to the psychology of learned behavior. Populations are said to possess modal and enduring personality characteristics (that is, psychological constraints) that are imparted from one generation to the next via political socialization. Individuals enter political life as members of families, clans, religious groups, ethnic blocs, and so on. In some formulations group patterns with deep historical roots are said to uniquely mold values and behavior, as seen, for example, in the persistence of civic virtues in northern Italy.[13] Specifying group membership and loyalties is thus critical for explaining the prevalence of democratic values, religious affiliations, ethnic identifications, and so forth. The approach carefully delineates the reasons for the satisfaction derived from preferences in terms of a prevailing pattern of constraints (s) but is less successful in providing a psychological explanation for the emergence of alternative preferences (sa). As a consequence, (R) is largely inferred. Cultural ambiguity and conflict are invariably explained descriptively from analysis of group behavior. Given the methodological emphasis on insightful interpretation, empirical comparisons of different societies are virtually impossible.

THE SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH

In this approach values and beliefs are ascertained from survey data that have been subjected to various forms of statistical manipulation.[14]

[12] Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Random House, 1995).

[13] Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[14] See, as examples, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980); Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Prince-

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These analyses, grounded in psychological theories of social learning, consider socialization in particular and the influence of social life in general to be critical determinants of values and behavior. The best of these studies have focused on societies where systematic survey research is possible. To simplify somewhat, the psychological model that informs these analyses is one in which the values and beliefs of a populace are assumed to reflect the influences of socialization to a significant degree. It is thus the environment—social and physical—that conditions individual responses. Given the importance of socialization, it is necessary to conduct longitudinal studies to demonstrate how intergenerational differences in preferences correlate with changes in external influences. Cross-national surveys of values and beliefs are based on the same assumption of differences among societies in their historical and contemporary conditions. By identifying long-term transformations in preference patterns, this approach fits well with studies that seek to make sense of how technological changes, increasing educational levels, and so forth affect social and political life.

Wildavsky puzzled over the rise of egalitarianism in the United States. Inglehart provides a stunning explanation in *Modernization and Postmodernization*. He argues that economic development, cultural change, and political change go together in predictable ways to create fundamental alterations in value systems and basic changes in the hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations that have been essential for the creation of modern society. For Inglehart culture is "the subjective component of a society's equipment for coping with its environment" (p. 55). The interaction between culture and environment may yield profound changes in the way that people view the world. His book is the latest of his works to show how a shift from modernization to postmodernization has been mirrored by an increase in postmaterialist values.

A shift in priorities from materialist to postmaterialist values involves the steady diminution of those values that played a key role in industrialization, such as economic achievement and rationality, and an increasing emphasis on self-expression and quality of life. Change is driven by rising feelings of security. While the shift is not linear, and while the materialist-postmaterialist dimension is only one along which change is measured, the tendency is clear. As Inglehart says: "The linkage between economic growth rates and the percentage of values and

ton University Press, 1989); Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, *The American Ethos* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Harry C. Triandis, "The Psychological Measurement of Cultural Syndromes," *American Psychologist* 51, no. 4 (1996); and Sidney Verba et al., *Elites and the Idea of Equality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

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norms shifting in the Postmodern direction is significant at the .01 level" (p. 321). While a number of different values are involved, it is movement from traditional authority to secular rational authority and from survival values to well-being values that is most significant. Indeed, these two dimensions alone account for 51 percent of cross-national variation (p. 82).

Inglehart's findings are based on tests of two hypotheses: (1) a socialization (that is, social learning) hypothesis that states that change will not occur quickly since the basic values that individuals hold reflect the conditions that existed in their preadult years and (2) a scarcity hypothesis that states that because people value what is in short supply, increasing prosperity will bring a concomitant, predictable shift from materialist to postmaterialist values. Because experiencing prosperity is a formative influence, the emergence in a society of postmaterialist values will occur with generational change; its increasing salience can be measured by analyzing different birth cohorts over time. Inglehart has done this on a massive scale beginning nearly three decades ago with samples from a small number of Western European countries and expanding in this work to sixty thousand respondents from forty-three countries representing 70 percent of the world's population and with per capita incomes ranging from $300 to $30,000.

One of Inglehart's most provocative findings mirrors Huntington's identification of civilizations but with vastly different implications. The data reveal that forty of the forty-three societies fall into coherent, historically meaningful clusters on the most significant dimensions such that it is possible to identify a Northern European zone, a Confucian zone, a Latin American zone, and so on. Differences reflect levels of economic development, with the values of richer countries varying systematically from those of poorer countries. Of even greater importance, the ratio of postmaterialists to materialists rises over time in virtually every case. Indeed, advanced industrial societies with widely varying cultural traditions and different economic levels are shown to be experiencing similar changes in political, economic, religious, sexual, and gender norms (p. 49).

Inglehart has offered a new take on modernization theory—one that is not linear, deterministic, or tied to Westernization or democratic theory. He avoids impressionistic historical evidence and relies instead on tightly constructed surveys for data that reveal widespread shifts in preference orientations and societal changes in the configuration of preferences. Not only do younger birth cohorts have a greater preponderance of postmaterialists than older ones, but there is also a notable transformation in in-

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stitutional forms. Economic development leads to structural changes (for example, urbanization and mass education) and to attitudinal changes as well (for example, greater distrust and skepticism regarding hierarchical institutions). In virtually all societies where postmaterialism is significantly in evidence, political action that challenges elites increases to the point where a strong positive correlation is found between the postmodernization dimension and democracy (p. 104).

The assumptions of the social learning approach are clear. The use of statistical controls permits replicability and comparison on dimensions independent of expert interpretation. Causation is additive and not conjunctural; estimations can be made of the separate contribution of each independent variable allowing probabilistic statements about a variable's net effect in a wide variety of settings. Alongside these strengths, however, are some significant weaknesses. Surveys are expensive and time-consuming and often difficult to conduct in the very societies where it would be desirable to understand the political culture, namely, societies in crisis (for example, where revolutions are in progress) and countries with closed, authoritarian regimes.

The most difficult problem relates to the conception of culture. In Inglehart's work as the satisfaction from espousing a postmaterialist orientation grows (s), and as the satisfaction from holding a materialist orientation decreases (sa), the rate (R) of expressing postmaterialist preferences increases. As postmaterialism becomes a significant orientation, support for democratic institutions and democratic norms increases. The feedback loop is thus closed; normative prescriptions and preference orientations are reciprocally related. However, the postmodernization cultural dimension needs to be more fully elaborated and greater care needs to be given to explaining the definition of culture as a "subjective component" (p. 55). For instance, interpersonal trust and subjective well-being are noted as the two most prominent cultural values that sustain democratic institutions (pp. 194, 197), although both are more properly individual psychological dispositions than they are normative injunctions. As a consequence, the causal significance of culture in the social learning hypothesis, independent of feedback, is unclear.

THE COGNITIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH

The study of political culture has recently incorporated Piagetian theory in its theoretical design.[15] These analyses differ from social charac-

[15] See, as examples, Dan Candee, "Ego Developmental Aspects of New Left Ideology," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 30, no. 5 (1974); Stephen Chilton, *Defining Political Development* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988); Nicholas Emler, Stanley Renwick, and Bernadette Malone,

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ter studies in the way they conceptualize value orientations. They also differ from studies utilizing survey research in the reduced importance they impute to social influences, unmediated by individual psychological variables, as determinants of values and beliefs. In this perspective individual and social life are conceived as developmentally and reciprocally organized, if not necessarily synchronous. There is a continuous interaction between individual- and social-level constructions of meaning, between the ways that individuals think and the norms of the political culture. Age-related changes in the organization of thinking occur at the individual level, and these lead to increasingly abstract and complex conceptions about obedience, obligations, relations with authority, reciprocity, and benevolence. And at the social level increasingly complex normative prescriptions evolve to minimize the transaction costs involved with maintaining status hierarchies and to provide a moral underpinning for social solidarity. Because reasoning about social issues inevitably involves the invocation of moral criteria, it is moral reasoning that especially influences the norms of the political culture. The consequence is a specification of preference constraint that is dependent on both an individual's stage of moral development and the nature of normative prescriptions.

Michael Gross in *Ethics and Activism* confronts a paradox: what we want in a democratic political culture are individuals with considered moral judgment who act judiciously and who resolve disputes in a peaceful, institutionalized manner, but what we get may be something quite different. For as Gross points out, activism to foster a democratic political culture may involve groups whose incentive structures are highly parochial and whose members are motivated by materialistic goals.

Gross begins by asking what best anchors democratic integrity in ethical activism. Is it strong political morality, exemplified in the works of Locke, Mill, Rawls, and Habermas? Or is it weak political morality, as found in the work of Madison. Strong political morality states that collective action to remedy injustice requires that citizens have both moral insight and the cognitive capacity to recognize injustice. In possession of these qualities, they will feel an obligation to become active defenders of democratic norms. Gross concludes, however, that moral

"The Relationship between Moral Reasoning and Political Orientation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45, no. 5 (1983); Shawn W. Rosenberg, *Reason, Ideology and Politics* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1988); Shawn W. Rosenberg, Dana Ward, and Stephen Chilton, *Political Reasoning and Cognition; A Piagetian View* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988); John R. Snarey, "Cross-Cultural Universality of Social-Moral Development: A Critical Review of Kohlbergian Research," *Psychological Bulletin* 97, no. 2 (1985); and Richard W. Wilson, *Compliance Ideologies: Rethinking Political Culture* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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behavior and moral-political behavior are two different things. As a consequence, it is weak political morality, with its emphasis on benign regulation and nonviolent participation, that best anchors democratic integrity by stressing limited social altruism and a relatively narrow concern for the common good.

Gross supports this conclusion with three case studies backed by extensive empirical evidence. The first of these involves groups that rescued Jews during the Second World War. He found that among those sheltering Jews moral competence did have an effect on rescue activity but only when joined with strong parochial motivations or weak postconventional moral preferences (p. 149). In his second case, an analysis of pro-life and pro-choice abortion activists, he found that normative incentives had a weak effect on activism while material and solidarity incentives had a strong effect (p. 173). He thus concluded that "without exception, no measure of moral development has any significant effect on any form of activism" (p. 179). In his last case study, of peace activism in Israel, he came to conclusions that were similar to those drawn in the abortion study. What emerges from analysis of the cases, therefore, is a paradox: the morally competent are politically incompetent. Successful collective action rests on parochial norms that are inherent in small and interdependent communities.

Specifically Gross found that "moral outrage does not mesh well with effective political action" (p. 115) in part because moral judgment is not always a necessary condition for moral-political action. The most effective moral motivations, in fact, are anchored in narrow perceptions of altruism, moral duty, and fairness. The most successful collective action is cultivated in small groups that have well-developed social and organizational infrastructures with intense parochial affiliations. In such groups conventional moral reasoners, who in any case are always a majority in societies and whose moral outlooks stress the correctness of group norms, are especially well integrated cognitively. Gross believes the chief obstacle to successful activism is not insufficient moral energy but free-rider problems. As a consequence, organizational incentives that tap rational, self-interested concerns within the context of tight social networks are required to overcome collective action problems. The successful pursuit of moral claims occurs when effective organization is linked to rational and solidarity incentives.

Do these conclusions mean that morality has no place? Not at all. Action proceeds from a perception that moral interests are threatened. The material and solidarity benefits that are crucial for collective action

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would be useless without a clearly delineated moral community. Normative incentives, moreover, are the strongest reason for joining a group, although it is personal identity norms (such as guilt and self-interest) that actually sustain activism. Interestingly, because moral incentives are amenable to a utilitarian calculus (solidarity and material benefits), both cognitive psychology and rational choice offer insights into understanding political morality and behavior. Cognitive epistemology sets forth the stages of moral development that range from self-interest to a Kantian perspective; it explains why people cleave to particular moral orientations. Collective action and incentive theory explain how individuals utilize their convictions in politics. "Ultimately," says Gross, "the two psychological theories can be combined into a single, more predictive model to investigate ethics and political activism" (p. 65).

The cognitive epistemological approach provides a coherent explanation of individual-level reasoning and its link to preference formation, but it is theoretically complex and highly abstract, positing that it is the moral development of individuals that changes the relationship between (s) and (sa). At a given point in the maturation process an individual reasons in a certain manner. Only with maturation does there develop a new pattern of reasoning (sa) that reduces the probability of choices in terms of a developmentally lower stage of reasoning (s). The relationship of (s) to (sa) thus shifts, seriatim, as new and more complex structures of reasoning evolve. However, given that people are always at different stages of development, determining how and in what way preferences affect the norms of political cultures is still a matter of conjecture. Michael Gross has provided an intriguing answer to this problem.

Preferences and Political Culture

It is surprising that political culture theorists have had such difficulty confronting the question of preference formation. The answer, I believe, lies in a tendency to conflate political culture and preferences—to assume, on the one hand, that an explanation of political culture reveals the preferences of those who live within that culture or, on the other hand, that an explanation of preferences and preference formation is sufficient to reveal the political culture. We should ask, therefore, what a political culture is and what its relationship is to preference formation. Any understanding of political culture must first ascertain what the function of political culture is within a social system. Such an ex-

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planation necessarily takes us beyond the description of a political culture as a distribution of values or as meanings embedded in myths, symbols, and rituals.

In the most general sense political cultures are socially constructed normative systems that are the product of both social (for example, rules that coordinate role relationships within organizations) and psychological (for example, the preferences of individuals) influences but are not reducible to either. They have prescriptive qualities that stipulate not only desired ends but also appropriate ways to achieve those ends. The norms are not coterminous with legal codes, although they often overlap. They are manifested in a variety of ways, including symbolic representations and the content of hegemonic discourse, especially of socialization. Preferences, by contrast, are ends desired by individuals. They vary widely depending on differences in individual experience and psychology. The relationship between the two levels is interactive in the sense that individual preferences continuously affect the normative order while the norms themselves are one of the influences that shape preferences. They are not, however, identical and, as stated previously, neither is reducible to the other. A political culture is not simply the sum of individual preferences, nor do preferences, especially those of any given individual, necessarily correspond with normative prescriptions. Indeed, the mismatch is at times quite glaring. Yet it is essential to understand the goals that are embodied in both individual preferences and normative prescriptions, for it is the dynamic relationship between the two that underwrites the stability or instability of political systems.

Each of the political culture approaches has strengths and weaknesses with regard to the relationship between political culture and preference orientations. In the *hermeneutic approach*, for example, careful fieldwork involving immersion in local networks reveals the myths, symbols, and rituals that convey the meaning and intensity of the norms that underwrite social solidarity. There is a careful and nuanced description of sets of interrelated normative prescriptions. The researcher delineates which symbols undergird authority, how these symbols came into being, and how their salience is made known through a variety of rituals. The analysis is rich in detail but is concomitantly highly descriptive. Why people choose to believe in certain symbols or are swayed by particular rituals is generally inferred from analysis of social action and discourse. In explaining change the presence of opposing preference orientations is usually adduced by observation of an alternative, or counterhegemonic, discourse that references an "unoffi-

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cial" set of myths, symbols, and rituals. Interpretive analysis of behavior is privileged and surveys and/or psychological interviews tend to be avoided.

Kertzer makes the case succinctly when he speaks of political change as encapsulated in a narrative about the party and its history. Occhetto, the leader of the Italian Communist Party, proposed "that the narrative itself change and, with it, the identity and history of those who based their personal narratives on it" (p. 155). Narrative in this sense is a proxy for preference orientations. These dispositions are then said to be connected to symbolic associations and forged through ritual, which fosters "heightened emotional states" that link the cognitive aspects of political allegiance and political activism "both with particular social bonds and with a particular world view" (p. 127). Notwithstanding the intent of this formulation, the cognitive aspect is largely asserted. Kubik, in his excellent study of legitimacy in Poland, states clearly where the focus of analysis lies: "The introduction of sociological surveys, with their specific methodology and results, would destroy the thematic, theoretical, and methodological unity of the book, whose primary concern is with *the interpretation of symbolic behavior*."[16]

Culture theorists adhere to the opposite extreme. In their concern to avoid ad hoc description, they embrace a theoretical model in which only a stipulated number of ideal-type preference orientations can exist. This conception is necessarily coercive and arbitrary, as macropolitical culture (the level familiar to most people) virtually drops from sight. Instead, political culture is interpreted as the preference orientations of individuals.

A strength of culture theory is its parsimony in mandating the recognition of five (no more and no less) different preference orientations. It requires, as well, an understanding of interactions among people with different preferences. The preferences themselves, however, are said to be derived from conscious choices that individuals make regarding an appropriate lifestyle. This ignores important socialization influences and unconscious motivations (for example, aggressive impulses) that may also affect preference orientations.

Culture theory incorporates an explanation for why an individual's preference orientation may shift—because of dissonance caused by an accumulated mismatch between the promise and the performance of an individual's chosen lifestyle. However, because political culture is conceived of as microculture, that is, the preferences of individuals, there

[16] Kubik (fn. 5), 10, emphasis in original.

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has been less exploration of dominant configurations at the macrolevel. A general typology of such distributions for macropolitical cultures has not been attempted. (A start has been made, however, for the United States, which is said to have two dominant orientations, egalitarianism and individualism, and for Britain, where the dominant orientations are said to be hierarchalism and egalitarianism). The relationship between micropolitical culture (the preferences) and macropolitical culture is thus poorly articulated. There is no convincing explanation of how dominant configurations at the macrolevel influence the choices of individuals. The problem of feigned compliance, where people express particular preferences in order to avoid punishment, is also unexplored.

The *social character approach* recognizes the broad differences that exist among political cultures, employing criteria such as language or religion to assess significant differences from society to society. Although this approach is ideally suited for generalizations about large-scale differences among political cultures, these sweeping descriptions impose a uniformity on society's members that does not exist. The consequence is that political cultures are reduced to little more than a description of dominant cultural themes.

Preferences in the social character approach are presented as group preferences, derived from a shared socialization experience, with the consequence that they are virtually synonymous with cultural norms. The dynamic interaction between political-cultural norms and individual preferences is elided. Indeed, they merge. As Richard Solomon put it regarding the Chinese: "The notion of a dependency social orientation as the modal personality configuration . . . establishes conceptual linkages between the system of personality and the larger cultural tradition."[17] That there may be a significant number of people within the group who hold alternative preference orientations is often not acknowledged, nor does analysis of political transformation generally proceed by reference to the dynamic interaction among people who hold different preference orientations.

The *social learning approach* provides an exhaustively detailed account of dominant and emergent preference orientations within societies. Based on an assumption of shifts in socialization practices related to changes in variables at the social level (for example, increasing affluence), the approach specifies the relative salience of modal preference orientations at any given point in time. However, in Inglehart's work

[17] Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), 5.

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the approach places preferences in a dependent relationship to cultural, political, and economic variables. Two dimensions, survival/well-being and traditional authority/secular rational, define a field; differences among societies in their materialist-postmaterialist value orientations are mapped on this field according to their position relative to the pole values of the two dimensions. Only the values associated with one dimension (traditional authority/secular rational authority), however, could be construed as embodying political-cultural norms, and that dimension has meaning as an explanatory variable only in conjunction with economic and social variables. Hence, the cultural merges with the social/economic and is not treated as having independent validity.

If culture entails normative prescriptions that result from the interaction of sociological and psychological variables, but is not reducible to either, then Inglehart needs to focus more attention on culture per se if he truly wishes to retain it as an independent variable. Otherwise, culture is not clearly distinguished from the value orientations (materialism and postmaterialism) that are presumed to be the product of cultural (and economic and political) influences. As his work clearly reveals, the weight of the socialization hypothesis falls instead largely on political and economic variables.

The *cognitive epistemological approach* sees societies as composed of people who reason differently depending on their stage of development. Societies thus always contain individuals with different preference orientations. As a consequence, the normative component of moral and ethical norms, the political culture, is subject to continuous reassessment. The approach has been criticized for its conception of change (although without reference to the theory itself).[18] It does provide an explanation for transformations in political cultures, in part as a consequence of the emergence of new modal preference orientations that are infused with developmentally higher levels of moral reasoning.

In this approach political cultures and preference orientations are distinct areas of analysis. The dynamic forces that foster changes at both levels are explained by reference to Piagetian theory. The resolution of "dilemmatic concerns" is a major conceptual device for understanding why individual preference orientations change and why there are shifts in the moral and ethical norms of political cultures.[19] Such concerns often address the functional requirement of political cultures both to legitimize status inequalities and to underwrite social solidarity.

[18] David D. Laitin, "The Civic Culture at Thirty," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 1 (1995).

[19] Michael Billig et al., *Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking* (London: Sage Publications, 1988), 18, 25.

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But a significant body of empirical data is still lacking. Thus more clearly needs to be done to clarify (and verify) the linkage between the two levels of analysis.

There is, then, a general failure of most approaches to recognize the dynamic interaction between political culture and preferences. Serious implications flow from this: a theory of political culture that slights preferences risks being little more than a description of cultural norms; a theory that slights the normative dimension in favor of an analysis of preferences risks being no more than a typology of individual values. A fully formed theory, therefore, must take account of the fact that political cultures are not simply the product of preferences and that preferences are not simply a reflection of the political culture. They are, rather, inextricably interdependent in a manner that requires theoretical explanation at both levels and of the linkage between them.

Linkage

Linking the norms of a political culture with preference orientations is the most difficult theoretical task faced by political culture theorists. As linkage implies a reciprocal relationship, a theory of linkage must stipulate what changes at either the cultural or the personality level will stimulate change at the other level and what mechanisms foster interaction. It must explain how preferences act upon culture and, conversely, how normative prescriptions affect individual choices. Thus, for example, if massive and rapid technological change alters the moral justifications that legitimize status, then prevailing normative prescriptions, if unchanged, will become less effective as coordinators of social behavior and as an influence on preference formation. If the introduction of novel ideas alters individual preferences, then normative prescriptions, if unchanged, may become incongruent with the moral preferences of an increasing number of people. Changes in meanings at either level are thus interactive; they are related to the mixing of people from different cultures, the invention or diffusion of new relationship patterns, changes in social complexity, technological or environmental changes, the introduction of new ideas, and the capacity of individuals to assess and compare moral alternatives.[20]

Linkage thus requires a correspondence of meanings; normative prescriptions must be comprehensible (if not universally legitimate) to the

[20] Alan Page Fiske and Philip E. Tetlock, "Taboo Trade-offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice," *Political Psychology* 18, no. 2 (1997), 284.

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members of society, while individual preferences must resonate with selected aspects of normative prescriptions. In addition, there must be some way to transmit meanings between levels. I suggest that transmission has two aspects: (1) communications about political-cultural norms to the members of society (for example, socialization, ideological campaigns, party rallies, and legal decisions) and (2) communications among individuals that evaluate political cultural norms (for example, moral discourse, activism, dissident literature, and voting). Evaluating linkage for degrees of congruence in meanings reveals important information about the stability of political systems and clues about which groups are central or marginal in the political process.

The question of correspondence of meaning, however, is thorny given the widely different assumptions and methodologies employed in the various approaches. I contend, therefore, that the normative prescriptions of political cultures must be viewed in terms of how public morality is addressed—how right and wrong are stipulated in social life, who gets what kind of reward and in what amount, how particular property rights regimes are legitimized, and so on. Given this feature of political cultures, it follows that the most fundamental axis around which communications of meaning revolve is moral in nature, linking in some fashion the ethical standards embodied in normative prescriptions with the moral sentiments of individuals.

How then might theorizing about moral linkage enrich studies of political culture? Four avenues for future research will be noted. All emphasize morality but do so in different ways. The first refines the concept of preference formation to include an explicit moral dimension. The next two focus on linkage itself. The last presents a startling new vision of culture with linkage defined in biological terms. Each requires further elaboration and testing and ultimately greater scrutiny in the marketplace of ideas.

First, while many works on political culture use a combination of approaches[21]—placing variable emphasis on surveys, historical analysis (that is, path dependency), and understanding the themes embedded in myths and rituals—they rarely, if ever, attempt to evaluate the merits of the approaches or develop theory that links preferences and political culture. An effort in this regard has obvious value. For example, it is clear that the norms of cultures are learned and must be widely shared for social viability. At the macrolevel shared values, ascertained in the social learning approach through surveys, are the general wiring dia-

[21] Putnam (fn. 13).

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gram that knits the members of society together. Because the process of uncovering these values is subject to statistical controls, the determination of patterns is less subject to error than when they are decoded by expert identification. Survey research by itself, however, is insufficient for understanding changes in cultural norms. Longitudinal studies to ascertain change, based on the assumption of modifications in the learning environment, say nothing about why in fact people change their values and beliefs.

To understand the dynamic of change it is necessary to determine the relative strength of the social relationship patterns that people choose to be identified with, the moral bases for these choices, and the way that these choices relate to the moral quality of political-cultural norms. This takes analysis into the realms of culture theory and cognitive epistemology. Culture theory posits that change occurs because individuals experience a cumulative disjunction between values and opportunities and hence shift their choice of social relationship pattern, leading ultimately to differences at the macrolevel in the relative strength of the patterns. Cognitive epistemological theory, however, posits that individuals develop morally with age, and thus as they mature apply different standards of evaluation to cultural rules. As individuals change, they will choose social relationship patterns that more closely accord with their changed moral competencies. Adding this explanation of preference change to culture theory's notion of "surprise" thus strengthens the underpinning of interpretations of the changes that can occur in preference orientations. Overall shifts in the relative salience of different preference orientations will then provide clues for reciprocal changes in normative prescriptions.

A second avenue for exploration focuses on understanding the mechanisms that link how individuals comprehend moral norms and how these normative injunctions are formed and made known. One place to start is by reference to North's definition of institutions (the major constraints on social relations) as "a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals."[22] On the basis of this formulation, political culture can be conceptualized as the "moral and ethical behavioral norms" that undergird rules (noted preeminently in the legal culture) and that stipulate the ways that rules are enforced (that is, as "compliance ideolo-

[22] Douglass C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 201–2.

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gies").[23] Linkage is thus the interactive relationship between the moral prescriptions of the political culture and the moral preferences of individuals. Specifically, there is a reciprocal relationship (that is, a correspondence of meaning) between moral constructions of meaning at the political-cultural level regarding rights and duties and moral constructions of meaning at the individual level regarding expectations and social obligations.

In this conception the moral rules that undergird political-cultural norms are expressed in terms of culturally specific definitions of rights and obligations. Political cultures, both contemporaneously and historically, reflect different ways that rights and obligations are defined and honored. These result in different definitions of deviance, different ways that political legitimacy is secured, differences in who may participate in the political process, different limitations on the exercise of power, differences in the type and extent of the rewards that elites may legitimately claim, and variations in likely trajectories of change. Although the differences among societies may be large, the focus on rights and obligations makes it possible to compare different political cultures.

At the individual level an examination of moral discourse (how and when people talk to each other about rights and obligations) aids in understanding why status rules change (as, for instance, changes in the role of women that have occurred in many societies over the past hundred years). Changes such as this occur in response to a variety of influences (such as technological change, famine, and defeat in war) but always involve a moral questioning of prevailing normative standards.[24] The result is by no means always the swift alteration of cultural rules, for powerful countervailing forces may block the development and diffusion of more inclusive moral standards. What does occur is a debate, often fraught with danger, about the possibilities inherent in a transformed political culture.

A third promising avenue for further research is exemplified in the work of Michael Gross. Gross grounds preference orientations in two theoretical frameworks, moral development theory, and rational choice theory.[25] He argues that the development and maintenance of a demo-

[23] Wilson (fn. 15).

[24] Richard W. Wilson, "American Political Culture in Comparative Perspective," *Political Psychology* 18, no. 2 (1997).

[25] Another work that utilizes a rational choice perspective although without specific reference to political culture or moral prefeences is James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 4 (1996).

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cratic political culture cannot be based on moral preferences alone. Rather, individuals make rational calculations in small group contexts that further the group's ability to pursue moral objectives. This formulation locates political culture within a complex sociological field that includes the organizations within which people strive for the realization of particular goals. Preferences and political cultures do not interact directly but through intermediate groupings whose internal structures are characterized by solidarity pressures, face-to-face relations, and immediate hierarchical concerns. These are the contexts within which people actually live and where, to get along, they make prudential calculations as well as moral judgments. It is an arena where preferences have an immediacy and a relevance that is lacking when political culture is conceptualized only at the societal level. The consequence is an enriched understanding of the linkage between individual preferences and political cultures. A clear theoretical advantage is that rational choice is dealt with on its own terms (as an aspect of incentive theory and organizational theory), rather than being reconceptualized as utility calculations bounded by moral preferences.

Finally, work in evolutionary psychology (or, more broadly, universal Darwinism) places cultural studies in the controversial framework of sociobiology. Specifically, it is suggested that biological evolution, rooted in the way that genes are copied and spread, has an analogue at the cultural level in memes. These are ideas, beliefs, instructional codes, and norms that are passed from person to person by a process of imitation. Organic evolution and cultural evolution are said to resemble each other in the sense that both genes and memes are replicators that obey the general principles of evolutionary theory, carrying out the crucial evolutionary tasks of mutation, replication, and selection. Both are associated with the concept of reciprocal altruism, which functions (albeit weakly) as a preference orientation. At the genetic level altruism favors animals who reciprocate friendship (thus allowing their genes to be copied at a rate greater than for those who do not reciprocate); at the level of memes altruism is rooted in moral sentiments and ideas of justice.

To date no theory of political culture has been elaborated, although game theory has modeled memetic strategies favoring cooperation that are exceptionally robust (for example, Tit-for-Tat). What is now needed is a tighter specification of the relationship of altruism to preferences, of how other preference orientations affect altruism, of memes as replicators of altruistic norms, and of the link between them. Rapid advances in the life sciences in understanding the genetic bases of be-

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havior suggest that such theories will not be long in coming to the social sciences, almost certainly within the next decade.[26]

Conclusion

A theory of political culture must do four things. It must specify the functional role of political culture and define the concept in a way that maintains an analytical distinction between social and psychological variables. It must ground preference formation in a theory of motivation that specifies how and why people make choices that affect political life. It must specify the nature of the interaction between the normative level and the level of preference formation and show how particular interconnections (for example, socialization, moral discourse, and activism) link the two levels and how and why behavior or discourse generated at one level has an affect on the other. Finally, it must specify a sociological context in which hypotheses can be fruitfully tested.

The debate about political culture is an old one, yet at the same time it is in its infancy. New conceptualizations are challenging received wisdom in ways that enrich the culturalist-rationalist dichotomy set forth by Eckstein a decade ago.[27] The field is now poised to move beyond the sterile description of effects to an understanding of basic causes. From the vigorous debate now taking place there has arisen the possibility of a new and invigorated theory of political culture.

[26] See, as examples, Richard D. Alexander, *The Biology of Moral Systems* (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1987); Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Comides, and John Tooby, eds., *The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Susan Blackmore, *The Meme Machine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); William H. Durham, *Coevolution: Genes, Culture and Human Diversity* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991); and Robert Wright, *The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).

[27] Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (1988).

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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